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Abstract 
 Fisheries science faces a challenging combination of complexity and data 
limitation that places opposing pressures on theoretical research - which seeks to describe 
the complexity - and empirical research - which is constrained to simplicity by the 
limitations of available data.  In this volume, I present studies aiming to reconcile 
theoretical and empirical approaches to assessing the current status of fished populations 
and designing management plans in two ways: i) by using concise mechanistic theories 
rooted in measurable parameters to develop new predictive assessment tools; and ii) by 
using ecological and economic theory to develop insights whose applications are not 
data-dependent or system specific.  My research provides several important insights for 
assessment and management in fisheries: 1) Combinations of biological and 
socioeconomic conditions that eventually lead to extinction or overfishing can often be 
empirically identified decades before high harvest rates and large population declines 
occur, allowing for preventative management. 2) Though there is concern that harvest 
value, which rises as a harvested species is depleted, can allow profits to be maintained it 
is driven extinct, this threat most often also requires catch-rates to be substantially robust 
to declining abundance.  Because range contraction often buffers population densities 
against abundance declines, habitat destruction may exacerbate threats of overharvesting. 
3) Assessments based on single-species population models in multispecies fisheries can 
often provide reliable estimates of sustainable yields and harvest rates in populations with 
high vulnerability to overfishing, but often significantly overestimate sustainable yields 
and harvest rates in populations with lower vulnerability.  However, single-species 
assessment frameworks can nonetheless be used to identify conditions leading to such 
bias, and estimate bounds on its magnitude.  4) Diversifying technologies and efficiencies 
within fishing fleets often leads to fewer population collapses in both managed and 
unmanaged fisheries; and increases the positive impact management can make on fishery 
yields and profits.  The studies in this volume provide new perspectives on theoretical-
empirical synergies in fisheries research, and maximizing the information value of 
fisheries data through theoretical concision and ecological abstraction. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 Effectively managing the world’s fisheries is important to food security, 
livelihoods, and sustaining diverse and productive marine ecosystems (Worm et al. 2009; 
Costello et al. 2012; Halpern et al. 2012; Sumaila et al. 2012).  Fisheries management is 
guided by fitting models to data to assess the current health of target populations, and to 
predict the impacts of future fishing efforts or management strategies on these 
populations and their ecosystems (Hilborn & Walters 1992; Cadima et al. 2003).  
However, modeling efforts in fisheries face a challenging combination of complexity and 
data-limitation: marine ecosystems are complex (e.g. Link 2002), and oceans are difficult 
and expensive to sample (Hilborn 2011).   
 Data-limitation makes fitting complex models with many parameters difficult and 
unreliable.  Consequently, the combination of complexity and data-limitation in fisheries 
has led to a significant disconnect between advances in theory and empirical approaches 
to assessment and modeling.  For example, despite numerous recent calls for ‘ecosystem-
based fishery management’ (Pikitch et al. 2004), most fishery management organizations 
still fit data to single-species growth models to predict future population responses to 
fishing pressure, ignoring species interactions (Cadima et al. 2003; Hilborn 2011; Hilborn 
& Ovando 2014).  Approaches to assessing threats of extinction and overfishing to 
populations are often correlative or phenomenological - deducing a threat from past 
declines in abundance or from combinations of life-history traits that correlate with 
susceptibility to overfishing in other species (Dulvy 2004; Cheung et al. 2005; Mace et al. 
2008; Le Quesne & Jennings 2012; Costello et al. 2012), rather than using predictive 
models based on the ecological and socio-economic mechanisms driving overfishing.  
Theoretical models in fisheries science often use parameters or conceptualizations that 
are difficult to match with collectible data (Hilborn 2011). 
 The research I present in this volume aims to reconcile theory with empirical 
approaches to fisheries assessment, modeling, and management in two ways.  First, I use 
simple mechanistic theories rooted in commonly measured parameters to develop new 
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empirical approaches to predicting extinction and overfishing threats.  Second, I explore 
ecological and economic fisheries theory to extract practical insights for fisheries 
management, which are not data-dependent or system-specific.   
 Chapters 2 and 3 present mechanistic approaches to identifying combinations of 
biological and socioeconomic conditions that would eventually cause a harvested 
population to be driven extinct or severely depleted, before high harvest rates and 
resulting population declines occur.  Chapter 2 focuses on identifying threats to weak 
stocks and by-catch species in multispecies fisheries.  Multispecies fisheries, which catch 
multiple species simultaneously, pose severe threats (e.g. Hall et al. 2000; Lewison et al. 
2004a, 2014) because more resilient species can support profits at high effort while more 
vulnerable species are depleted (Gaines & Costello 2013). The assessment approach 
presented is built on the premise that the shared threat of fishing effort in a multispecies 
fishery links the fates of the species caught in a predictable way.  The fates of some ‘key’ 
species can be predicted as a result of their influence on economic or regulatory factors 
driving maximum effort in the fishery. The approach presented predicts threats to other 
species by measuring their average vulnerability to depletion relative to these key 
species.  In a case study of Western and Central Pacific tunas and billfish, it is shown that 
threats to 4 populations recently identified as threatened with overfishing could have been 
identified in the 1950s.  
 Chapter 3 presents an approach to identifying threats to target populations as a 
result of profits that are robust to declining abundance. Several recent studies (e.g. 
Courchamp et al. 2006; Gault et al. 2008; Collette et al. 2011; Palazy et al. 2011; 
2012a,b; Purcell et al. 2014) have provided empirical evidence that harvest prices of 
species tend to rise as their abundances decline. If prices rise faster than the costs of 
obtaining harvest, a species could be profitably harvested to extinction (Courchamp et al. 
2006).  I present an approach to empirically estimating whether current bioeconomic 
conditions would allow profitable harvesting to extinction.  The approach illustrates that 
profitable harvesting to extinction requires a combination of price flexibility in response 
to declining abundance and catch rates that are ‘hyperstable’, meaning that they decline 
more slowly than abundance (Harley et al. 2001).  Drawing on evidence from bluefin 
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tunas, caviar producing sturgeons, whales, and other valuable harvested aquatic species, 
it is argued that, even for rare and highly valued species, prices are often relatively 
inflexible, but catch rates can be highly hyperstable – in some cases even uncorrelated 
with abundance – particularly in species that aggregate (e.g. in herds or schools) 
(Mackinson et al. 1997).  Thus, more conservation and management attention to catch 
hyperstability is merited, particularly in terrestrial species, where very little attention has 
been paid to this phenomenon.  It is also argued that habitat destruction may exacerbate 
threats of overharvesting by buffering population densities against declines in abundance. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 are theoretical studies, seeking to provide practical general 
insights for fisheries management. Chapter 4 explores the idea that single-species 
assessment models in fisheries, though not explicitly considering species interactions, 
may nonetheless effectively capture the true relationship between yield and fishing effort 
for a population when fit to data.  This idea has not been widely explored, but has 
recently been challenged in predator-prey models (Abrams 2009a,b,c) and economically-
inspired ‘general equilibrium ecosystem models’ (GEEM), designed to capture effects of 
dynamic foraging behavior (Tschirhart 2012).  Understanding ecological contexts under 
which single-species assessment models can produce reliable estimates of sustainable 
harvests is important for prioritizing ecological data collection and implementation of 
ecosystem-based fishery management (Pikitch et al. 2004).  I focus on the effect of 
competitive interactions on the reliability of single-species assessment models in 
multispecies fisheries. It is likely that species caught in multispecies fisheries compete 
ecologically with one another because multispecies fishing methods tend to select species 
with similar ecological niches as a result of using bait, size-selective gear, and spatial and 
temporal targeting.  I find evidence suggesting that sustainable yields of species with high 
susceptibility to overfishing (weak stocks) will often be reliably estimated, but 
sustainable yields of species least susceptible to overfishing (strong stocks) will often be 
significantly overestimated. However, I also illustrate how single-species assessment 
frameworks can be reliably used to identify conditions under which such overestimates 
are likely to occur, as well as bounds on estimation bias.  I discuss how existing 
management solutions addressing the problem of unbalanced exploitation in multispecies 
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fisheries – the ‘weak stock problem’ (Gaines & Costello 2013) – can also reduce the 
likelihood of overestimation of sustainable strong stock yields.   
 Chapter 5 illustrates opportunities and pitfalls presented by the diversity of 
technologies, strategies and technical efficiencies in fishing fleets.  Biological diversity is 
known to play an important role in driving the productivity and stability of ecosystems, 
along with other functions (e.g. Tilman & Downing 1994; McCann 2000; Loreau et al. 
2001; Isbell et al. 2011; Reich et al. 2012).  However, despite theoretical parallels, the 
role of fleet diversity in driving the productivity, profitability, and ecological impacts of 
fisheries has received little attention.  In multispecies fisheries, it is shown that diversity 
in relative catch rates of different species, as a result of diversity in gear or 
spatial/temporal targeting for example, leads to higher yields and less overfishing in both 
well-managed and unmanaged fisheries. Diversity in technical efficiency is shown to be a 
double-edged sword – creating opportunities for higher profits in well-managed fisheries, 
but leading to greater overfishing threats in unmanaged fisheries.   
 In the concluding chapter, I discuss the information-driven tradeoff in assessment 
methods in fisheries between reach, or breadth of applicability (which correlates with 
informational simplicity), and predictive power (which correlates with mechanistic 
accuracy and detail).  I argue that this tradeoff underlies many debates between simplistic 
and holistic assessment approaches, and that the most effective assessment method is 
likely to be highly context-dependent.  Instead, more attention should be paid to 
maximizing the information value of the data that are collected.  The studies presented in 
this volume demonstrate that: i) making mechanistic theory more concise to allow for 
predictive assessments with limited data, and ii) understanding when complex realities 
can and cannot be effectively abstracted by fitting simple models to data, are potentially 
promising avenues toward this goal that deserve further attention.  iii) Interpolating 
missing data using data from similar species or fisheries (e.g. Cheung et al. 2005; 
Costello et al. 2012; Le Quesne & Jennings 2012), and iv) making use of recent advances 
in non-linear non-parametric forecasting methods (e.g. Sugihara & May 1990; Sugihara 
et al. 2012; Deyle et al. 2013), are other avenues that have shown recent promise.  Future 
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approaches to fisheries science and management combining these four avenues are likely 
to be highly successful in the face of data limitations. 
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Chapter 2 
Predicting overfishing and extinction threats in 
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Matthew G. Burgess1, Stephen Polasky1,2, David Tilman1,3 
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Abstract 
Threats to species from commercial fishing are rarely identified until species have 
suffered large population declines, by which time remedial actions can have severe 
economic consequences, such as closure of fisheries. Many of the species most 
threatened by fishing are caught in multispecies fisheries, which can remain profitable 
even as populations of some species collapse. Here we show for multispecies fisheries 
that the biological and socioeconomic conditions that would eventually cause species to 
be severely depleted or even driven extinct can be identified decades before those species 
experience high harvest rates or marked population declines. Because fishing effort 
imposes a common source of mortality on all species in a fishery, the long-term impact of 
a fishery on a species is predicted by measuring its loss rate relative to that of species that 
influence the fishery’s maximal effort. We tested our approach on eight Pacific tuna and 
billfish populations, four of which have been identified recently as in decline and 
threatened with overfishing. The severe depletion of all four populations could have been 
predicted in the 1950s, using our approach. Our results demonstrate that species 
threatened by human harvesting can be identified much earlier, providing time for 
adjustments in harvesting practices before consequences become severe and fishery 
closures or other socioeconomically disruptive interventions are required to protect 
species. 
 
Keywords: early warning; preventative management; overharvesting; mechanistic; 
assessment 
 
Author Contributions: M.G.B. designed research; M.G.B., S.P., and D.T. performed 
research; and M.G.B., S.P., and D.T. wrote the paper. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 Marine fisheries are an important global source of food and livelihoods 
(Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009; Godfray et al. 2010; Costello et al. 2012), but 
there are concerns that current fishing practices threaten some marine species with severe 
depletion or eventual extinction (Hutchings & Reynolds 2004; Beddington et al. 2007; 
Worm et al. 2009; Costello et al. 2012). Many of the largest commercial fishing methods, 
such as trawling, longlining, and seining, unavoidably catch multiple species 
simultaneously (Clark 1976; Hilborn 1985a; Boyce 1996; Hall et al. 2000; Lewison et al. 
2004a). Multispecies fisheries pose a particular threat of extinction or severe depletion 
because fishing can remain profitable as long as some valuable species remain abundant, 
even while others collapse (Clark 1976, 1985; Hilborn 1985a; Boyce 1996; Hall et al. 
2000; Lewison et al. 2004a). In contrast, in a single-species fishery profits tend to fall as 
the target population declines, thereby removing the incentive to fish before extinction 
occurs (Clark 1976). Multispecies fisheries pose a threat to two types of species or stocks 
(populations): (i) commercially valued species, called “weak stocks”, which are more 
vulnerable to overharvesting than are other commercially valuable species (Hilborn 
1985a), and (ii) by-catch species, which are caught accidentally and create little economic 
incentive to cease fishing as their populations collapse because they have little or no 
commercial value (Boyce 1996; Hall et al. 2000; Lewison et al. 2004a). 
 Failure to prevent collapse of weak stocks and by-catch species can impose 
substantial long-term environmental and economic costs. Slow-growing populations are 
most likely to collapse, but can take several decades to recover (Hutchings & Reynolds 
2004). Recovery often requires long-term fishery closures or reductions in effort, having 
substantial economic and social consequences (Hutchings & Reynolds 2004; Worm et al. 
2009). Moreover, population declines caused by one fishery can diminish yields and 
profits in other commercial or artisanal fisheries that depend on the same species (e.g., 
Whitmarsh et al. 2003). 
 Despite these costs, species threatened by fishing have rarely been identified until 
after their populations have declined substantially (Hall et al. 2000; Hutchings & 
Reynolds 2004; Lewison et al. 2004a; Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009; Costello 
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et al. 2012). Assessments of fishery impacts on species mostly focus on estimating 
current exploitation rates or past population trends (Cadima et al. 2003; Mace et al. 2008; 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 2011), which identifies 
already declining species rather than predicting future declines. Data limitations have 
made empirical prediction of future threats from fishing challenging, particularly for 
weak stocks and by-catch species.  Oceans are difficult to sample extensively, and few 
economic incentives exist to gather data on species other than the most commercially 
valued species (Hall et al. 2000; Lewison et al. 2004a). Some predictive models (e.g. 
Christen & Walters 2004) have been developed to forecast the impacts of some fisheries, 
but these are often data intensive. Some of the characteristics that make a population 
susceptible to overfishing are well known—for example, low population growth rates 
(Roberts & Hawkins 1999; Dulvy et al. 2004; Lewison et al. 2004a; Cheung et al. 2005; 
Collette et al. 2011), high value and/or low fishing costs (Clark 1976, 1985; Roberts & 
Hawkins 1999; Courchamp et al. 2006; Collette et al. 2011), and schooling behavior 
(Roberts & Hawkins 1999). Recently, some correlative approaches based on these 
characteristics have been developed for assessing likely relative threats to data-poor 
species (Dulvy et al. 2004; Cheung et al. 2005; Costello et al. 2012; Le Quesne & 
Jennings 2012). However, predicting the severity of future threats in absolute terms with 
this type of approach can be challenging. 
 Here, we present a mechanistic approach that uses readily available data to predict 
the potential of current fishing practices, if maintained, to eventually cause a population 
to be driven extinct or “overfished”, here defined as depletion below its maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) abundance (NMSY) (Worm et al. 2009). Our approach identifies 
combinations of biological and socioeconomic conditions that are likely to eventually 
lead to high mortality rates and population declines. As we show, these conditions can be 
identified long before either occurs. 
 We test the predictive power of our approach on eight tuna and billfish 
populations of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean fisheries. High-seas tuna and 
billfish have elicited recent conservation concern due to significant population declines 
and range contractions found in many species (Collette et al. 2011; Juan-Jorda et al. 
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2011; Worm & Tittensor 2011). Three of the populations in our study, bigeye tuna 
(Thunnus obesus) and both the northern and the southern striped marlin (Tetrapturus 
audax) populations, have been recently identified as experiencing overfishing—meaning 
their exploitation rates have exceeded the MSY exploitation rate (FMSY) (Langley et al. 
2006; Brodziak & Piner 2010; Harley et al. 2010; Juan-Jorda et al. 2011). A fourth, blue 
marlin (Makaira nigricans), whose overfishing status has been subject to considerable 
uncertainty (Kleiber et al. 2003), has undergone a significant population decline and 
range contraction (Kleiber et al. 2003; IUCN 2011; Worm & Tittensor 2011). We 
determine whether our approach could have predicted threats to these four populations, 
using data from as early as the 1950s, and assess the threats predicted by the latest 
available data to all populations. 
 
2.2 The Eventual Threat Index (T) 
 The central premise of our approach is that the shared threat of effort in a given 
multispecies fishery links the fates of species in a way that allows the fates of all species 
to be predicted if the fate of any one species can be predicted. The fates of some “key” 
species can be predicted based on their influence on the economic or regulatory factors 
that determine maximum fishing effort in the fishery. Other species’ fates can be 
predicted by measuring their vulnerabilities to long-term depletion by the fishery relative 
to the key species. For the purposes of our approach, we define a “species” at the 
population level and a “fishery” as a group of fishermen using a particular type of gear to 
target a particular group of species in a particular region, with roughly uniform relative 
catch rates of the species (Branch et al. 2005). 
 For each fishery, j, we measure the “vulnerability” to long-term depletion of 
species i at time t [denoted Vij(t)], using three population-specific pieces of data that are 
readily available for many fisheries: population size [N(t)] (e.g., Ricard et al. 2012), 
average catch-per-unit effort [CPUE(t)] (e.g., Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC) 2012), and maximum per-capita growth rate (r) (e.g., Myers et al. 
1999; Ricard et al. 2012): 
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€ 
Vij t( ) =
CPUEij t( )
riNi t( )
 (2.1). 
Vulnerability measures the fraction of species i’s maximum population growth rate 
[riNi(t)] lost on average to each unit of fishing effort (e.g., hooks, days fished, etc.) (Clark 
1976, 1985). Because fishing effort is shared by all species, the fishery’s relative long-
term impacts on different species can be predicted by measuring their relative 
vulnerabilities as defined in Eq. 2.1 (Fig. 2.1A). We derive the mathematical properties of 
relative vulnerabilities in a general theoretical model in SI Materials and Methods. In 
general, effort levels greater than 1/V put a species on a path to extinction, as this implies 
the total catch rate (CPUExEffort) is larger than the maximum population growth rate 
(rN). 
 If a fishery is profitable, effort increases until either profit declines to zero 
because commercially valued species become depleted (Clark 1976, 1985) or regulations 
prevent further increase because species protected by management become depleted (Fig. 
2.1B and C). Profitability or regulations thus impose an upper bound on fishing effort in 
the fishery that determines which species will likely experience a severe decline or 
extinction. 
 Except in rare cases (Clark 1973; Courchamp et al. 2006), a fishery would be 
expected to cease operation before all of its commercially valued species are driven 
extinct, due to a lack of profitability, regulatory intervention, or both (e.g., Hutchings & 
Myers 1996). Thus, there is at least one species in most fisheries whose importance to the 
fishery’s profits or regulations ensures that the fishery will close before this species is 
driven extinct. Because high profits and nonbinding limits on the exploitation of managed 
species in a fishery tend to lead to increases in effort (Clark 1976, 1985), most fisheries 
also have one or more commercially valued or managed species that are likely to be 
exploited at least at a minimum rate. Species having both of these properties are key 
species because their long-term fates are most easily predicted or bounded. We predict 
the long-term threat of current fishing practices to a given species by calculating its 
vulnerability relative to a key species in each fishery in which it is caught. 
 In a managed fishery, the most vulnerable species targeted by management is a 
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likely key species, as fishing effort is likely to increase only until this species reaches the 
minimum population size or maximum exploitation rate allowed by management (Fig. 
2.1C). In an unmanaged fishery, the species generating the most revenue is a likely key 
species, as its importance to the fishery’s profits will likely prevent it from being either 
driven extinct or underexploited (Clark 1976, 1985). In the analysis presented here, we 
identify key species in this manner. However, our approach to threat prediction is robust 
to many other approaches to identifying key species (SI Materials and Methods). For 
instance, if a key species could be profitably driven extinct due to the presence of another 
valued species that is more robust, the other valued species would become the key long 
before the first was near extinction. 
 Fish species are typically caught in multiple fisheries so to be practical the threat 
measure must capture the vulnerability to harvest of each species across all of the 
fisheries in which it is caught. For each fishery, we measure its impact on species i 
relative to that fishery’s key species at time t, using the ratio, Vij(t)/Vkey,j(t). This ratio can 
also be measured by replacing measures of CPUE in Eq. 2.1 with total catch in the 
fishery, if this is easier to measure, as effort will cancel out (Catch = CPUExEffort). We 
measure the combined threat of all fisheries to species i at time t by calculating the 
“eventual threat index”, Ti(t), 
€ 
Ti t( ) =
Vij t( )
Vkey, j t( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
Catchkey, jj t( )
Catchkey, jk t( )k∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ j
∑  (2.2). 
Ti(t) sums the Vij(t)/Vkey,j(t) ratios for all fisheries catching species i, including where 
species i is a key species, and weights the Vij(t)/Vkey,j(t) for each fishery j by the catch of 
its key species in year t (Catchkey,jj(t)) as a fraction of its key species’ total catch from all 
fisheries in year t (∑kCatchkey,jk(t)). 
 If fishing practices and relative efforts in different fisheries do not change, then 
Ti(t) becomes a constant through time, denoted Ti*, even as total effort changes (SI 
Materials and Methods).  Fishery managers commonly evaluate threats to populations by 
comparing their estimated abundances (N) and mortality rates (F, where F = Catch/N) to 
those producing MSY (NMSY and FMSY) (e.g., Kleiber et al. 2003; Langley et al. 2006; 
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Brodziak & Piner 2010; Worm et al. 2009; Harley et al. 2010; Juan-Jorda et al. 2011; 
Costello et al. 2012; Ricard et al. 2012). With the common assumption in fisheries that 
the fishing mortality rate, F at MSY for a species, FMSY, is half of its maximum growth 
rate, r (Schaefer 1954), Ti* can be shown (SI Materials and Methods) to have the useful 
property, 
€ 
Fi*
Fi,MSY
= Ti*
Fkey*
Fkey,MSY
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ (2.3a), 
where Fi* is species i’s long-term fishing mortality rate, and  is a weighted 
average of the long-term fishing mortality rates of the key species of fisheries catching 
species i. Thus, Ti(t) predicts the long-term mortality rate (F) that current fishing 
practices at time t would eventually impose on species i relative to the key species of the 
fisheries in which it is caught, were these fishing practices to continue indefinitely (Fig. 
2.1D). 
 Managed fisheries often aim to maintain their target species at their MSY 
populations (Beddingtom et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009; Costello et al. 2012). This would 
mean that  =1 if all fisheries were well managed, and consequently the fishing 
mortality rate of species i (Fi/Fi,MSY) would approach Ti* in the long term (i.e., Fi*/Fi,MSY = 
Ti*). Fig. 2.1E illustrates this property in a simulation model (Materials and Methods). 
Unmanaged fisheries tend to overfish their target species (Clark 1976, 1985) [i.e. 
 > 1]. Because key species are unlikely to be driven extinct by their fisheries 
(Clark 1976, 1985; Hutchings & Myers 1996), it can be assumed that an upper bound on 
fishing effort is set by Fkey* ≤ r (i.e., harvest rate ≤ maximum growth rate) for all key 
species. Because we are assuming FMSY = r/2, this implies, 
 
< 2. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that 
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€ 
Ti* ≤
Fi*
Fi,MSY
< 2Ti*  (2.3b). 
 Under these assumptions, measured Ti(t) values should be interpreted as implying 
that current fishing practices at time t pose a high threat of species i’s eventual extinction 
if Ti(t) ≥ 2 (because this implies Fi* ≥ ri), a high threat of eventual overfishing and a 
possible threat of extinction with poor management if 1 < Ti(t) < 2, a possible threat of 
overfishing with poor management if 0.5 < Ti(t) ≤ 1, and a very low threat of overfishing 
if Ti(t) ≤ 0.5 (Fig. 2.1D). Fishing gear, targeting behaviors, and management often change 
in response to evolving technology (e.g., Gilman et al. 2006), markets (e.g., Delgado et 
al. 2003), or political climate. Thus, Ti(t) should be re-measured on a regular basis. 
 If assuming that r = 2FMSY or that MSY is a measurable and desired target for 
management is inappropriate (e.g., Johannes 1998), our index, Ti(t), can still be used to 
predict threats, but the threshold values for interpretation (Ti(t) = 2, 1, 0.5) would need to 
be adjusted (SI Materials and Methods). Our approach can also be adapted to incorporate 
age structure, by altering the procedure for measuring vulnerabilities (SI Materials and 
Methods). 
 
2.3 Case Study: Western and Central Pacific Tuna and Billfish 
 To test our approach, we use historical data for eight tuna and billfish populations 
of the Western and Central Pacific (WCPFC 2013) to estimate yearly T values from the 
1950s to the present time, using Eqs. 2.1 and 2.2. We compare each population’s earliest 
possible T and V estimates (1953–1967, depending on the population) to their observed 
abundance and exploitation trends from these early years up until the most recent year for 
which data are available (1997–2009, depending on the population) (Figs. 2.2, 2.3, 2.4) 
(Kleiber et al. 2003; Langley et al. 2006, 2009; Brodziak & Piner 2010; Worm et al. 
2009; Brodziak & Ishimura 2010; Harley et al. 2010; International Scientific Committee 
for Tuna and Tuna-Like Species in the North-Pacific Ocean (ISC) 2011; Hoyle 2011; 
Juan-Jorda et al. 2011; Costello et al. 2012; Ricard et al. 2012) (SI Materials and 
Methods). These populations are the northern and southern populations of Pacific 
albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga), bigeye tuna (T. obesus), blue marlin (M. nigricans), 
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the northern and southern Pacific striped marlin (T. audax), North Pacific swordfish 
(Xiphias gladius), and yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares). Northern and southern 
populations of some species are treated separately because they are considered 
ecologically distinct (Langley et al. 2006; Brodziak & Piner 2010; Brodziak & Ishimura 
2010; Hoyle 2011; ISC 2011). We use international catch data from longline, purse-seine, 
and pole-and-line fisheries (WCPFC 2012) (Fig. 2.3), together accounting for 92% of all 
reported tuna and swordfish catch in this region in 2010 (WCPFC 2011).  For the 
purposes of estimating T, we define “fisheries” spatially by dividing the WCPFC 
Convention area (WCPFC 2013) into 15 regions (Fig. 2.S1) (∼30° × 30°), having roughly 
uniform relative catch rates within fisheries (WCPFC 2011). We also distinguish between 
shallow- and deep-set longline catch and between purse-seine catch from schools 
associated and unassociated with floating objects, as these are known to have different 
catch rates (Crowder & Myers 2001; Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) 2012). 
We also tried other ways of distinguishing fisheries for our analysis and found our 
predictions were robust to these alternatives (SI Materials and Methods and Fig. 2.S2). 
We estimate historical T values, assuming open access, as there was little international 
management of these fisheries before the 1980s (SPC 2012). For all populations, we find 
our T estimates robust to considerations of older data limitations (SI Materials and 
Methods). We use 3-y moving geometric averages of T to reduce noise. We compare T 
values to average annual fishing mortality rates (denoted U) (Ricard et al. 2012) from the 
fisheries studied (UCombined = combined catch/average population biomass) (Fig. 2.2 and 
SI Materials and Methods) instead of instantaneous fishing mortality (F), as the latter is 
difficult to estimate without seasonal and size- or age-structured catch and population 
data, which are not publicly available for these fisheries (WCPFC 2012). For the same 
reason, we also use average annual measures of CPUE and maximum per-capita growth 
rate in estimating V and T (SI Materials and Methods). 
 Longline fishing effort began to expand rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, using 
predominantly shallow sets targeting bigeye and yellowfin tuna in northern and 
equatorial regions and albacore tuna in southern regions (WCPFC 2012, Kleiber et al. 
2009) (Fig. 2.3 and Table 2.S1). There was little effort in the purse-seine and pole-and-
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line fisheries (WCPFC 2012). At this time, T estimates (Fig. 2.2) predicted that North 
Pacific swordfish and all three marlin populations were on paths toward extinction (T > 
2), South Pacific albacore and bigeye tuna were on paths toward overfishing (1 < T < 2), 
and there were low threats to yellowfin and North Pacific albacore tuna (T ≤ 0.5). In the 
mid-1970s, the tuna-targeting longline fishery largely shifted toward using deeper sets, 
with many of the remaining shallow sets targeting swordfish (Kleiber et al. 2009) (Fig. 
2.3 and Table 2.S1). This shift in fishing technology led to reductions in the threat level 
predicted by T for most species (Figs. 2.2 and 2.3) because the profits from the shallow-
set longline fishery were now heavily dependent in many places on swordfish, which has 
high vulnerability relative to other species (Table 2.S1). This limited the capacity of the 
shallow-set swordfish fishery to threaten other species. Additionally, the catch rates of 
swordfish and albacore tuna were lower in the deep-set longline fisheries that were 
targeting bigeye and yellowfin.  As a result of this technological shift, T estimates for 
North Pacific swordfish, South Pacific albacore tuna, and blue marlin no longer indicated 
a threat beginning in the late 1970s and continuing to the early 1990s (Figs. 2.2, 2.3, 2.4). 
Also in the 1970s, the purse-seine and pole-and-line fisheries began to expand, targeting 
primarily skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis), with yellowfin and bigeye tuna as 
significant by-catch (ISC 2011; WCPFC 2012), particularly in purse-seine sets targeting 
schools associated with floating objects (ISC 2011). This led to increases in T values for 
yellowfin and bigeye tuna. An eventual threat to yellowfin is predicted beginning in the 
early 1990s (T > 1) (Figs. 2.2 and 2.4) as an increasing fraction of purse-seine landings 
came from purse-seine sets targeting associated schools (Fig. 2.3). 
 T values from as early as the 1950s have consistently predicted threats of eventual 
extinction (T ≥ 2) or overfishing (T > 1) from then-current fishing technologies for both 
northern and southern striped marlin populations (extinction), for blue marlin (extinction, 
pre-1975, and overfishing until the 1990s), and for bigeye tuna (overfishing) (Figs. 2.2 
and 2.4). As predicted, all four of these populations eventually did experience mortality 
rates from these fisheries (UCombined) exceeding UMSY, but not until decades after T values 
predicted this (Fig. 2.2). Our predictions provided a warning beginning 40 y before this 
occurred for bigeye tuna and South Pacific striped marlin. These four populations also 
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suffered significant population declines and have abundances currently either at (bigeye 
tuna) or below (striped marlin) NMSY (Langley et al. 2006; Brodziak & Piner 2010; Harley 
et al. 2010) (Fig. 2.4). Blue marlin’s NMSY is unknown (Kleiber et al. 2003). These 
depletions were only recognized three or more decades after they could have been 
predicted by measuring T (Fig. 2.4). Blue marlin has also experienced a significant range 
contraction in this region (Worm & Tittensor 2011). The first stock assessments 
identifying these populations as overfished (N < NMSY) or experiencing overfishing (F > 
FMSY or U > UMSY) came out in the 1980s or later (Yuen & Miyake 1980; Miyabe 1989; 
Kleiber et al. 2003; Langley et al. 2006; Brodziak & Piner 2010; Harley et al. 2010) (Fig. 
2.4). 
 T values from the last two decades predict a threat of eventual overfishing to 
yellowfin tuna (Fig. 2.2). Although it has not yet become overfished (N > NMSY, UCombined 
< UMSY) (Figs. 2.2 and 2.4) (Langley et al. 2009), its mortality rate is steadily increasing 
(Fig. 2.2), and it has undergone a marked population decline since T predicted a threat 
(Fig. 2.4). Early T values (1950–1970) indicated a threat to South Pacific albacore tuna 
(Fig. 2.2), and it suffered a significant decline during that period, leading to concern for 
an overfishing threat in an early stock assessment (Skillman 1975) (Fig. 2.4). More recent 
T values (post-1970s) have not indicated a threat (Fig. 2.2), and it is not currently 
considered to be overfished or experiencing overfishing (Hoyle 2011; Juan-Jorda et al. 
2011). Its population has been relatively stable (Fig. 2.4). Similarly, more recent T values 
for North Pacific swordfish and albacore tuna do not indicate a threat and neither 
population appears to be on a trajectory toward overfishing (Brodziak & Ishimura 2010; 
ISC 2011) (Figs. 2.2 and 2.4). 
 Our most recent estimates of T, under the assumption of open access, suggest that 
the northern and southern striped marlin population and yellowfin and bigeye tuna face 
severe overfishing, and the striped marlin populations may face extinction (Figs. 2.2 and 
2.4), if these fisheries are poorly managed and current technologies remain the same. The 
striped marlin populations are particularly threatened by deep-set longline fisheries; and 
yellowfin and bigeye tuna are particularly threatened by purse-seine fisheries targeting 
schools associated with floating objects (Fig. 2.3). Purse-seine fisheries targeting 
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associated schools have received recent conservation attention (SPC 2001). However, 
shallow-set longline fisheries have received far more conservation attention than deep-set 
fisheries, as shallow sets tend to have higher bycatch rates (Crowder & Myers 2001). 
Because of the key species’ (bigeye and yellowfin tuna) relatively lower vulnerabilities in 
the deep-set fishery, our results suggest that effort in the deep-set fishery has a greater 
potential to profitably increase in the future. If this occurs, striped marlin would be highly 
impacted. Although a continued expansion of purse-seine fishing might mitigate some of 
the threat to the striped marlin by depleting yellowfin and bigeye tuna, the possible threat 
of deep-set longline fisheries merits further study. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
 For each of the four populations currently believed to be experiencing or to have 
recently experienced overfishing (F > FMSY or U > UMSY) (Kleiber et al. 2003; Langley et 
al. 2006; Brodziak & Piner 2010; Harley et al. 2010; Juan-Jorda et al. 2011), our 
approach was able to predict a threat of eventual overfishing or extinction starting from 
as early as the 1950s (Figs. 2.2 and 2.4), before each began its dramatic population 
decline (Fig. 2.4). Moreover, for all populations except North Pacific albacore tuna, 
which has a very low mortality rate, estimates of T and UCombined/UMSY appear to be 
converging (Fig. 2.2), consistent with the theory underlying the use of T as an eventual 
threat predictor (SI Materials and Methods). Because these results suggest that our 
approach can predict threats well in advance of high mortality rates and declines in 
abundance (Figs. 2.2 and 2.4), its use in these and other fisheries may provide time to 
adopt preventative management before fishery closures or other highly disruptive 
interventions are needed. Of the four populations predicted by our approach to be 
currently threatened, only the striped marlins are already severely overfished (N < NMSY) 
(Langley et al. 2006, 2009; Brodziak & Piner 2010; Harley et al. 2010). Thus, it could be 
possible to avoid severe depletion of yellowfin and bigeye tuna in this region. 
 Multispecies tuna fisheries are also known to significantly impact sharks, sea 
turtles, and other by-catch species in the Pacific and elsewhere (Lewison et al. 2004a,b; 
Clarke et al. 2013; Worm et al. 2013). The slow population growth and high recent catch 
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rates of these species suggest they likely have high vulnerabilities, and many could be 
threatened with extinction (Lewison et al. 2004a,b; Clarke et al. 2013; Worm et al. 2013).  
Our approach, along with recent advances in by-catch monitoring and data-poor 
abundance estimation methods (Lewison et al. 2004b; Clarke et al. 2013; Worm et al. 
2013), could be used to rapidly assess future extinction threats posed by current fishing 
practices to by-catch species worldwide. 
 Internationally cooperative management of large high-seas fisheries can be 
challenging (Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009), but will be critical to protecting 
weak stocks and by-catch species in tuna and billfish fisheries (Lewison et al. 2004a,b; 
Collette et al. 2011; Juan-Jorda et al. 2011; Worm & Tittensor 2011; Clarke et al. 2013; 
Worm et al. 2013). Managing each fishery to protect its most vulnerable species is one 
possible solution (Hilborn et al. 2004). However, such “weak-stock management” can 
cause faster-growing populations to be underexploited, which lowers profits and 
decreases food supplies (Hilborn et al. 2004).  Trade-offs between conservation and yield 
could be mitigated by improving the species selectivity of fishing technologies (Lewison 
et al. 2004a; Gilman et al. 2006). Measurements of T and V/Vkey can be used to set 
selectivity goals and monitor progress. Marine protected areas or other spatial fishing 
restrictions, which can provide refuges or reduce impacts on species’ spawning grounds, 
are also useful management tools that have been implemented in some fisheries, 
including some Pacific tuna fisheries (Sibert et al. 2012). Another option is to manage the 
relative sizes of different fisheries with different catch rates, for example the deep-set 
longline and purse-seine fisheries. This type of management could mitigate both over- 
and underharvesting without requiring technological advances by equalizing species’ 
aggregate catch rates. Recent studies suggest that some spatial management strategies, 
such as maritime zoning (Sibert et al. 2012) or setting regional catch quotas for fishery-
wide goals (Dougherty et al. 2013), could accomplish this in Pacific tuna (Sibert et al. 
2012) and groundfish (Dougherty et al. 2013) fisheries. 
 Our approach, like all other approaches to threat assessment, is subject to 
uncertainties associated with measurement of populations’ sizes, growth rates, and catch 
rates (Ricard et al. 2012) and should be interpreted accordingly. Moreover, we strongly 
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encourage the incorporation of size- or age-structure data when using our approach, 
whenever possible, and describe a possible method for incorporating age structure in SI 
Materials and Methods. 
 Our approach is designed to identify direct threats to populations from fisheries in 
which the populations of interest are not the key species. It is not relevant to a species 
that is the key species in most or all of the fisheries in which it is caught. It is for this 
reason that we do not present T values for skipjack tuna. Although many species severely 
threatened by fishing are weak stocks or by-catch species in multispecies fisheries 
(Hilborn 1985a; Boyce 1996; Hall et al. 2000; Lewison et al. 2004a), a few target species, 
such as southern bluefin tuna (Collette et al. 2011) and caviar-producing sturgeons 
(Courchamp et al. 2006), are threatened by their high and increasing rarity value 
(Courchamp et al. 2006). Our approach is also not designed to predict indirect threats 
from fishing mediated by species interactions. If Ti > 2, current practices are likely to lead 
to a harvest rate of species i that exceeds its maximum growth rate, guaranteeing 
extinction. However, extinction or severe depletion can be caused indirectly by fishing at 
a much lower level. For example, a recent sea otter decline in Alaska may be linked to a 
trophic cascade caused by offshore fisheries (Estes et al. 1998) – a threat our approach 
would not have detected. Further research is needed to develop preventative approaches 
for threats from species interactions and rarity value. 
 Growing human populations and rising food demands are putting increasing 
pressure on marine ecosystems (Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009; Costello et al. 
2012). Long-term costs and societal impacts of conservation could be substantially 
reduced by shifting resources toward preventative measures, instead of rescuing already 
threatened species (Wilson et al. 2011). Developing cost-effective approaches that can 
predict future threats to species is a valuable tool for conservation. Our results illustrate 
that a simple mechanistic theory has the potential to effectively predict species threats 
well into the future, thus allowing time for preventative management actions. 
 
2.5 Materials and Methods 
 Mathematical derivations of the properties and generalizations of the eventual 
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threat index, T, can be found in SI Materials and Methods. A detailed description of our 
data sources and methods for the case study can also be found in SI Materials and 
Methods (Figs. 2.S1, 2.S2, 2.S3, 2.S4). This includes population, catch, effort, and price 
data; estimates of population growth rates; estimates of populations’ vulnerabilities; 
methods for determining the key species in each fishery; and an analysis exploring the 
sensitivity of our case study results to older data limitations and different means of 
defining key species and fisheries. 
 
Simulation Model: Fig. 2.1E.  
 Fig. 2.1E shows the results of a simulated model designed to illustrate the 
properties of T in fisheries managed to exploit their target species at MSY. The model 
simulates two fisheries each catching three species. Fishery 1 targets species 1 and 
fishery 2 targets species 2, but both fisheries catch both species 1 and 2, as well as a by-
catch species, i. All three species are assumed to have logistic growth and linear catch 
rates, such that the instantaneous rate of population change of species x (where 
x = 1, 2, i) at time t is given by, 
€ 
dNx t( )
dt = rxNx t( ) 1−
Nx t( )
2Nx,MSY
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ − qx1Nx t( )E1 t( ) − qx2Nx t( )E2 t( )   (2.4). 
Here, Ej(t) is the level of effort in fishery j at time t, and qxj is the per-capita per-unit-
effort catch rate of species x in fishery j, which we assume is constant in this model. 
Vulnerability, Vxj(t) = qxj/rx is constant. Fishing effort in both fisheries (j, k = 1, 2; k ≠ j) 
grows according to Eq. 2.5: 
€ 
dE j t( )
dt = aE j t( ) 0.5rj − q jj E j t( ) − q jkEk t( )( )   (2.5). 
Here, a is a constant determining the adjustment rate of effort to the target species 
exploitation rate relative to its target rate (FMSY). We use the following parameter values: 
{Nx,MSY = 1, Nx(0) = 2 for all x; E1(0) = E2(0) = 0.1; r1 = r2 = 1; ri = 0.5; q11 = q22 = qi1 = 
qi2 = 0.1; q12 = q21 = 0.05; a = 0.35}. Species 1 is the key species in fishery 1, and species 
2 is the key species in fishery 2 for the calculation of Ti(t). 
 
  22 
Acknowledgements  
We thank Steve Gaines, Paul Venturelli, Chris Costello, Belinda Befort, Keith Criddle, 
and two reviewers for their comments and Jon Brodziak, Daniel Ricard, and Pierre 
Kleiber for their assistance with stock assessment data. This work was supported by the 
University of Minnesota and by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council 
of Canada (Postgraduate Scholarship D3-389196-2010 to M.G.B.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  23 
 
Figure 2.1. General theory and simulated example. A–D illustrate the theoretical framework and E 
provides an illustrated example. Each panel assumes r = 2FMSY for all species, and all but D assume 
constant vulnerabilities (V). A illustrates how species’ relative vulnerabilities determine relative depletion, 
which combined with effort determines long-term abundances for populations (open circles). Higher effort 
pushes the outcome farther down the set of possible abundances determined by species’ relative 
vulnerabilities (blue, black, and yellow lines). B and C illustrate how relative vulnerabilities and 
profitability (B) or regulatory constraints (C) (dark red lines) jointly determine long-term species 
abundances (solid circles). C assumes that the fishery is managed to harvest species 2 at MSY. D illustrates 
the theoretical relationship between the long-term exploitation rate of species i (Fi*/Fi,MSY) and the average 
long-term exploitation rate of the key species (
€ 
Fkey* /FKey,MSY ), as determined by the long-term Ti value 
(Ti*), shown for Ti = 2 (blue), Ti = 1 (black), and Ti = 0.5 (yellow). For Ti = 2, species i will be harvested to 
extinction when the key species is harvested at MSY or overfished. In contrast, for Ti = 0.5, the key species 
would be harvested to extinction before species i would be overfished. E shows time trends of the eventual 
threat index (Ti(t)), mortality (Fi(t)/Fi,MSY), and abundance (Ni(t)/Ni,MSY) for the case of a bycatch species (i) 
caught in two fisheries whose technologies and relative fleet sizes do not change and where the key species 
in each fishery is harvested at MSY. Extinction of species i is predictable in year 0 whereas extinction 
causing mortality does not occur until year 26. Growth equations and parameter values for E are provided 
in Materials and Methods. 
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Figure 2.2. Exploitation histories and estimable T values. A comparison of eventual threat index values 
[T (3-y geometric mean), red] to the combined fishing mortality rates (UCombined) from longline, purse-seine, 
and pole-and-line fisheries as a fraction of the mortality rate producing MSY (UMSY), (UCombined /UMSY, 
purple), for each population. Levels indicating high extinction threats (T, UCombined /UMSY = 2) (solid black 
lines), high overfishing threats (T, UCombined /UMSY = 1) (dashed black lines), and low overfishing threats (T = 
0.5) (dotted black lines) are shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  25 
 
Figure 2.3. Gear-specific threats. Fishing gear-specific estimates of threats (3-y geometric mean T values 
summed only over fisheries within each gear type) are shown. T values of 2 (solid line) (high extinction 
threat), 1 (dashed line) (high overfishing threat), and 0.5 (dotted line) (low overfishing threat) are 
highlighted. The shift in longline fishing toward deeper sets beginning in the 1970s led to a reduction in the 
threat caused by the shallow-set longline fishery to all populations and introduced a threat from the deep-
set fishery to striped marlin populations. Purse-seine fisheries have recently begun to pose a threat to 
bigeye and yellowfin tuna. 
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Figure 2.4. Assessment histories and earliest identifiable threats. Shown is a comparison of when 
threats could have been identified by estimating T (T > 1: red triangles) vs. when populations were first 
assessed as overfished (N < NMSY) or subject to overfishing (F > FMSY) in stock assessments (purple 
diamonds). The populations’ abundance trends are shown (black curves), each scaled to its maximum value 
in the series. Estimates of NMSY (dashed lines) and dates when the eventual threat index no longer would 
have predicted an overfishing threat (T < 1) (green triangles) are also shown. 
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2.6 Supporting Information 
 
SI Materials and Methods 
1.Vij/Vkey, j and T and Generalizations of Their Interpretation.  
 Our approach is based on the fact that the shared threat of effort in a multispecies 
fishery links the fates of species in a way that allows the fates of all species to be 
predicted if the fate of any one species can be predicted. Specifically, we assert that in 
any multispecies fishery there is at least one identifiable species, which, due to its 
socioeconomic importance to the fishery, will not be driven extinct without first 
triggering the closure of the fishery (Clark 1976, 1985; Hutchings & Myers 1996), but 
will be depleted to at least a certain level. On the basis of this assumption of a bounded 
threat of depletion to this “key species”, we introduce an approach to bounding the likely 
threats to all other species, using the measurable threat index, T. This threat index can be 
used under highly general assumptions regarding population growth and species 
interactions to predict direct threats from multispecies fishing, although it does not assess 
indirect threats via species interactions. Additionally, although we give fairly specific 
criteria with which to identify the key species, our approach is quite robust to different 
identifications in practice. We illustrate these points below. 
 
1.1. Vulnerability, relative long-term impacts, and T.  
 In a general model of a group of S species caught in a single fishery, with 
 as the vector-form representation of the population sizes of all species at time t, 
, and general population growth function, , with (fi(.) ≤ 1), 
the instantaneous rate of change of species i’s population at time t is given by: 
€ 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni ri f i N t( )( ) − qi t( )E t( )( )  (2.S1.1a), 
which can be rewritten equivalently as: 
€ 
dNi t( )
dt = riNi f i N t( )( ) −Vi t( )E t( )( ) (2.S1.1b), 
because Vi(t) = qi(t)/ri (Clark 1976, 1985; Holt 1977). Vulnerability is constant when q is 
€ 
N t( )
€ 
N t( ) ≡ N1 t( ),...,NS t( )( )
€ 
fi N t( )( )
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constant, which implies species’ per-capita catch rates are constant [i.e., average catch-
per-unit effort (CPUE) is proportional to abundance], but unlike in the simulated example 
in Fig. 2.1E, we now assume that q may change. In reality, per-capita catch rates (q) are 
likely to change through time as technology or the behavior of fishermen changes, and q 
may also change if schooling behavior or other biological factors cause catch rates to be 
hyperstable (i.e., they decline more slowly than abundance) (Harley et al. 2001). Thus, 
Vi(t) can be thought of as measuring the impact of current fishing practices at time t on 
species i, provided biologically caused hyperstability is small (i.e., q is constant if 
technology and the behavior of fisherman do not change). 
 Setting the right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. 2.S1.1b equal to 0, we see that for any 
species i having positive abundance at equilibrium, the following relationship must hold, 
€ 
fi N
*( ) =Vi*E * (2.S1.2), 
where Vi* is the equilibrium vulnerability of species i, Ni* is the equilibrium population 
size of species i, and .  From Eq. 2.S1.2, it follows that for any two 
species, x and y, that both have positive abundances at equilibrium, the following 
relationship must hold: 
€ 
fx N
*( )
fy N
*( )
=
Vx*
Vy*
  (2.S1.3a). 
Substituting current vulnerability measures, V(t), for V* in Eq. 2.S1.3a predicts the long-
term relative impacts of current fishing practices at time t on species x and y. If 
vulnerabilities (V) are constant, then Eq. 2.S1.3a defines a curve that represents all of 
the possible equilibrium population sizes (
€ 
N*) at different effort levels. This curve, 
determined by species’ relative vulnerabilities, is illustrated in Fig. 1A–C. For example, 
with logistic growth (Schaefer 1954) (Eq. 2.4), Eq. 2.S1.3a would become 
        
€ 
1− Nx
*
Kx
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
1− Ny
*
Ky
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
=
Vx*
Vy*
  (2.S1.3b), 
€ 
N* ≡ N1*,...,NS*( )
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which is a straight line emanating from the point where Ni = Ki for all i, the no-harvest 
equilibrium, as illustrated in Fig. 2.1A–C, because vulnerabilities are constant. 
 Suppose that a “key” species can be identified in the fishery, which will not be 
driven extinct without first triggering the fishery’s closure, but socioeconomic forces will 
allow the fishery’s effort to increase until this key species has at least a certain fishing 
mortality rate, Fkey,MIN. Suppose that the fishing mortality rate, F, needed to just drive the 
key species extinct is Fkey,MAX. Noting that Fi(t) = riVi(t)E(t), the bounds on mortality of 
the key species can be written as 
€ 
Fkey,MIN
rkey
≤Vkey*E * <
Fkey,MAX
rkey
 (2.S1.4), 
Rearranging [2.S1.4], we get bounds on equilibrium effort, E*, 
€ 
Fkey,MIN
Vkey*rkey
≤ E * < Fkey,MAXVkey*rkey
 (2.S1.5). 
Finally, by combining Eq. 2.S1.2 with Eq. 2.S1.5, we get bounds on the equilibrium 
fishing mortality rate of species i, Fi*, given by 
€ 
Vi*
Vkey*
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
Fkey,MIN
rkey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ ≤
Fi*
ri
<
Vi*
Vkey*
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
Fkey,MAX
rkey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  (2.S1.6a) 
If Fkey*/rkey values are exactly predictable, then Eq. 2.S1.6a becomes 
€ 
Fi*
ri
=
Vi*
Vkey*
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
Fkey*
rkey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ (2.S1.6b). 
Note that inequality [2.S1.6a] and Eq. 2.S1.6b are derived without any specific 
assumptions about population growth or species interactions. Essentially, they imply that 
the direct threat of a multispecies fishery to all species can be finitely bounded by 
measuring V/Vkey because the long-term harvest rates of at least one socioeconomically 
important species can be bounded. With the assumptions that r = 2FMSY for all species 
(MSY, maximum sustainable yield) (Schaefer 1954), directly caused extinction requires 
F ≥ r, and Fkey,MIN ≥ Fkey,MSY, inequality [2.S1.6a] and Eq. 2.S1.6b become 
€ 
Vi*
Vkey*
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ ≤
Fi*
Fi,MSY
< 2 Vi
*
Vkey*
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ (2.S1.7a) 
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€ 
Fi*
Fi,MSY
=
Vi*
Vkey*
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
Fkey*
Fkey,MSY
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  (2.S1.7b). 
 The same logic in a model with multiple fisheries is used to derive Eq. 2.3a in 
place of [2.S1.7b] and Eq. 2.3b in place of [2.S1.7a].  If there are M fisheries instead of 
one, the instantaneous rate of change of species i’s population is given by 
€ 
dNi t( )
dt = riNi f i N t( )( ) − Vij t( )E j t( )j=1
M
∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  (2.S1.8). 
For any species i having positive abundance at equilibrium, the following relationship 
must hold: 
€ 
fi N
*( ) = Vij*E j*j=1
M
∑  (2.S1.9). 
For any two species, x and y, that both have positive abundances at equilibrium, the 
following relationship must hold: 
€ 
fx N
*( )
fy N
*( )
=
Vxj*E j*j=1
M
∑
Vyj*E j*j=1
M
∑
  (2.S1.10). 
If vulnerabilities and relative efforts do not change [i.e., Ej(t)/Ek(t) is constant for all j and 
k], then the ratio on the RHS of Eq. 2.S1.10 is constant. 
 Assuming a key species can be identified for fishery j, which will not be driven 
extinct (occurring at mortality rate Fkey,j,MAX) without first triggering the closure of fishery 
j, but socioeconomic forces will likely allow effort in fishery j to expand until this key 
species has at least a fishing mortality rate of Fkey,j,MIN, the following will hold: 
€ 
Fkey, j ,MIN
rkey, j
≤ Vkey, jk*Ek*k=1
M
∑ <
Fkey, j ,MAX
rkey, j
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
∨ E j* = 0 (2.S1.11). 
Similarly to Eq. 2.S1.5 in the single-fishery case, we can derive bounds on equilibrium 
fishing effort Ej*, in any fishery j having positive effort at equilibrium (i.e., its key 
species is not extinct), by multiplying 
€ 
Vkey, jk*Ek*k=1
M
∑  in inequality [2.S1.11] by 
€ 
Fkey, j,MIN
rkey, j
Vkey, j*E j*
Vkey, j* Vkey, jk*Ek*k=1
M
∑( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
≤ E j* <
Fkey, j ,MAX
rkey, j
Vkey, j*E j*
Vkey, j* Vkey, jk*Ek*k=1
M
∑( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
 (2.S1.12a). 
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If we multiply the outer terms in inequality [2.S1.12a] by (rkey,jNkey,j*)/(rkey,jNkey, j*) and 
note that, for species i and fishery j, riVijNi* = Catchij*, the equilibrium catch (per unit 
time), we get 
€ 
Fkey, j,MIN
rkey, j
Catchkey, jj*
Vkey, j* Catchkey, jk*k∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ ≤ E j
* <
Fkey, j,MAX
rkey, j
Catchkey, jj*
Vkey, j* Catchkey, jk*k∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
 (2.S1.12b). 
Finally, by combining Eq. 2.S1.9 with Eq. 2.S1.12b, we get bounds on the equilibrium 
fishing mortality rate of species i, Fi*: 
€ 
Ti*
Fkey,MIN
rkey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ ≤
Fi*
ri
< Ti*
Fkey,MAX
rkey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  (2.S1.13a) 
Here, 
€ 
Fkey,MIN
rkey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  and 
€ 
Fkey,MAX
rkey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  are weighted averages of FMIN/r and FMAX/r for all key 
species, weighted by their relative catch shares and vulnerabilities relative to species i 
(precise weights can be derived from inequality [2.S1.12b]). If vulnerabilities and relative 
efforts do not change, Ti(t) is constant, meaning Ti(t) = Ti* for all t. If Fkey*/rkey values are 
known, then Eq. 2.S1.13a becomes 
€ 
Fi*
ri
= Ti*
Fkey*
rkey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟   (2.S1.13b) 
With the assumptions that r = 2FMSY for all species (Schaefer 1954), directly caused 
extinction requires F ≥ r, and Fkey,MIN ≥ Fkey,MSY, inequality [2.S1.13a] becomes inequality 
[2.3b] and Eq. 2.S1.13b becomes Eq. 2.3a from the main text, which imply the 
interpretations of measured T values presented in the text (i.e., T ≤ 0.5, T > 1, and T ≥ 2 
imply, respectively, a low threat of overfishing, a high overfishing threat, and a high 
extinction threat). However, if these assumptions about FMSY and extinction are known to 
not be valid for a particular species, then thresholds for interpreting T should be adjusted. 
T can still be used to measure threats because Eqs. 2.S1.13a and 2.S1.13b do not require 
these assumptions. 
 
1.2. The key species: Practical definitions and sensitivity.  
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 In the text, we recommended that the key species in a managed fishery should be 
identified as the species with the highest vulnerability among those that are targeted by 
management to not be depleted beyond a specific abundance. This particular manner of 
identifying the key species in a managed fishery is based on the assumption that managed 
species with higher vulnerabilities reach their management thresholds at the lowest effort. 
In an unmanaged fishery, we recommended identifying the key species as the species 
generating the most revenue. 
 In practice, using T to predict threats is insensitive to different approaches to 
identifying the key species. This insensitivity is particularly high in unmanaged fisheries, 
as we demonstrate in our case study (Fig. 2.S2). The essential property of the key species 
in a particular fishery, as illustrated in section 1.1 of this SI, is that it is a species that 
cannot be driven extinct without the fishery closing first and that effort in the fishery will 
expand to at least the level that causes the key species to experience a certain minimum 
long-term mortality rate (we assume this minimum mortality rate is FMSY in the text). In 
most unmanaged fisheries, these assumptions should hold for the highest-revenue–
generating species (Clark 1976, 1985). The highest-revenue–generating species is also 
easy to identify with few data, which is why we propose using this criterion for defining 
the key species in practice. In some fisheries, it is possible for these assumptions to be 
violated, for example if (i) a fishery is highly profitable and there are enough less 
vulnerable species to support it even at an effort level that causes this most profitable 
species to go extinct (1, 2) or (ii) the fishery is marginally profitable enough that the 
profitability constraint binds even before the key species is depleted to NMSY. In case i, 
interpreting T using thresholds (0.5, 1, 2) would likely underestimate the threat to all 
species (because the assumption that the key species will not be profitably driven extinct 
would be violated). However, before this occurred, the highest-revenue–generating 
species would change (because extinct species generate no revenue). Thus, T’s 
underestimation of threats would still be corrected potentially long before other species 
became threatened, assuming T was re-measured on a regular basis. In case ii, 
interpreting T using thresholds (0.5, 1, 2) would likely overestimate the threat.  This 
should be corrected by appropriately adjusting the thresholds for interpreting T. 
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 In a managed fishery, the assumption that determines the upper bound on threats – 
that the key species will not be driven extinct without the closure of the fishery – is likely 
a safe assumption as long as one of the species targeted by management is considered the 
key species when measuring T. The lower bound on threats, determined by the assumed 
depletion of the key species to its management target abundance (e.g., NMSY), is more 
sensitive to which species is considered the key species. If the species considered the key 
species is not the species that is depleted to its management target with the least effort, 
then interpreting T using its management target as a reference point will overestimate 
threats. Furthermore, unlike in the unmanaged case, erroneous key species identifications 
will not self-correct in this case. Thus, it is important to identify the key species in a 
managed fishery as the species that is most easily depleted to its target abundance by the 
fishery in question. This definition of the key species can be implemented with any type 
of population growth or species interactions, provided they allow relative depletability to 
be assessed if it differs from our measure of relative vulnerability. 
 
1.3. Accounting for age structure.  
 Age structure is an important consideration in assessing the status of and threats 
to fish stocks (Hilborn & Walters 1992).  Although we do not incorporate age structure in 
the presentation of our approach in section 1.1 above and in the main text, our approach 
can be easily adapted to consider age structure, by adjusting the way in which 
vulnerability is measured.  Vulnerability, as defined in the main text, measures the 
fraction of the maximum per-capita population growth rate lost by each unit of effort.  In 
principle, this concept could be measured in any type of age-structured model. 
 For example, suppose species i has A discrete age classes and time is also discrete. 
Let nix, t be the population size of species i of age class x in year t, Ni, t be the vector of 
these age-specific populations (Ni,t = (ni1,t,. . ., niA,t)), and Nt be the matrix of populations 
of all species (Nt’s dimension would be determined by species with the largest number of 
age classes). Individuals of species i give birth at rate bix in age class x and have 
probability gix(Nt) – ∑jUixj,t of surviving from age class x to age class x + 1, where Uixj,t is 
the fraction of individuals of age class x (of species i) caught in fishery j in year t. By the 
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Euler–Lotka equation (Kot 2001), species i’s population in year t has an overall 
population growth rate per time step approaching λi,t, which is the largest positive real 
solution of 
€ 
λi,t
−x giy Nt( ) − Uiyj,tj=1
M
∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
y=1
x−1
∏⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
=1
x=1
A
∑   (2.S.1.14a). 
In other words, species i’s population growth at time t is approaching Ni,t+1 = λi,tNi,t. 
Suppose further that species i’s maximum intrinsic rate of population increase per 
discrete time step (e.g., yearly or monthly), λmax,i, is known. Finally, let λ-j,i,t be the growth 
rate that would be approached at time t by species i if fishery j was absent, but all other 
fisheries and abundances of other species remained the same. λ-j,i,t would be the largest 
positive real solution of 
€ 
λ− j ,i,t
−x giy Nt( ) − Uiyk,tk≠ j∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
y=1
x−1
∏⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
=1
x=1
A
∑   (2.S.1.14b). 
Species i’s vulnerability to fishery j at time t, Vij,t could be measured as 
€ 
Vij,t=
λ− j ,i,t − λi,t
E j,t λmax,i −1( )
  (2.S.1.15). 
Vulnerability estimated in this way for an age-structured population may be used to 
generate V/Vkey and T estimates, which would have similar interpretations to those in the 
non–age-structured models presented above. Similarly to the non–age-structured case, 
effort (Ej,t) can be ignored when estimating vulnerability ratios, as it will cancel out. 
 
2. Data and Methods for Case Study.  
2.1. General methodology and aims.  
 Our case study had two main aims: first, to test the accuracy of our approach to 
identifying threatened populations (commonly referred to as “stocks” in fisheries), using 
the parameter T (Figs. 2.2, 2.4, 2.S2); and second, to provide a rough approximation of 
how early our approach could have been used to identify threats to stocks that have 
recently been determined to be at risk and declining using conventional approaches (Fig. 
2.4).  This latter aim serves as a means to quantify any temporal advantage our approach 
may have over conventional methods of identifying threatened stocks. We chose the 
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Western and Central Pacific tuna and swordfish fisheries as a case study because several 
stocks in these fisheries have recently been identified as threatened and declining 
(Langley et al. 2006; Brodziak et al. 2009; Harley et al. 2010; Collette et al. 2011; IUCN 
2011; Worm & Tittensor 2011) and because historical data on these fisheries and some of 
the threatened stocks are available for periods dating back several decades, some as early 
as 1950.  For each stock, we estimated T in each year, following Eqs. 2.1 and 2.2, using 
the best currently available data on its population size (N) (measured as exploitable stock 
biomass, B), its catch rate in each fishery, and its maximum population growth rate (r). 
However, we replaced CPUE in each year with total catch in Eq. 2.1, as this is easier to 
measure, and effort cancels out when measuring the ratio of two stocks’ vulnerabilities, 
leaving T in Eq. 2.2 unchanged. We used these estimates of T to test its accuracy against 
observed patterns of decline (Figs. 2.2 and 2.4). Data and sources on catch, effort, and 
intrinsic growth rate (r) are summarized below. 
 When approximating the earliest date at which threats to stocks could have been 
identified using our parameter T, we considered availability of data at the time in light of 
the data requirements of T. With some aquatic and most terrestrial species, it is possible 
to determine relative abundances (N) and catch rates (CPUE) with a single year of data, 
although this is less reliable in marine fisheries, as it is difficult to sample ocean stocks 
extensively. Modern stock assessments generally determine a stock’s abundance by 
comparing observed total catch with inferred year-to-year trends in the abundance from 
survey or effort-standardized catch-per-unit-effort indexes of abundance within each age 
class (Cadima et al. 2003).  We assumed that this type of analysis would have required at 
least 2 y of data when constructing Fig. 2.4, although stock assessments often use longer 
series to obtain more robust estimates (Hilborn & Walters 1992).  Estimating T may not 
have been possible the first year in which we had catch and population data, but it would 
likely have been possible to estimate species’ relative abundances not long after this first 
year of data, certainly still decades before threatened species’ exploitation rates exceeded 
their MSY levels in the 1980s and 1990s. Estimating r empirically for fish stocks 
generally requires a stock size-recruitment time series of fairly significant length (Myers 
et al. 1999) and thus would not have been possible in the earliest years in which catch 
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data on each species were collected. To address this, we tested whether estimating T 
using r-values approximated using allometric scaling relationships would have affected 
the results (section 2.5). 
 
2.2. Population data.  
 We used data from seven species, comprising nine distinctly recognized stocks in 
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, namely albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga), bigeye 
tuna (Thunnus obesus), blue marlin (Makaira nigricans), skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus 
pelamis), striped marlin (Tetrapturus/Kajikia audax), swordfish (Xiphias gladius), and 
yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares). Whereas the populations of bigeye tuna, blue 
marlin, skipjack tuna, and yellowfin tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean are 
each considered to be and managed as a single stock (Kleiber et al. 2003; Langley & 
Hampton 2008; Langley et al. 2009; Harley et al. 2010), albacore tuna, striped marlin, 
and swordfish are each considered to have distinct stocks north and south of the equator 
(Langley et al. 2006; Brodziak & Piner 2010; Brodziak & Ishimura 2010; Hoyle 2011; 
ISC 2011). However, we were unable to obtain historical data on the southern stock of 
swordfish. The length of our population time series varied by stock [albacore tuna 
(north), 1966–2009; albacore tuna (south), 1959–2006; bigeye tuna, 1952– 2006; blue 
marlin, 1955–1997; skipjack tuna, 1972–2006; striped marlin (north), 1952–2004; striped 
marlin (south), 1950–2003; swordfish, 1951–2006; yellowfin tuna, 1952–2005]. Skipjack 
tuna is the key species in all of the fisheries in which there were available data and thus 
was not included in our main comparisons of T values and historical exploitation and 
abundance trends (Figs. 2.2, 2.3, 2.4). 
 We obtained yearly estimates for each stock of its exploitable population size (B) 
and its reproductive adult population size [termed spawning stock biomass (SSB) in 
fisheries] in mass units (tonnes) in each year and at MSY (BMSY, SSBMSY). For the 
southern stock of albacore tuna, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna, the southern stock of striped 
marlin, and yellowfin tuna, these estimates came from the RAM Legacy Stock 
Assessment Database (Ricard et al. 2012), and for blue marlin, they came from a recent 
stock assessment (Kleiber et al. 2003). We obtained an estimate of B only for swordfish 
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from a recent stock assessment (Brodziak & Ishimura 2010) [we used biomass in subarea 
1 from the two-stock scenario model (table 3.1 in Brodziak & Ishimura 2010)].  We were 
able to obtain estimates of SSB only for the northern populations of albacore tuna (ISC 
2011) and striped marlin (Brodziak & Piner 2010). For these populations, we 
approximated B by assuming SSB/B for each population in each year was the same as in 
the southern population. We used the exploitable biomass (B) for each species as N when 
calculating vulnerability (V). 
 The population trajectories shown in Fig. 2.4 are generated using the SSB time 
series for all stocks except swordfish, for which we used B, with each value in each series 
divided by the largest value in the series, and the MSY value (as a fraction of the largest 
in the series) shown. 
 
2.3. Catch and effort data and estimates of r, V, and UCurrent/UMSY.  
 We obtained public domain data on aggregate catch and effort in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC 2012), by year and 5° × 5° latitude and longitude, for 
each of longline, purse-seine, and pole-and-line fisheries, which together account for a 
large majority of tuna and swordfish catches in this region (92% in 2010) (WCPFC 
2011). Because some 5° × 5° regions had very little or no catch in some years, we 
aggregated catches in each fishery within 15 regions defined by dividing the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Convention area (WCPFC 2013) into 
four roughly equal latitudinal and longitudinal sections (rounded to the nearest 5°) (Fig. 
2.S1). The size of these regions was chosen with the goal of being large enough to have 
significant catch in most regions, but small enough so that relative catch rates of the 
different species in each region were roughly uniform (WCPFC 2011). The length of the 
time series varied by gear (longline, 1950-2009; purse-seine, 1970–2009; pole-and-line, 
1970-2008). 
 We distinguished within the purse-seine fishery between catch and effort from 
sets targeting schools associated with floating objects and those targeting free schools, as 
these are known to have different by-catch rates (SPC 2001). We also sought to 
distinguish within the longline fisheries between shallow sets, primarily targeting 
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swordfish, and deeper sets, primarily targeting tunas, as these are also known to have 
dramatically different catch rates (Crodwer & Myers 2001).  However, although the 
WCPFC public domain data distinguish between purse-seine sets targeting free and 
associated schools, they do not distinguish between different types of longline sets 
(WCPFC 2012). We were able to find public longline catch and effort data disaggregated 
in this way only for the Hawaii-based fleet from 1991 to 2011 (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 2012a), which composes only a fraction of the 
total effort and covers only a fraction of the study region. 
 In practice, fishery managers have access to confidential (non-publicly available) 
vessel-level data, which include the average number of hooks between floats used in 
longline sets (e.g., Kleiber et al. 2009).  This information can be used to infer whether a 
vessel was using shallow or deep sets, as deeper sets have more hooks between floats 
(Kleiber et al. 2009). Thus, although we were unable to obtain the data necessary to 
directly distinguish between shallow- and deep-set longline effort, we assume that fishery 
scientists and managers within the institutions that collect such data can access the data 
and thus make this distinction. We disaggregated longline catch into shallow set and deep 
set in the following manner. We assumed that, although absolute catch rates for each 
species are certain to vary spatially and temporally, the catch rate of a species in the 
shallow-set fishery relative to its catch rate in the deep-set fishery is roughly constant 
across space and time and dependent on its habitat preferences with respect to the water 
column. In other words, for each species i, we assumed a constant ratio, ci, of its average 
shallow-set (
€ 
CPUE iSS,τ in year τ) and deep-set (
€ 
CPUE iDS,τ in year τ) catches-per-unit-
effort in all years and regions: 
€ 
CPUEiSS,τ
CPUEiDS,τ
= ci (2.S2.1). 
We estimated this ratio empirically, using the data from the Hawaiian fleet (NOAA 
2012a) for each year they were available, and assumed the median of these values for 
each species as ci (Fig. 2.S3).  We obtained estimates of the total shallow- and deep-set 
effort in the North Pacific from 1971 to 2002 (Kleiber et al. 2009), where the two are 
distinguished as lines having >6.5 hooks between floats (deep set) and those having <6.5 
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hooks (shallow set) (Kleiber et al. 2009). Deep-set effort pre-1975 was close to 0 (Kleiber 
et al. 2009) and thus we assumed there to be a single shallow-set longline fishery before 
1975. We used these data (Kleiber et al. 2009) to calculate the respective fractions of 
total longline effort in shallow and deep sets from 1971 to 2002 and assumed the 
fractions of total effort that were shallow set/deep set to be 0.12 and 0.88, respectively, 
from 2002 to 2009 (these are the mean fractions from 1999 to 2002) (Kleiber et al. 2009). 
We assumed these annual fractions, pDS,τ ≡ EDS,τ/ET,τ and pSS,τ ≡ ESS,τ/ET,τ [where ESS,τ, ESS,τ 
and ET,τ are respectively the cumulative efforts in year τ in the shallow-set, deep-set, and 
combined (shallow-set + deep-set) fisheries], were equal in the southern and northern 
fisheries.  Using these assumptions, we calculated the total annual catch (Catch = 
*E) for each species i in each year, τ, in the shallow- and deep-set fisheries, using Eqs. 
2.S2.2b and 2.S2.2c, which are derived from [2.S2.2a]: 
€ 
CatchiT ,τ = CPUE iT ,τET ,τ = CPUE iSS,τESS,τ +CPUE iDS,τEDS,τ   (2.S2.2a), 
€ 
CatchiDS,τ =
EDS,τ
ET ,τ
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ CatchiT ,τ
EDS,τ
ET ,τ
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ +
ESS,τ
ET ,τ
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
CPUE iSS,τ
CPUE iDS,τ
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
=
pDS,τCatchiT ,τ
pDS,τ + pSS,τci
  (2.S2.2b), 
€ 
CatchiSS,τ =
pSS,τCatchiT ,τ
pSS,τ +
pDS,τ
ci
  (2.S2.2c).  
We also separately estimated each species’ T value, assuming a single longline fishery for 
comparison (Fig. 2.S2). The results of each of these analyses were qualitatively similar 
for all species, highlighting the robustness of our approach to different delineations of 
fisheries. 
 For each population, we estimated the combined fishing mortality rate from all of 
the fisheries in our case study (UCombined in Fig. 2.2) in year τ as 
€ 
Ui,τ =
Catchij,τj∑
Bi,τ
  (2.S2.3). 
For South Pacific albacore and striped marlin, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna, and yellowfin 
tuna, we calculated UMSY as 
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€ 
UMSY =
MSY
BMSY
  (2.S2.4), 
where MSY (in tonnes) and BMSY (stock biomass at MSY in tons) estimates were obtained 
from their respective stock assessments (Langley et al. 2006, 2009; Langley & Hampton 
2008; Harley et al. 2010; Hoyle 2011). For North Pacific swordfish, an estimate of UMSY 
was given directly in its stock assessment (Brodziak & Ishimura 2010). For North Pacific 
striped marlin, we used the relationship F = – ln(1 – U) (Ricard et al. 2012) to calculate 
UMSY from an estimate of FMSY given in its stock assessment (Brodziak & Piner 2010). 
Estimates of FMSY and UMSY were not given in the stock assessment of North Pacific 
albacore tuna (ISC 2011), so we assumed it had the same UMSY as South Pacific albacore 
tuna. 
 For the blue marlin, estimates of FMSY or UMSY were not available (Kleiber et al. 
2003). We estimated UMSY from FMSY as described above and estimated FMSY by assuming 
it was equal to 2r. We estimated r as follows, using a method developed by Myers et al. 
(1997). We obtained estimates, from its stock assessment (Kleiber et al. 2003) of its 
average age at maturity (Tm) and average natural (i.e., non-fishing-related) adult mortality 
rate (m), from which we calculated its average annual adult survival probability (Myers et 
al. 1997) (ps) as ps = e-m. We then assumed blue marlin to have a maximum reproductive 
rate (number of recruits per spawner) (Myers et al.’s 1999), α, equal to that of swordfish, 
the most closely related species for which an estimate was available in Myers et al.’s 
(1999) recent meta-analysis of these values across species, and solved for r numerically 
from the following equation [from Myers et al. 1997]: 
  (2.S2.5). 
 Because we were using catch and population data aggregated annually and across 
all size and age classes, it was appropriate to use a discrete-time version of the maximum 
per-capita growth rate, R, in place of r when estimating V for each population in each 
fishery. We assumed R = 2UMSY when estimating V, equivalent to an assumption of 
discrete-logistic growth (Costello et al. 2012). 
 To summarize, Vij was estimated for population i (e.g., North Pacific striped 
marlin) in fishery j (e.g., shallow-set longline fishing in region BC) in year τ as 
€ 
er( )Tm − ps er( )
Tm −1( ) −α = 0
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€ 
Vij,τ =
Catchij,τ
RiBi,τ
 (2.S2.6). 
T was estimated for each species in each year by inserting Eq. 2.S2.6 into Eq. 2.2. 
 
2.4. Identifying the key species.  
 To identify the key species in each fishery, we estimated the relative contributions 
made by catch of each stock to the total revenue of each fishery. In our main analysis, 
presented in Figs. 2.2–2.4, we identified the key species in a given fishery in a given year 
as the species generating the most revenue among those for which population data were 
available. Estimating relative revenue contributions required estimates of the price-per-
unit mass paid to fishermen for all stocks relative to one another. We estimated these 
historical relative prices, using historical data on catch and landed values [in 2000 US 
dollars (USD)] from the Sea Around Us Project (2013). For all species in our analysis 
except blue marlin, these data were available for the period 1950–2006 within some or all 
of six regions in the Pacific: Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest, Eastern 
Central, and Western Central [note that the Western Central region in the Sea Around Us 
data is only a subset of the WCPFC Convention area (Sea Around Us Project 2013; 
WCPFC 2013)]. Missing historical price data for blue marlin were largely 
inconsequential, as the blue marlin would likely never have been identified as a key 
species. However, we nonetheless generated a point estimate of its price in 2000 USD by 
averaging annual price data from 2001 to 2008 from the Hawaii fleet (NOAA 2012b), 
adjusting for inflation. We used this point estimate as a proxy for its price in all years, to 
verify the assumption that it would never have been the key species. 
 For each species and each region in which it was available, we generated an 
annual price estimate by dividing the total revenue (2000 USD) by the total catch (tons). 
Prices varied across regions, but data were not available for all regions for some species 
(Sea Around Us Project 2013). We filled in missing prices by fitting a linear model to the 
available price data for all species, with dummy variables for region and species and a 
continuous variable for year as predictors (n = 1,125, R2 = 0.5, P < 0.001) (Fig. 2.S4). For 
northern populations (North Pacific striped marlin, swordfish, and albacore tuna), we 
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estimated their price in a given year by averaging their estimated (or predicted) prices in 
the Northwest and Western Central regions. For southern populations (South Pacific 
striped marlin and albacore tuna), we estimated their price in a given year by averaging 
their estimated (or predicted) prices in the Southwest and Western Central regions. For 
populations that were more equatorial (skipjack tuna, bigeye tuna, and yellowfin tuna), 
we estimated their price in a given year by averaging their estimated (or predicted) prices 
in the Northwest, Southwest, and Western Central regions. 
 
2.5. Sensitivity.  
 In general, our estimates of T could have been affected by biases in our estimates 
of relative catch rates, abundances (B), and growth rates (R). Each component, Vij/Vkey,j, 
of Ti,τ will be biased by a factor equal to the factor by which each of (Catchij/Catchkey,jj), 
Bi/Bkey,j, and Ri/Rkey,j are biased.  For the case study presented here, we tested the 
sensitivity of T estimates for each population to several different assumptions (Fig. 2.S2). 
In the main analysis (Figs. 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 and dark red T estimates in Fig. 2.S2), we 
made the following assumptions: (i) The key species in a given fishery in a given year 
was the stock generating the most revenue in that fishery in that year for which 
population data were available, (ii) estimates of r (or R) for each stock were available in 
all years, and (iii) shallow-set and deep-set longline catch were approximately 
disaggregated using the method shown in section 2.3 above. We found our T estimates to 
be largely robust to all three of these assumptions. To test the importance of assumption i, 
we tried two alternate methods for determining the key species: (1) We assumed the key 
species was the species contributing the most revenue in the majority of years where 
population data were available (Table 2.S1 and light red T estimates in Fig. 2.S2) and (2) 
we assumed that the species generating the second most revenue in each year was the key 
species of a given fishery (pink T estimates in Fig. 2.S2). In both cases, we held 
assumptions ii and iii constant. To test the importance of assumption ii, we re-estimated T 
values for all populations assuming R was unknown and was instead approximated using 
the scaling relationship between body mass and population growth rate, 
€ 
Ri
Rkey, j
≈
Mi
Mkey, j
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
−
1
4
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(Savage et al. 2004) (black T estimates in Fig. 2.S2), holding assumptions i and iii 
constant. We estimated Mi for each population by dividing the total catch in mass units 
by the total catch in individual units, both given for longline fisheries (WCPFC 2012), 
and averaging these values for each stock across all years. For skipjack tuna, catch in the 
longline fishery is not given (WCPFC 2012) (because its catch rate is very low), and we 
instead estimated Mi using estimates of its common length and length-weight relationship 
from FishBase (Froese & Pauly 2012). To test the importance of assumption iii, we re-
estimated T for each population, holding estimates i and ii constant, but now treating the 
aggregate longline catch in each region as a single fishery (gray T estimates in Fig. 2.S2). 
In all cases, the threats predicted by T were similar. 
 
 
Figure 2.S1.  Map of the regions used in the analysis.  A map of the WCPFC Convention Area (WCPFC 
2013), with the 15 regions used in our analysis shown.  Regions were derived by dividing the Convention 
Area into 4 latitudinal and longitudinal sections of similar size. 
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Figure 2.S2.  Sensitivity of T estimates. A comparison of T values (3 year geometric mean) using base 
(dark red) and alternate estimation assumptions.  In particular, estimates using: i) different assumptions 
guiding the identification of the key species (light red and pink); ii) approximations of relative growth rates, 
r, using relative body-mass (black); and iii) combining shallow-set/deep-set longline catch data (grey) are 
shown for each population.  Grid lines are drawn for reference at T = 2 (solid), T = 1 (dashed), and T = 0.5 
(dotted). 
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Figure 2.S3.  The annual ratios of shallow-set to deep-set longline CPUE in the Hawaii-based fisheries are 
shown for each species, along with a box plot showing the median, inter-quartile ranges, and maximum and 
minimum.  Yellowfin tuna, skipjack tuna and blue marlin each had a single year (2001) in which there was 
a reported shallow-set CPUE of 0 (NOAA 2012a).  Notably, there was also very little total reported effort 
in the shallow-set fishery in that year (4 trips, 27 sets, 21380 hooks) (NOAA 2012a). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.S4.  Predicted vs. observed average prices from the model used to fill in missing regional prices 
(n = 1125, R2 = 0.5, p < 0.001). 
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Table 2.S1. Key species in majority of years.   
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Abstract. 
The market values of harvested species rise as they become depleted due to falling 
supply, rarity value, or both.  High price flexibility in response to the depletion of a 
harvested population can cause profits to be stable or increase even as the population 
declines toward extinction. Although recent empirical studies have focused on 
demonstrating rarity value-driven price flexibility in some species believed to be 
threatened by harvesting, extinction is predicted to occur only if the value of the harvest 
rises faster than the cost of obtaining harvest, which is also likely to increase as a 
population declines.  Here, I present a simple mechanistic framework for assessing the 
likelihood that profits from harvesting a population would remain positive as abundance 
declines toward extinction. Drawing on empirical evidence from minke whales, caviar-
producing sturgeons, bluefin tunas, and other marine species, I argue that threats of 
extinction from overharvesting are likely to be driven to a much greater extent by catch 
rates that are robust to abundance declines, termed ‘hyperstable’, resulting from 
aggregation behavior, advanced technology, or habitat destruction, than by price 
flexibility per se; though extinction does require some degree of price flexibility. My 
analysis provides a workable model for assessing threats of such extinctions, often called 
Anthropogenic Allee Effects, in both marine and terrestrial systems, and highlights a 
previously underappreciated interaction between threats of habitat destruction and 
overharvesting. 
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3.1 Introduction  
Classic harvesting theory (Gordon 1954; Clark 1976) suggests that, when 
harvesting a single population, the rise in the cost of obtaining a unit of catch as the 
population declines can prevent its extinction, since harvesters would not make a profit 
once the population fell below a certain size.  However, the prices of harvested 
commodities (e.g. meat, horns, tusks, pelts) tend to rise as the harvested population is 
depleted due to falling supply (Barten & Bettendorf 1989; Schrank & Roy 1991; Asche et 
al. 2007), an effect that can be magnified by ‘rarity value’ – elevated value placed on rare 
species by consumers (Dulvy et al. 2003; Courchamp et al. 2006). If prices are flexible 
(i.e. rise quickly) enough, in response to falling supply, to offset the rising costs of 
obtaining harvest as a population declines, it can be profitably harvested to extinction – a 
phenomenon proposed by Courchamp et al. (2006) and termed ‘the Anthopogenic Allee 
Effect’ (AAE). Moreover, even if prices do not increase significantly as abundance 
declines, a population can be driven to an abundance low enough to make it susceptible 
to extinction from stochastic or other forces if the value of its harvest is high enough,  
(Clark 1976; Courchamp et al. 1999; Lande et al. 2003; Branch et al. 2013). 
There is concern that price-related threats may be driving a number of species 
harvested for luxury commodities towards extinction, including land mammals and 
insects hunted for trophies (Johnson et al. 2010; Palazy 2011; Palazy et al. 2012a; Biggs 
et al. 2013), collections (Courchamp et al. 2006; Tournant et al. 2012), or body parts 
regarded as having medicinal or aphrodisiac properties (Courchamp et al. 2006; Angulo 
& Courchamp 2009); and sources of luxury seafood including large whales (Clark 1973; 
Amundsen et al. 1995; see also Branch et al. 2013), caviar-producing sturgeon species 
(Acipenseriformes) (Pikitch et al. 2005; Lenhardt et al. 2006; Gault et al. 2008), bluefin 
and other high-value tunas (Collette et al. 2011), and some invertebrates (Purcell et al. 
2014).  Many of these species have already suffered substantial population declines, 
prompting listing by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red 
List (IUCN 2013), the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES 
2014), or both.  Expanding human populations coupled with rapid economic growth in 
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developing countries with large luxury harvest markets may increase pressures on these 
species in the coming decades (Graham-Rowe 2011; Purcell et al. 2014). 
Several recent studies have provided empirical evidence that prices have indeed 
risen as abundance declined, possibly due to rarity value, in sturgeons (Gault et al. 2008), 
mammals hunted for trophies (Palazy et al. 2011, 2012a,b), and collected beetles 
(Tournant et al. 2012) (see Angulo & Courchamp 2009; Angulo et al. 2009 for more 
general experiments); arguing for this as evidence of extinction threats to these species 
from AAE. However, others (e.g. Mysterud 2012; Harris et al. 2013; Lyons & Natutsch 
2013) have disputed the strength of this evidence, pointing out that: i) rising prices alone 
are not a sufficient condition for extinction; ii) the AAE framework is built on an 
assumption of open-access, which is likely to be violated in harvests that have some form 
of central management, cooperative governance, or property rights; and iii) in cases 
where only a specific segment of the population is targeted (e.g. trophy hunting of only 
large males), the population as a whole may not be as susceptible to collapse. 
Though it has so far been challenging, empirically evaluating the susceptibility of 
a species or population to AAE and other value-related threats is important.  Some broad 
correlates of extinction risk in harvested species are well known, including large body 
size, slow population growth rate, high market value, and low harvest cost due to high 
habitat accessibility (e.g. proximity to human population centers) (Roberts & Hawkins 
1999; Purvis et al. 2000; Alroy 2001; Dulvy et al. 2003; Sethi et al. 2010; Collette et al. 
2011; Branch et al. 2013; Purcell et al. 2014), though patterns of overharvesting in some 
systems run counter to these (e.g. Pinsky et al. 2011). However, mechanistic frameworks 
that identify biological and/or socioeconomic conditions likely to result in future 
extinction threats instead of identifying evidence for past declines could inform 
preventative conservation (e.g. Burgess et al. 2013).   
Here, I present a framework for empirically assessing the susceptibility of a 
population to the Anthropogenic Allee Effect. Specifically, I show how combinations of 
bioeconomic conditions that would allow profits from harvesting a given population to 
remain positive as it is depleted to extinction can be identified empirically using a small 
set of measurable parameters, and often even when some are un-estimable.  Drawing on 
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empirical evidence from caviar-producing sturgeons (Acipenseriformes), bluefin tunas 
(Atlantic bluefin tuna (ABF) (Thunnus thynnus), Pacific bluefin tuna (PBF) (Thunnus 
orientalis), and Southern bluefin tuna (SBT) (Thunnus maccoyii)), the Northeast Atlantic 
minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata), and other marine species, I argue that prices, 
even of the most valued species, may rarely be responsive enough to declining abundance 
to cause deterministic extinction (AAE) unless catch rates are also highly robust to 
declines in abundance, or ‘hyperstable’ (Harley et al. 2001). Hyperstable catch rates can 
be caused by aggregation behavior (e.g. schooling or herding) (Winters & Wheeler 1985; 
Mackinson et al. 1997), technology or communication among harvesters (Hilborn & 
Walters 1987; Gaertner & Dreyfus-Leon 2004; Thorson & Berkson 2010; Torres-Irineo 
et al. 2014), and likely also by habitat destruction.  
 
3.2 Identifying conditions conducive to AAE 
General framework 
 The basic framework presented here considers the harvest of a single population 
with no discounting of future profits and constant cost per-unit-effort (e.g. hours of 
hunting or fishing), but possible extensions to consider opportunistic or multispecies 
harvesting, economies of scale, or discounting are discussed, along with possible 
extensions of the framework.  The Anthropogenic Allee Effect (AAE) requires rising 
harvest values to allow harvesting a population to remain profitable even as it is driven to 
extinction (Courchamp et al. 2006).  With constant per-unit-effort costs, AAE requires 
stable or increasing per-unit-effort revenue (RPUE) as abundance declines (Figure 3.1). 
 The RPUE from harvesting a population, i, RPUEi, is equal to the catch-rate per-
unit-effort (CPUEi) multiplied by the price of each unit of catch (denoted pi for 
population i), which are both functions of abundance (denoted Ni for population i): 
€ 
RPUE i Ni( ) = pi Ni( )CPUE i Ni( )   (3.1). 
CPUE generally falls as abundance (denoted N) decreases (Figure 3.1A) and, following 
Harley et al. (2001) and others, I assume the following relationship (Figure 3.1A): 
€ 
CPUE i Ni( ) = qiNiβ i   (3.2), 
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where qi and βi are constants. Here, βi measures the percent change in CPUEi resulting 
from a one percent change in abundance (Ni) – the elasticity of catch to abundance.  
When βi < 1, catch is said to be ‘hyperstable’ because CPUE falls more slowly than 
abundance (Harley et al. 2001). 
 The price of catch of population i (pi) generally increases as the supply of catch 
(denoted QSi for catch of population i) decreases (Figure 3.1B).  The strength of this 
relationship is measured in economics, for harvested products, by the ‘own-price 
flexibility of demand’ (Houck 1965; Barten & Bettendorf 1989; Schrank & Roy 1991; 
Eales et al. 1997), denoted fi for catch of population i. which measures the percentage 
increase in price that results from a one percent decrease in supply, all else equal: 
  
€ 
∂pi
∂QSi
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
QSi
pi
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ = − f i   (3.3a). 
It should be noted that, though I define fi using a negative sign so that fi is positive when 
demand responds negatively to price, some studies do not (e.g. Eales et al. 1997).  It is 
also worth briefly mentioning the more common measure of quantity-price relationships, 
own-price elasticity of demand (usually denoted ε), which measures the percentage 
decrease in the quantity of a product demanded in response to a 1% increase in its price.  
Price flexibility, f, is related to ε, but not an exact reciprocal for most goods (i.e. f ≠ 1/ε; 
see Houck et al 1965; Schrank & Roy 1991; Eales et al. 1997; Asche et al. 2007). Price 
flexibility (f) is considered a more appropriate measure of the quantity-price relationship 
than ε for harvested products because quantity is determined before price, in contrast to 
many other types of markets (Houck 1965; Barten & Bettendorf 1989). There is also 
empirical support (e.g. Eales et al. 1997) for price flexibility being better measure of 
quantity-price relationships in harvested species than demand elasticity.    
 Equation (3.3a) can be solved for pi to give the following relationship between 
price (pi) and supply of catch, when incomes and supplies of complement and substitute 
goods stay constant: 
 
€ 
pi QSi Ni0( )( ) = pi0
QSi Ni( )
QSi Ni0( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
− fi
 (3.3b). 
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Here, pi0 is the price at current abundance (Ni0), and the notation reflects the fact that the 
quantity of catch supplied (QSi) is a function of abundance (Ni). Specifically, at an 
equilibrium at abundance Ni, the quantity of harvest supplied (QSi(Ni)) is equal to the 
surplus production at that abundance (i.e. births – natural deaths), denoted Si(Ni) (Figure 
3.1C).   
 I assume surplus production Si(Ni), has negative density-dependence (i.e. Si'(Ni) < 
0), which can be expressed as, 
€ 
Si Ni( ) =QSi Ni( ) = riNigi Ni( )   (3.4), 
where ri is the maximum per-capita rate of population increase over a standard time-
interval (e.g. years), and gi(.) (gi ≤ 1 by definition of ri) is a function describing the 
density dependence of population i’s growth. The assumption of strictly negative density-
dependence implies that gi'(.) < 0, with gi(0) = 1, and gi(Ki) = 0, where Ki is the un-
harvested equilibrium abundance, or ‘carrying capacity of population i (Figure 3.2A).   
 Putting equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) together, current economic and 
biological conditions, measured by βi, fi, and gi(Ni), give the following relationship 
between RPUEi and abundance (Ni), all else equal:  
€ 
RPUE i Ni( ) = RPUE i Ni0( )
Ni
Ni0
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
β i − fi( ) gi Ni( )
gi Ni0( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
− fi
  (3.5a), 
where 
€ 
RPUE i Ni0( ) = qiNi0β i pi Ni0( ).  Under the assumption of constant per-unit effort 
costs, it is empirically useful to rewrite equation (3.5a) as: 
€ 
Ri
Ci
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ =
Ri0
Ci0
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
Ni
Ni0
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
β i − fi( ) gi Ni( )
gi Ni0( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
− fi
  (3.5b), 
where R/C is the ratio of revenues to costs, which can be measured at any effort scale.  It 
can be shown, by taking the derivative of equation (3.5a) with respect to Ni, that per-unit-
effort revenues (RPUEi) increase as abundance (Ni) decreases (i.e. δRPUEi/δNi < 0) if: 
€ 
fi 1+ Ni
giʹ′ Ni( )
gi Ni( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
> βi   (3.6). 
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The second term on the right-hand side of inequality (3.6) will be negative because giʹ′(.) 
< 0.  The interpretation inequality (3.6) is that a one percent decrease in abundance (Ni) 
results in a βi percent decrease in CPUEi and an increase in price of fi percent or less.  
The price increase is dampened by the fact that the population’s per-capita growth rate 
increases as its abundance decreases, as a result of negative density-dependence (i.e. giʹ′(.) 
< 0), which means that the supply of catch (QSi(Ni) = riNigi(Ni)) decreases by less than 
one percent as a result of a one percent decrease in abundance.  
 In fact, the supply of catch (QSi) population i produces at equilibrium initially 
increases as abundance decreases from its carrying capacity (Ki) until it reaches its 
maximum sustainable yield- (MSY) producing abundance (denoted Ni,MSY for population 
i), and then decreases (Figure 3.1C).  Thus, when N > NMSY, both CPUE and equilibrium 
price decrease as abundance decreases, implying that it is impossible for RPUEi to 
increase as abundance decreases when Ni > Ni,MSY.  However, when Ni < Ni,MSY, 
equilibrium prices increase as the population decreases, and, as can be seen in inequality 
(3.6), the dampening effect of density-dependence on price responses to declining 
abundance approaches 0 as abundance (Ni) approaches 0.  Thus, if fi > βi, RPUEi would 
be expected to initially decline as abundance declined, reaching a minimum at an 
abundance greater than 0 and smaller than Ni,MSY, and increasing at smaller abundances.  
Similarly, if fi = βi, RPUEi would be expected to monotonically decline as abundance (Ni) 
declined, but would approach a non-zero minimum as Ni approached 0 (Figure 3.1D). If 
this minimum RPUE is greater than opportunity costs (often measured as variable costs 
(Clark 1976; 1980)), the population faces deterministic extinction from AAE under open-
access, starting from any initial size (Figure 3.1E). If costs are greater than this minimum, 
the population cannot be harvested deterministically to extinction if fi = βi, and has a 
critical size if fi > βi, above which it will be harvested to a stable non-zero equilibrium 
under open-access, and below which it will be harvested to extinction from AAE (Figure 
3.1F) (see also Courchamp et al. 2006; Hall et al. 2008).  All else equal, more flexible 
prices (i.e. larger fi) will result in the minimum RPUE occurring at a larger abundance 
relative to NMSY (Ni/Ni,MSY for population i) (Figure 3.1D), and stronger density 
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dependence (i.e. larger |giʹ′(.)|) will result in the minimum RPUE occurring at a smaller 
Ni/Ni,MSY (Figure 3.2B,C).  If fi < βi, RPUEi would be expected to decline monotonically 
to 0 as abundance (Ni) declined, and the population would not be threatened by AAE 
(Figure 3.1D).  
 
Empirical application 
 The first step in empirically assessing whether current biological and economic 
conditions pose a threat of extinction by AAE to a population, i, is to estimate whether fi 
≥ βi.  If not, then current conditions are unlikely to pose a threat of AAE (though the 
population may still be threatened by harvesting by other mechanisms). If price flexibility 
(fi) is indeed estimated to be larger than or equal to catch elasticity (βi), the next step is to 
determine whether RPUEi should be expected to increase or decrease as abundance 
declines from current abundance, by testing inequality (3.6).  In addition to estimates of 
βi and fi, this requires estimates of the strength of density dependence (i.e. the shape of 
gi(Ni)) and the current abundance relative to a reference point relevant to density-
dependence (e.g. Ni/Ki or Ni/Ni,MSY).  If RPUEi is estimated to be increasing as abundance 
declines, then current conditions pose a threat of extinction by AAE to the population, 
under open-access. If it is estimated that fi ≥ βi, but that RPUEi is currently still 
decreasing as abundance declines (i.e. inequality (3.6) is determined to be false at current 
abundance), then an estimate of the current revenue/cost (R/C), in addition to the 
information collected above, can be used to determine, using equation (3.5b), if the 
minimum revenue would be expected to be greater than or less than costs.  A projected 
minimum revenue greater than costs (i.e. a minimum R/C > 1) implies a threat of 
extinction by AAE under open-access.  Even though some of these parameters, N/NMSY 
and the strength of density-dependence in particular, may be difficult or impossible to 
estimate for some harvested populations, equations (3.5b) and (3.6) can be used to solve 
for the ranges of unknown parameters that would lead to a threat, as illustrated in Figure 
3.3. Similarly, equations (3.5b) and (3.6) can be used to generate probabilistic 
assessments of AAE threats from uncertainty bounds on parameters. Informative 
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assessments of AAE threats are often possible even with very large uncertainty in one or 
more parameters.     
 Catch elasticity, βi, can be estimated empirically from time series of CPUE and an 
independently estimated index of abundance (Ii = ciNi, where ci is a constant) using linear 
regression on log-transformations of these data (Harley et al. 2001): 
€ 
log CPUE i,t( ) = α i + βi log Ii,t( )   (3.7a), 
where αi = ciqi is the estimated intercept, and t is the time index (e.g. year, month, or day) 
of each observation.  Harley et al. (2001) also discuss other methods for estimating βi 
with this type of data to account for observation errors and other sources of potential bias.  
In some harvests (e.g. illegal poaching) effort, and consequently CPUE, may be difficult 
to estimate.  In such cases, it may be possible to approximate βi if fractional changes 
between two time periods in both the abundance (ΔNi = (Ni,2 – Ni,1)/N1 or (Ii,2 – Ii,1)/Ii,1) 
and geographic range size, denoted Ai for population i, (ΔAi = (Ai,2 – Ai,1)/A1) are known:  
 
€ 
βi =
% change in CPUE
% change in abundance ≈
% change in density
% change in abundance =
1+ ΔNi
1+ ΔAi
−1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ΔNi   (3.7b). 
This estimation approach (equation (3.7b)) makes use of the fact that one of the main 
known drivers of hyperstability (i.e. β < 1) is range contraction in declining populations 
(Winters & Wheeler 1985; Mackinson et al. 1997), which leads to reductions in 
population density (one of the main determinants of CPUE) that are smaller than the 
reductions in overall abundance (see Brown 1984; Lawton 1993 for theoretical 
discussion; Ceballos & Ehrlich 2002; Laliberte & Ripple 2004 for terrestrial examples; 
Winters & Wheeler 1985; Worm & Tittensor 2011 for marine examples).  Other factors 
can cause hyperstability, including technological improvement, learning and information-
sharing among harvesters (e.g. Hilborn & Walters 1987; Gaertner & Dreyfus-Leon 2004; 
Thorson & Berkson 2010; Torres-Irineo et al. 2014); and aggregation among individuals 
in the harvested population (e.g. schooling, herding), as aggregations are generally easier 
for harvesters to locate than individuals and aggregating species often manifest declines 
to a greater extent as range contractions than density reductions (Mackinson et al. 1997).  
  57 
However, equation (3.7b) may provide a useful baseline estimation method for β when 
reliable CPUE data is not available. 
 There are several ways to estimate fi, (see Barten & Bettendorf 1989; Schrank & 
Roy 1991; Eales et al. 1997; Chiang et al. 2001 for examples).  In general, estimating fi 
requires time series data on consumer incomes or expenditures (denoted X), prices (pi) 
and quantities supplied or traded (QSi) of the harvest or harvest product of population i, 
and quantities supplied or traded (when estimating fi) of closely related complements or 
substitutes.  The simplest possible estimation method uses a regression equation of the 
following form: 
€ 
log pi,t( ) = ai − f i log QSi,t( ) + f ij log QSj ,t( )j∑ + f ix log Xt( )  (3.8). 
Here, t is again the time index of each observation, ai is an estimated intercept, fij and fix 
are respectively the estimated ‘cross-price flexibilities of demand’ and ‘income (or 
expenditure or scale) flexibility of demand’, which respectively measure the effects of 
changes in the supply of related good j and changes in consumer incomes or expenditures 
on the price of harvest of population i (Houck 1965; Eales et al. 1997).  I present this 
method for its simplicity and ease of interpretation (i.e. f is estimated directly by the 
regression) in light of the limited data for many rare harvested species.  However, when 
time series of significant length (e.g. monthly for 10 or more years (e.g. Barten & 
Bettendorf 1989; Eales et al. 1997)) are available, modern demand studies have often 
used more complex estimation methods that allow for dynamic effects and are more 
firmly rooted in modern consumer theory (see Eales et al. 1997 for overview).  
 It is also important, for the purposes of both estimating fi and more generally 
predicting extinction threats, to identify any other species or products that are perfect 
substitutes for harvest of population i, meaning that consumers do not distinguish 
between the two products.  Perfect substitutes are defined, for the purpose of this 
analysis, by the Law of One Price (LOP), which states that perfect substitutes must either 
have identical or proportional equilibrium prices (where any proportional differences 
result from differences in quality or transportation costs that are immune to arbitrage) 
(Hotelling 1929; Asche et al. 1999, 2007).  The simplest test for perfect substitutability 
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between two products, 1 and 2, involves estimating the parameters in the following 
equation: 
€ 
log p1,t( ) = a + blog p2,t( )  (3.9), 
and testing the hypothesis that b = 1 (perfect substitutability).  This equation can also be 
used to test a hypothesis of no market interaction (b = 0).  Asche et al. (1999, 2007) 
review other methods for testing for substitutability (often referred to more broadly as 
‘market integration’ in economic studies, as the LOP depends on both equivalence of 
products for consumers and ease of arbitrage between markets in a spatial sense) that can 
allow for non-stationarity in prices and other dynamic complexities, when longer 
unbroken time-series data are available. 
 Identifying perfect substitutes is important for two reasons. First, if a good, j, is a 
perfect substitute for harvest of population i (i.e. the LOP holds), then treating them as 
separate products creates bias in estimating fi, as the ‘true’ fi will vary with the supply of 
the perfect substitute good at each time period.  Second, and more fundamentally, if 
harvest of population i is part of a set of populations producing equivalent harvests 
(denoted Y), then the price responds to changes in the total supply of harvest of all 
populations in Y.  In other words, all else equal, price would be given by (analogously to 
equation (3.3b)):    
 
€ 
pi QSi Ni0( )( ) = pi0
QSk Nk( )k∈Y∑
QSk Nk0( )k∈Y∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
− fi
 (3.10). 
This implies that the effect of a population’s declining abundance on its harvest price 
(δpi/δNi) approaches 0 as its abundance approaches 0, eliminating the threat of AAE, if 
there are other more common populations or products which are perfect substitutes.  
Thus, with respect to threats of AAE, a group of populations whose harvests are perfect 
substitutes are only as weak as their strongest (i.e. most slowly depleted) member.  This 
result may have important implications for rare fish species that are aquacultured. 
However the assumption that aquaculture is a perfect substitute for wild harvest remains 
untested for most species, and evidence so far suggests that perfect substitutability may 
be rare (Asche et al. 2001). 
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 Estimating either the strength of density-dependence or the current population 
size relative to a reference point require time series estimates of an index of abundance, 
coupled with either catch data, recruitment data, or both (see Hilborn & Walters 1992 for 
canonical discussion on estimating abundance and reference points in fisheries; Myers et 
al. 1999 for methods of estimating the strength of density-dependence, as well as 
estimates for a wide range of fish taxa).  It is also often required to assume a particular 
functional form of density-dependence.  Two of the most common flexible forms (i.e. 
allowing for different strengths of density dependence) are the θ-logistic model (Gilpin & 
Ayala 1973), where 
€ 
gi Ni( ) =1− Ni Ki( )
θ i , and the Beverton-Holt model (Beverton & 
Holt 1957), which, in the absence of age-structure, can be written in the form, gi(.), as 
(see Appendix A and Mangel et al. 2003): 
€ 
gi Ni Ki( ) =
1− hi( ) 1− Ni Ki( )( )
1− Ni Ki( ) + hi 5 Ni Ki( ) −1( )( )   
 (3.11a), 
or equivalently,   
€ 
gi Ni Ni,MSY( ) =
1− hi( ) hi 5 − Ni Ni,MSY( )( ) + Ni Ni,MSY( ) 1− 2 hi 1− hi( )( ) −1⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ 
5hi −1( ) 1+ hi Ni Ni,MSY( ) −1( ) − Ni Ni,MSY( ) 1− 2 hi 1− hi( )( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟   
 (3.11b), 
where h is a measure of the strength of density-dependence termed ‘steepness’, which is 
defined as the fraction of the maximum recruitment that occurs at an abundance 20% the 
size of the carrying capacity (Mangel et al. 2013) (larger h implies stronger density-
dependence) (Figure 3.1C, Figure 3.2).  I assume this form of gi(.) (equation (3.11b)) in 
my discussion below of threats of AAE to commercial fish species, in light of published 
estimates of h and N/NMSY. 
 
3.3 Empirical examples in aquatic systems 
 The key parameters (β, f, h, R/C, and N/NMSY) highlighted here for identifying 
conditions conducive to AAE, have been estimated for many aquatic exploited species, 
including some that are thought to be (or have recently been) facing possible value-
related threats.  For example, Ricard et al. (2012) and Costello et al. (2012) together 
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provide estimates or approximations of N/NMSY for most of the major harvested fish 
species worldwide; Lam et al. (2011) and Sumaila et al. (2007) recently estimated fishing 
costs and ex-vessel prices, from which R/C can be calculated; and Myers et al. (1999) 
estimate steepness (h) for a wide range of fish taxa.  With the exception of groundfish, 
there have not yet, to my knowledge, been comparable compilation efforts for estimates 
of β or f for fish and other exploited aquatic species (see Schrank & Roy (1991) for 
overview of estimates of f and other components of the global groundfish demand 
system; Harley et al. (2001) for estimates of β from nearly 300 series from north Atlantic 
groundfish fisheries).  However, numerous studies have estimated one or both of these 
parameters in specific systems. 
 Estimates of catch elasticity (β) in aquatic systems have varied widely among 
species and harvesting methods, but have tended to be less than or equal to 1 (indicating 
hyperstability). Estimates of β have been smallest among schooling species, often <0.5 
and frequently not significantly different from 0, meaning that CPUE is nearly 
uncorrelated with abundance.  This includes lower-trophic level forage fish, such as the 
Peruvian anchovy (Engraulis ringens) Pacific sardine (Sardinops sagax caerulea) and 
Atlantic herring (Clupea harengus harengus) (MacCall 1976; Winters & Wheeler 1985; 
Bjorndal 1988; Mackinson et al. 1997), in addition to larger species, such as the minke 
whale (Amundsen et al. 1995), and likely Atlantic bluefin tuna (Pintassilgo & Duarte 
2002). Other schooling tunas have (e.g. skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis) and yellowfin 
(Thunnus albacares)) have been estimated to have moderate hyperstability (β ≈ 0.3-0.7) 
in their surface fisheries (e.g. purse-seine, pole-and-line), which specifically target 
schools (Gaertner & Dreyfus-Leon 2004; Campbell et al. 2010), but low hyperstability (β 
≈ 1) in longline fisheries (Ward 2008; Campbell et al. 2010; Campbell & Kennedy 2010).  
Schooling populations are susceptible to hyperstable catches for two reasons: i) they tend 
to manifest population declines primarily as range contractions, maintaining school size 
and density (Winters & Wheeler 1985); and ii) schools are generally easier for fishers to 
locate than individual fish (Mackinson et al. 1997) and advances in fishing technology 
have greatly enhanced detection capabilities (Pintassilgo & Duarte 2002).  A meta-
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analysis of flatfish (megrim, plaice, sole) and gadiformes (cod, haddock, hake, pollock, 
whiting), mostly from trawl fisheries, estimated β values of 0.64-0.75 (Harley et al. 
2001).  There have been few estimates of β for commercial fisheries for diadromous 
species (e.g. salmonids, sturgeons), but recent estimates from anglers have ranged from ~ 
0.6-1 for salmonids (Tsuboi & Endou 2008; Ward et al. 2013).     
 Estimates of f for fish products have varied among species, commodity types, and 
estimation methods, but have mostly been 0.5 or smaller (e.g. Schrank & Roy 1991; 
Eales et al. 1997; Jaffry et al. 1999; Chiang et al. 2001; Asche et al. 2007), suggesting an 
often small response of fish prices to falling supply. Of particular note, Eales et al. (1997) 
estimated f to be 0.46 for high value fresh fish in Japan, one of the main consumers of 
rare fish products.  Moreover, studies of fish demand have found ex-vessel prices to be 
less flexible than retail prices (Asche et al. 2007).  Studies of market integration 
(substitutability) have found high substitutability between species within broad classes of 
fish products, including salmon, whitefish – including cod, haddock, saithe, hake and 
pollock (see Asche et al. 2007 for review) – and substitutability, but not perfect 
substitutability, between most tuna species (Chiang et al. 2001; Sakai et al. 2009). 
 Even the most highly valued aquatic species seem to have relatively inflexible 
prices (i.e. f << 1).  The price flexibility, f, of fresh bluefin tuna (lumped ABF, PBF, and 
SBT) in Japan was estimated by Chiang et al. (2001) to be from 1984-1999 to be 0.19, 
indicating a 0.19% increase in price for every 1% decrease in supply, with low to 
moderate substitutability between bluefin and bigeye (Thunnus obesus) and yellowfin 
tunas. This is consistent with the relative historical stability observed in bluefin prices 
(Figure 3.4A,B compare annual catches (data from Ricard et al. 2012) with average 
Japanese import prices (data from FAO 2014), where SBT (Figure 3.4A) is distinguished 
from ABF and PBF (Figure 3.4B)).  Historical caviar prices (Figure 3.4C) have risen 
more than those of bluefin tunas, but are still consistent with the consensus among price 
flexibility estimates in fish that harvest prices tend to rise by half of the percentage by 
which harvest supplies decline, or less.  To my knowledge, there have been no studies 
estimating price flexibility for caviars, likely due in part to a lack of widely available data 
to which modern estimation methods (see Eales et al. 1997) can be applied.  To 
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preliminarily address this gap for caviars, I use historical (1980-2011) country-level price 
and quantity data from FAO (2014) on exports of caviar and caviar substitutes (defined 
by FAO (2014) as roe products from species other than sturgeons and paddlefishes) to 
estimate price flexibility (f) using equation (3.8), with per-capita real GDP (in units of 
purchasing-power parity), averaged over importing countries weighted by their fraction 
of total imports over the time period, as a proxy for expenditure.  This analysis estimates 
a price flexibility (f) of 0.48 (Table 3.S1).  Though publicly available data with which to 
estimate price flexibilities of hunted whales are sparse, one series from the Norwegian 
harvest of Northeastern minke whale (Amundsen et al. 1995) suggests a price flexibility 
possibly in the neighborhood of 0.65 (i.e. prices have historically risen by roughly 0.65% 
on average for every 1% decline in catch) (Figure 3.4D).  
 The pervasive observation of low price flexibility (f << 1, most often < 0.5), even 
in highly valued aquatic species, suggests that threats of AAE may be very unlikely 
except among species that have both few substitutes and very high hyperstability (β < 
0.5).  Even species that do meet both of these criteria are unlikely to have RPUE 
currently increasing as abundance decreases unless (β << 0.5) and/or they are already 
nearly extinct (Figure 3.3A). However, if they are caught in fisheries with substantial 
profit margins (R/C > 1.5, e.g. tuna purse-seine and pole-and-line fisheries, which have 
R/C > 2.5 on average (Lam et al. 2011)), even moderate depletion and β ≈ f can allow 
minimum revenues to remain above costs (Figure 3.3B,C).  
 Severe hyperstability in the Northeastern minke whale (β ≈ 0-0.15) (Amundsen et 
al. 1995) may have allowed its profitable harvest to extinction, had the international 
moratorium on whaling not been imposed during the 1980s (RMIN/C > 1; Figure 3.3B).  It 
should be noted that Amundsen et al. (1995) reached the opposite conclusion in a 
simulation of open-access Norwegian whaling, though this relied on an assumption of 
constant prices, which seems to have been violated (Figure 3.4D). There have not been, 
to my knowledge, many past studies directly estimating β for sturgeons or bluefin tunas. 
However, β is thought to be very low (~0.2) in the ABF fishery, which mostly uses 
purse-seine and other gears which target schools (Pintassilgo & Duarte 2002).  Catch 
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elasticity (β) is thought to be larger in SBT fisheries, with recent studies assuming 
moderate β for Australian purse-seine fisheries, which target younger fish in schools (e.g. 
Kennedy 1999 assumes β = 0.6); and assuming β close to 1 in Japanese longline fisheries 
(Kennedy 1999; Campbell & Kennedy 2010).  Though there is little information with 
which to estimate β for sturgeons, there may be reason to believe that catches are quite 
hyperstable (i.e.β << 1), because many of the most severely depleted caviar-producing 
sturgeons (e.g. Beluga sturgeon (Huso huso), Russian sturgeon (Osetr) (Acipenser 
gueldenstaedtii)) have faced suffered significant habitat destruction caused by pollution, 
hydroelectric dams, and other forms of encroachment (IUCN 2013), which has 
undoubtedly led to range contraction.  
 To test the approximation method for β from range data I present here (equation 
(3.7b)), I use this method to approximate average (i.e. across all gears) β values for tunas 
by combining the average 1960-1999 range contraction across Atlantic, Pacific, and 
Indian Oceans estimated by Worm & Tittensor (2011), with estimates from the RAM 
Legacy Stock Assessment Database (Ricard et al. 2012) of the decline in each population 
(in units of total biomass) over the same period (Figure 3.4E).  Multiple populations of 
the same species in the same ocean were aggregated to be compatible with Worm & 
Tittensor’s (2011) range contraction estimates, and estimated range contractions of SBT 
were averaged across all 3 oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, Indian). Estimates of β using this 
approach are quite consistent with existing hypotheses (Figure 3.4E). Species caught 
mostly in longline fisheries (albacore (Thunnus alalunga), bigeye, SBT) had average β 
estimates close to 1, while species caught mostly in purse-seine, pole-and-line and other 
surface fisheries targeting schools (ABF, PBF, skipjack, yellowfin), had mostly low to 
moderate average β estimates.  Estimates of average β for both ABF and PBF using this 
method were close to or below 0, as their ranges have contracted as much or more than 
their abundances (Worm & Tittensor 2011; Ricard et al. 2012).  It is highly unlikely that 
the true βs for these species is negative (this would mean CPUE increases as abundance 
decreases), but likely that they are indeed very low.  
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 Based on these analyses, open-access harvesting would likely pose an AAE 
extinction threat to Northeastern minke whale (f > β, RMIN/C > 1; Figure 3.3B), could 
(depending on the degree of catch hyperstability, β) pose a threat to ABF, PBF, and 
caviar-producing sturgeons such as the severely depleted Beluga and Russian sturgeons (f 
may be greater β, RMIN/C may be greater than 1; Figure 3.3A,C), but would not likely 
pose a deterministic extinction threat to SBT (f < β).  These analyses also suggest that 
range contraction may indeed be a key driver of catch hyperstability, and may provide a 
useful tool for empirically estimating catch elasticities (β) when CPUE data is difficult to 
obtain.  
    
3.4 Discussion 
 Since Courchamp et al. (2006) first hypothesized that the rising value of a 
population’s harvest as it was depleted might cause deterministic extinction - the 
Anthropogenic Allee Effect (AAE) - several studies have empirically demonstrated that 
harvest prices of rare species indeed rise in response to falling supply, partly due to rarity 
value (Courchamp et al. 2006; Gault et al. 2008; Angulo et al. 2009; Palazy et al. 2011, 
2012a,b; Tournant et al. 2012). However, empirically assessing whether rarity value or 
other factors could drive prices up fast enough to maintain harvest profits as a population 
was depleted has remained elusive (Harris et al. 2013).  This study presents an intuitive 
approach to empirically predicting extinction threats from AAE under open-access.  First, 
it provides a basic and readily estimable indicator of the possibility of an AAE: AAE can 
only occur if the own-price flexibility of demand of a population’s harvest is larger than 
or equal to the elasticity of its catch to its abundance (i.e. f ≥ β).  To my knowledge, this 
fundamental requisite of price-driven extinction has not been previously highlighted. This 
study also illustrates how other factors such as the strength of density-dependence and the 
current level of depletion can affect the threat of AAE to a population, but that 
informative assessments are possible even with large uncertainties in these factors.   
 To date, the literature on AAE has mostly focused on price flexibility – the idea 
that, as a harvested population is depleted, both scarcity (moving along the demand 
curve) and increases in demand driven by preferences for rarity (shifts in the demand 
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curve) (Courchamp et al. 2006; Hall et al. 2008) can lead to price increases large enough 
to allow profitable harvesting to extinction.  However, the evidence presented and 
reviewed in this study suggests that, at least in fish and whales, AAE threats are likely to 
be driven to a far greater extent by hyperstable catch rates than rising prices, as prices 
generally rise proportionally more slowly than catches decrease – with estimated own-
price flexibilities generally 0.5 or lower (e.g. Barten & Bettendorf; Schrank & Roy 1991; 
Eales et al. 1997; Chiang et al. 2001).  Conceptually, this may be related to the fact that 
most harvest products, even the most highly valued luxuries such as caviar and bluefin 
tuna sashimi, have partial substitutes. If consumers devote a constant share of their 
budgets to a particular good, irrespective of the supplies and prices of other goods, then 
(assuming constant incomes) the own-price flexibility (f) of this good should be 1, 
because a one percent decrease in supply would be exactly offset by a one percent 
increase in price, allowing consumers to maintain their expenditure. However, the 
existence of substitutes causes consumers to prefer to shift some of their demand away 
from a product whose supply has fallen, rather than accepting a price increase that fully 
offsets the lost supply (Mas-Collel et al. 1995).  Moreover, my analysis demonstrates that 
populations whose harvests have perfect substitutes are very unlikely to be threatened by 
AAE, unless all perfect substitutes are also threatened, as perfect substitutability causes 
the impact of declines in a population’s abundance on its price to diminish as it 
approaches extinction.  
 In contrast, catch-rates should generally be expected to be hyperstable – declining 
at a slower rate than abundance (β < 1) – as a result of range contraction, technology, 
information-sharing among harvesters, aggregation behavior (e.g. herding, schooling), or 
other factors (Winters & Wheeler 1985; Hilborn & Walters 1987; Mackinson et al. 1997; 
Harley et al. 2001; Gaertner & Dreyfus-Leon 2004; Thorson & Berkson 2010; Torres-
Irineo et al. 2014).  The fact that price flexibilities are generally smaller than 0.5, it is 
likely that populations must have catch elasticities (β) of 0.5 or smaller to be threatened 
by AAE.  Among harvested fish populations, those with catch elasticities this small have 
been predominantly schooling species, which manifest population declines as range 
contractions, maintaining population density (Winters & Wheeler 1985; Mackinson et al. 
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1997).  Some schooling populations have catch rates that are seemingly uncorrelated with 
abundance (β ≈ 0) (Mackinson et al. 1997), which can lead to population collapses 
regardless of demand or substitutability (referred to as ‘catchability-led stock collapse 
(Pitcher 1995)).   
 Though seldom studied, it is likely that many terrestrial harvested species have 
hyperstable catch rates as well, particularly those that aggregate.  Estimating β in 
terrestrial harvests has likely been hindered by difficulty in obtaining catch-per-unit-
effort (CPUE) data in many terrestrial harvests, particularly poaching.  However, in this 
study I introduce a novel approach (equation (3.7b)) to approximating β from range data, 
and provide preliminary validation for this approach. Additionally, because range 
contraction is an important driver of hyperstable catch rates, it is likely that habitat 
destruction could exacerbate harvesting threats of extinction by overharvesting, by 
buffering population densities against declines in abundance, and shrinking the search 
area for harvesters.  Habitat destruction is unlikely to be a major issue for high-seas 
marine species (Worm & Tittensor 2011), but may be an important consideration for 
terrestrial, freshwater, reef, and diadromous species, likely including sturgeons (Lenhardt 
et al. 2006).  Investigating extinction threats posed by catch hyperstability in harvested 
land animals, and interactions between threats of habitat destruction and overharvesting is 
an important area of future research. The extinction of the passenger pigeon (Ectopistes 
migratorius), which has been attributed to both habitat destruction and overharvesting 
(e.g. Bucher 1992), is one potentially interesting historical case study.  Climate change 
could possibly also lead to range contraction-related overharvesting threats to some 
species.   
 This study largely focuses on open-access mechanisms of extinction by 
overharvesting, which has been a source of criticism for some empirical studies of AAE, 
as there are property rights in many harvests, including some poaching (Harris et al. 
2013), and certainly many fisheries (Worm et al. 2009), including most whales 
(International Whaling Commission (IWC 2014)) and all 3 bluefin tuna species (CCSBT 
2011a,b; IATTC 2012; ISC 2012). There is some management of trade in sturgeons 
under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES 2014). 
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While it is true that some types of cooperation, governance, or management can prevent 
extinction of a harvested population under most circumstances, it is nonetheless 
important to understand open-access incentives, as there is rarely perfect enforcement or 
access restriction, particularly in the oceans.  There is significant illegal and unreported 
fishing of SBT, for example (Polachek 2012), despite a very strong recent tradition of 
management, led by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(CCSBT).  For populations that are not yet managed, understanding open-access threats 
can inform management priorities. Moreover, in populations for which f > β, there may 
be profit maximizing incentives to deplete the population, though the strengths of such 
incentives likely depend on the type of cooperation or property rights, the discount rate, 
and other factors. This merits further study.  Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
finding f > β or that the projected minimum revenue-to-cost ratio (R/C) is greater than 1 
implies that deterministic extinction is possible under current biological and economic 
conditions and open-access incentives, not that extinction will happen necessarily.  It is 
important to consider other incentive structures that may exist, and to re-estimate β and f 
on a regular basis as technologies and demand conditions can change.  Estimating f at 
regular intervals may be particularly important because this could allow detection of 
shifts in demand associated with preferences for rarity (Hall et al. 2008), rather than 
sensitivities of prices to scarcity.   
 The assumption of constant per-unit-effort costs in this study is also worthy of 
mention.  Though this is frequently assumed in bioeconomic harvesting models (Clark 
1976, 1985), it is unlikely to be the case in reality, as costs can be highly influenced by 
variable fuel prices, economies of scale, or technological advances, for example (see Lam 
et al. 2011 for recent global analysis of fishing costs).  Economies of scale, which would 
cause per-unit effort costs to decrease as effort increased, might increase threats of AAE.  
The framework presented here could be extended to include changing costs.  However, 
the utility of this added complexity is strongly dependent on the predictability of future 
cost variations.  If such predictability is absent, then constant costs may be a good 
baseline assumption.   
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 This study presents an approach to assessing direct deterministic extinction threats 
to harvested populations from high and increasing value of targeted harvests, but does not 
consider indirect threats from ecological interactions with other populations (e.g. Estes et 
al. 2009), stochastic forces (Lande et al. 2003), market interactions (e.g. Sakai et al. 
2009), or multispecies or opportunistic harvesting (e.g. Branch et al. 2013; Gaines & 
Costello 2013).  Future work expanding or combining the approach presented here with 
other approaches considering these other factors is a fruitful area of future research.  For 
example, Burgess et al. (2013) develop a mechanistic approach to predicting extinction 
threats from multispecies harvesting which relies on estimating the relative depletion 
rates of species relative to those of highest economic or management importance.  
Burgess et al.’s (2013) approach could be easily combined with the approach presented 
here to allow predictions of the threat posed by a target species’ high and rising value to 
other species caught along with it.  Similarly, the approach presented here for estimating 
the profit-abundance relationship of a population’s harvest could be combined with 
estimates of its minimum stochastically viable population size (Lande et al. 2003; Brook 
et al. 2006) to evaluate threats of extinction from stochastic forces.    
 Overharvesting is a significant threat to many populations and species worldwide 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).  Highly-valued, rare species, such as caviar-
producing sturgeon species (Lenhardt et al. 2006; Gault et al. 2008), land-animals hunted 
for trophies (Johnson et al. 2010; Palazy et al. 2012a), large whales (Clark 1973; see also 
Branch et al. 2013), and highly valued tunas (Collette et al. 2011), are rapidly declining 
and are thought to be threatened with extinction by the AAE as a result of their rarity-
value (Courchamp et al. 2006).  This study demonstrates how this threat can be predicted 
from data readily available for many of these species; and provides evidence suggesting 
that hyperstable catch rates resulting from aggregation, range contraction, and possibly 
habitat destruction, are more likely drivers of AAE than rising prices, at least in minke 
whales, bluefin tunas, sturgeons, and other fish.  More research is needed to evaluate the 
possible threat of hyperstable catch to hunted land-mammals (e.g. rhinos, elephants, 
ungulates, large cats), and this study illustrates one possible method that does not require 
catch data.  Combining simple mechanistic theories with low-data assessment approaches 
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likely offers many fruitful avenues for predicting extinction threats from harvesting and 
other human activities before consequences become severe and irreversible (Burgess et 
al. 2013; Gaines & Costello 2013).      
 
Acknowledgements 
I thank S. Polasky, D. Tilman, P.A. Abrams, and P.A. Venturelli for useful discussions. 
This work was supported by a University of Minnesota Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship 
and a Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) 
Postgraduate Scholarship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  70 
 
Figure 3.1. Factors determining the relationship between revenue and abundance of a harvested 
population: (A) Catch elasticity with respect to abundance (β) measures the shape of the catch-per-unit-
effort (CPUE)-abundance (N) relationship. (B) Own-price flexibility of demand (f) measures the strength of 
the response of prices (p) to changes in harvest supply (QS). (C) Harvest supplied at a particular abundance 
at equilibrium is determined by strength of density-dependence, which can be measured by steepness (h), 
the fraction of maximum recruitment occurring at an abundance 20% carrying capacity.  (D) shows the 
shape of the relationship between revenue-per-unit-effort (RPUE) and population size (N) with different 
values of β and f.  When f > β, low costs result in deterministic extinction (E), while high costs result in 
alternative stable states (extinction, and filled circle), and an unstable tipping point (open circle) (F).   
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Figure 3.2.  The importance of the strength of density dependence (steepness). (A) and (B) respectively 
illustrate effects of varying steepness on the relationships between abundance (N) and per-capita growth 
rate (A) and sustainable yield (B).  (C) illustrates the impact of varying steepness on the relationship 
between RPUE and abundance. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Assessing threats under parameter uncertainties.  In each panel, shaded regions 
corresponding to each set of β and h values indicate ranges in the other parameters for which there is a 
threat of AAE: in (A), because parameters in this range imply RPUE is currently inversely related to 
abundance (i.e. dRPUE/dN < 0); and in (B) and (C), because parameters in this range imply that the 
minimum revenue-to-cost-ratio (RMIN/C) as abundance declines to extinction from its current level is 
greater than 1. Estimates with uncertainty bounds (where applicable) are shown for sturgeons (N/NMSY from 
Costello et al. 2012 for Beluga (Huso huso) and Osetr (Acipenser gueldenstaedtii)), East and West Atlantic 
bluefin tuna (N/NMSY estimate and bounds from ICCAT 2012), Pacific bluefin tuna (N/NMSY estimate from 
ISC 2012), Southern bluefin tuna (N/NMSY estimate and bounds from CCSBT 2013), and Northeast Atlantic 
minke whale (N/NMSY and R/C values shown are pre-moratorium (geometric mean of 1983-1985) from 
Amundsen et al. 1995).  The Northeast Atlantic minke whale (β ≈ 0-0.15, f ≈ 0.65) would likely be 
threatened by open-access harvesting (B: RMIN/C > 1). Atlantic bluefin tuna (β ≈ 0.2, f = 0.19) could be 
threatened with low steepness (C) (h ≈ 0.3-0.7 (Myers et al. 1999)).  
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Figure 3.4. Price trends in highly valued species and estimates of catch elasticity from range in tunas. 
(A)-(D) illustrate trends in supplies and prices of (A) SBT, (B) ABF and PBF, (C) caviar (data from FAO 
2014), and (D) the Northeast Atlantic minke whale (data from Amundsen et al. 1995).  All prices were 
converted from nominal to real value using data on annual inflation in the relevant currency (US Dollar 
(USD) or Norwegian Kroner (NOK)) from the World Bank (2014).  (E) shows estimates of average β for 
tuna species calculated from observed changes 1960-1999 in geographic range (data from Worm & 
Tittensor 2011) and abundance (data from Ricard et al. 2012), plotted against the fraction of total catch 
from purse-seine, pole-and-line, and other surface fisheries (data from FAO 2014). The solid line is fit to 
all points, and suggests an average β of 1.13 in tunas with no catch in surface fisheries, and an average β of 
0.03 in tunas caught exclusively in surface fisheries. The dashed line is fit excluding negative β estimates, 
and suggests average βs of 1.04 and 0.79 with no surface fisheries and exclusively surface fisheries, 
respectively. 
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3.5 Supplementary Material 
 
Appendix A. Transforming the Beverton-Holt Model 
 With a single age-class, a Beverton-Holt population growth model for a 
population, i, can be written as: 
€ 
dNi
dt =
xiNi
1+ yiNi
−MiNi  (3.S1), 
where the first term is the Beverton-Holt (1957) stock-recruitment relationship (xi and yi 
are positive constants), and Mi is a positive constant representing natural mortality.  The 
steepness (hi), defined as the fraction of maximum recruitment occurring at an abundance 
20% of natural equilibrium abundance, or carrying capacity (Ki = (1/yi)((xi/Mi) – 1)), can 
be shown to be equal to (Mangel et al. 2013): 
€ 
hi =
xi Mi( )
4 + xi Mi( )
  (3.S2a). 
Equation (3.S2a) can be re-arranged to express xi in terms of hi and Mi: 
€ 
xi =
4hiMi
1− hi
  (3.S2b). 
The maximum per-capita growth-rate in this model is ri = xi – mi, implying that gi(.) is 
given by:  
€ 
gi Ni( ) =
1
xi −Mi
xi
1+ yiNi( )
−Mi
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
 (3.S3). 
Substituting (3.S2b) into equation (3.S3) gives: 
€ 
gi Ni( ) =
hi 5 + yiNi( ) − yiNi −1
5hi −1( ) 1+ yiNi( )
  (3.S4). 
The right-hand side of equation (3.S4) can be set equal to 0 to solve for Ki in terms of hi 
and yi: 
€ 
Ki =
5hi −1
yi 1− hi( )
  (3.S5). 
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Finally, Ni in equation (S4), can be rescaled in terms of Ki by multiplying each Ni by 
multiplying each Ni in equation (S4) by 
€ 
5hi −1
yi 1− hi( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
Ki
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟  (which is equal to 1), which 
gives equation (3.11a): 
€ 
gi Ni Ki( ) =
1− hi( ) 1− Ni Ki( )( )
1− Ni Ki( ) + h 5 Ni Ki( ) −1( )( )   
 (3.11a). 
Ni,MSY as a fraction of Ki is given by (Mangel et al. 2013): 
€ 
Ni,MSY
Ki
=
4hi
1− hi
−1
4hi
1− hi
−1
  (3.S6a), 
which implies that: 
€ 
Ni,MSY =
4hi
1− hi
−1
4hi
1− hi
−1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
5hi −1
yi 1− hi( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  (3.S6b). 
Equation (3.S6b) can be used to rescale Ni in equation (3.S4), giving equation (3.11b): 
€ 
gi Ni Ni,MSY( ) =
1− hi( ) hi 5 − Ni Ni,MSY( )( ) + Ni Ni,MSY( ) 1− 2 hi 1− hi( )( ) −1⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ 
5hi −1( ) 1+ h Ni Ni,MSY( ) −1( ) − Ni Ni,MSY( ) 1− 2 hi 1− hi( )( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟   
 (3.11b). 
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Table 3.S1. Estimates of aggregate price flexibilities (f) for exported caviar (data from FAO 2014). 
Model Effect 
Estimate 
(S.E.) 
Intercept 4.38 (6.51) 
Own-price 
flexibility (f) - 
caviar 
-0.48 
(0.082)*** 
Cross-price 
flexibility - caviar 
exports -0.035 (0.18) 
Income flexibility  0.42 (0.78) 
Number of obs. 32 
R2 0.75 
Model p <0.0001 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Abstract. 
Multispecies fisheries catch numerous species simultaneously, and are particularly likely 
to catch species that compete ecologically with one another, as non-random spatial and 
temporal targeting patterns, bait, size selective nets, and other niche-relevant technologies 
are typically used.   It is also common for sustainable harvest levels to be estimated for 
target and by-catch populations using single-species population models.  Here, I present 
theoretical evidence suggesting that assessments using single-species population models 
are likely to significantly overestimate the sustainable harvests of competitors with 
lowest susceptibility to overfishing (strong stocks), which can lead to management that 
causes unexpected collapses. In contrast, single species models can often provide reliable 
estimates of sustainable harvests of the competitors with highest susceptibility to 
overfishing (weak stocks) in a multispecies harvest. This finding is of potential concern 
because assessment and management efforts in many fisheries focus on strong stocks, 
which often produce much of a fishery’s revenue.  I offer two solutions to these 
problems. First, I show how conditions under which biased estimates of sustainable 
harvests may occur, and bounds on the magnitude of such biases, can be identified using 
conventional single-species assessment models. Second, I discuss how recent advances in 
the management of weak stocks and by-catch species can effectively eliminate this threat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  78 
4.1. Introduction 
 Since the rise of industrial fishing in the mid twentieth century, fisheries have had 
profound impacts on many marine ecosystems (Jackson et al. 2001, Worm et al. 2006), 
severely depleting many target populations (Worm et al. 2009, Costello et al. 2012, 
Ricard et al. 2012).  However, the assessment and management of marine fisheries has 
also seen considerable advances in recent decades, with encouraging signs that 
overfishing is on the decline in many places, and many once depleted stocks have begun 
to rebuild (Costello et al. 2008, Worm et al. 2009, Hilborn & Ovando 2014).  However, 
multispecies fisheries, in which multiple species are caught simultaneously, still pose 
significant threats (Gaines & Costello 2013) because fully exploiting a target stock 
(population) may result in overexploitation of more easily depleted (weaker) stocks and 
species caught unintentionally as by-catch (e.g. Hall 2000; Lewison et al. 2004a,b). 
 Harvested fish populations exist within diverse and complex ecosystems, but their 
sustainable harvests are mostly estimated using single species population models 
(Hilborn & Walters 1992).  Some have called for a transition away from single-species 
assessment and management approaches and toward ‘ecosystem-based fishery 
management’ (EBFM) (Pikitch et al. 2004), while others have argued that such a 
transition is not necessarily pressing, citing the many recent examples of success in 
traditional fisheries management (Hilborn & Ovando 2014).  There is conceptual merit to 
both of these perspectives. Clearly, single species approaches may fail to capture critical 
fishery-relevant ecosystem properties; but fisheries science is also highly data-limited. 
The majority of fisheries do not even have sufficient data with which to perform 
traditional single-species assessments (Costello et al. 2012), and those for which whole 
ecosystem models can be applied empirically (e.g. Link et al. 2002; Christensen & 
Walters 2004; Hilborn 2011) are an even smaller minority.  
 A possibility that has not yet been widely explored in fisheries science is that 
single species population models may, under some conditions, be able to effectively 
abstract multispecies reality, and thus provide accurate estimates of maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) and other reference points for a population despite their simplicity.  Such 
abstraction would occur if the dynamics of a population being assessed were qualitatively 
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similar to the dynamics predicted by a single-species model, and the effects of 
interactions with other species were thus captured implicitly by the parameter estimates 
in the assumed single-species model (Schaffer 1981); allowing the relationship between 
yield and effort to be correctly predicted. In such cases, single-species assessment models 
would not only be adequate, they would be ideal, as their simplicity in comparison to 
multispecies models would be statistically advantageous.  One might imagine that 
multispecies realities indeed often do create yield-effort relationships for stocks that 
resemble a single-species model, as yield is certain to be zero at zero effort and efforts 
beyond a certain level, with some sort of peak in between (Figure 4.1).  However, a few 
theoretical studies have provided counterexamples in predator-prey models (Abrams 
2009a,b,c) and models of either predation or competition with switching or other 
dynamic interactions (Abrams 2009b,c; Tschirhart 2012) – finding yield-effort 
relationships to sometimes be not strictly concave (e.g. having multiple local maxima) or 
sharply-peaked (i.e. locally non-differentiable).  Such studies have not yet considered 
simultaneous species and gear interactions, as would occur in a multispecies fishery, but 
the analogous situation of shared predation among species has been shown to have 
important ecological implications (e.g. Holt 1977; Holt et al. 1994).  
 Here, I theoretically assess the reliability of estimates of MSY and other stock 
reference points from single-species assessment models in stocks being harvested along 
with their ecological competitors in multispecies fisheries.  I focus on competitive 
interactions because these are the most likely among species caught in modern 
multispecies fisheries, which, as a result of targeting specific spatial and temporal 
habitats typically using size-selective nets and/or bait, are likely to be catching species 
occupying similar ecological niches.  I show that estimates of reference points using 
flexible single-species models such as the Beverton-Holt model (Beverton & Holt 1957) 
may often be reliable for weak stocks – those most susceptible to overfishing – but will 
sometimes significantly overestimate the productivity of strong stocks, with potentially 
dangerous consequences for management. I discuss possible methods of empirically 
predicting when this bias will occur and estimating bounds on its magnitude within 
traditional stock assessment frameworks, as well as some management solutions. 
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4.2. Methods & Results 
 
(a) Two stocks and a single fishing type 
 Assessments of the status and health of a fish stock (population) involve 
estimating its abundance (denoted Ni for stock i) and harvest rate (denoted Fi for stock i), 
and how these compare to the abundance and harvest rate that would produce MSY 
(respectively denoted Ni,MSY and Fi,MSY for stock i) or some other reference point, along 
with the yield (i.e. total catch) produced at the reference point in question (Hilborn & 
Walters 1992; Cadima et al. 2003). For brevity, I focus my analysis on MSY, but the 
basic results can be applied to any other reference point. Data inputs typically include 
catch data (including age-structure if applicable (e.g. length-frequency data)), effort data, 
and an index of abundance, either calculated from catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) or 
independent research surveys (Hilborn & Walters 1992; Harley et al. 2001; Cadima et al. 
2003).  In the case of single-species assessments, a single-species population growth 
model is assumed, whose parameters are estimated using the data; and the fitted model is 
used to predict MSY, NMSY, FMSY, N/NMSY, F/FMSY, etc. (Hilborn & Walters 1992; Cadima 
et al. 2003).   
 The parameters of the assumed single-species population growth model determine 
how fast the abundance of the stock (N) is predicted to fall with increasing fishing effort 
(denoted E), and how fast the per-capita production rate (birth rate – natural death rate), 
denoted gi(Ni) for stock i, is predicted to increase as abundance (Ni) decreases (assuming 
negative density-dependence in population growth) (Figure 4.1A,B).  Both of these 
relationships are observed or inferred from the data, which allows the parameters in the 
model to be estimated.  For example, suppose a stock, i, caught by a single type of 
fishing, with effort, E(t), at time t, is assumed to have a constant catchability (per-capita-
per-unit-effort catch rate), denoted qi, and logistic population growth (Schaefer 1954) in 
the absence of harvesting, (gi(Ni) = riNi(1 – Ni/Ki), where ri is the maximum per-capita 
growth rate, and Ki is the natural equilibrium abundance, or carrying capacity - assumed 
to be equal to the pre-harvest abundance, denoted Ni0 (Ni0 = Ki)). These assumptions 
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result in the following predicted instantaneous population rate of change relative to pre-
harvest levels, dni(t)/dt (where ni(t) = Ni(t)/Ni0) at time t: 
€ 
dni t( )
dt = ni t( ) gi ni t( )( ) − qiE t( )( )  (4.1a), 
where,  
€ 
gi ni t( )( ) = ri 1− ni t( )( )  (4.1b). 
Additionally, yield (or total catch), denoted Yi(t) for stock i at time t, would be given by: 
€ 
Yi t( ) = qiNi0ni t( )E t( )   (4.1c). 
Observations of dni(t)/dt (or a discrete time equivalent), ni(t), E(t) and Yi(t) allow 
estimation (e.g. using maximum likelihood) of qi (estimate denoted 
€ 
ˆ q i), ri (estimate 
denoted 
€ 
ˆ r i), and Ni0 (estimate denoted 
€ 
ˆ N i0 ) using equations (4.1a,b,c).  The predicted 
relationship between fishing effort (E) and yield (predicted yield from stock i is denoted 
€ 
ˆ Y i) at the corresponding equilibrium abundance, denoted ni*(E), (i.e. where dni(t)/dt = 0) 
would be: 
€ 
ˆ Y i E( ) = ˆ N i0ni* E( )gi ni* E( )[ ] = ˆ N i0 ˆ q i E −
ˆ q i
ˆ r i
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ E 2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  (4.2). 
The predicted MSYi, Ni,MSY, Fi,MSY , and effort at MSY (denoted EMSYi) would be given 
by: {
€ 
Mˆ S Yi =
ˆ ri ˆ N i0
4 ,
€ 
ˆ N i,MSY =
ˆ N i0
2 ,
€ 
ˆ F i,MSY =
ˆ r i
2 ,
€ 
ˆ E MSYi =
ˆ ri
2 ˆ qi
}. 
  Suppose now that there is a multispecies fishery catching two competing stocks, 
denoted s and w, whereby the ‘weak’ stock, w, is more greatly impacted by the fishing 
effort than the ‘strong’ stock, s.  For the weak stock, fishing effort has the direct negative 
consequence of mortality and the indirect negative consequence of creating an 
unfavourable competitive imbalance – by putting greater pressure on its population than 
on the population of its stronger competitor. Thus, for the weak stock, competition 
magnifies the population impact of fishing mortality, which reduces its productivity 
(achievable yields (Yw) and per-capita production rate gw(.)) relative to non-competitive 
conditions (Figure 4.1A,C). However, the shape of its density-dependence (gw(.) vs. nw) 
yield-effort (Yw vs. E) relationships still often resemble those of a single-species model 
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(Figure 4.1A,C). Thus, it is often possible to accurately estimate MSY and other fishery 
reference points (e.g. F/FMSY) for the weak stock using a single-species assessment model 
(Figure 4.1A,C).   
 In contrast, fishing effort has the direct negative consequence of mortality for the 
strong stock, but the indirect benefit of creating a favourable competitive imbalance – by 
putting greater pressure on the population of its weaker competitor than on its own 
population.  If the direct population cost of effort is less than the indirect benefit, the 
shape of the yield-effort relationship may still resemble that of a single species model 
(Figure 4.1B,D, Figure 4.2A,B,D); but if the indirect benefit is larger, the stock may seem 
infinitely productive, as increasing effort will actually increase the equilibrium stock size 
– a ‘hydra effect’ (Figure 4.2C), named (and discussed in more detail) by Abrams 
(2009d) after the mythological creature that grows two heads in place of one that is cut 
off.  In either case, the strong stock will switch from a high-productivity regime to a 
lower-productivity regime at the effort level at which the weak stock is driven extinct (or 
functionally extinct), because maintaining the high productivity regime would require the 
abundance of the weak stock to continue declining into the negative range to maintain the 
indirect benefit of harvesting for the strong stock (Figure 4.1B,D, Figure 2).   
 Thus, the productivity of the strong stock may be accurately predicted by fitting a 
single-species model over the range of efforts at which the weak stock is extant, but MSY 
is likely to be overestimated if the weak stock is driven extinct at a lower effort (denoted 
EwExtinct) than the effort at which the strong stock would be predicted to reach its MSY 
under its productivity regime in the presence of the weak stock (denoted ÊMSYs) (Figure 
4.1B,D, Figure 4.2A,B,C vs. D). If the overestimate of MSY is large enough, attempts to 
achieve the MSY could cause both stocks to collapse (e.g. as is the case Figure 4.1B,D). 
The same logic can be applied to any other reference point.  
 Assuming constant qs and qw, the condition for overestimation of strong stock 
MSY and FMSY, EwExtinct < ÊMSYs, is equivalent to 
€ 
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( ) < Fw Fw,Extinct( )  because Fi = 
qiE and current effort (E) is the same for both stocks.  This will hold for any type of 
density-dependence or assessment model, gi(.), not only the logistic.  Moreover, if the 
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productivity (Yi, gi(.)) of the weak stock is reliably estimated, the condition for 
overestimation can be evaluated from the single-species assessments themselves as: 
€ 
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( ) < ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )  (where 
€ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( ) is assumed to be an unbiased estimate 
of 
€ 
Fw Fw,Extinct( )). If it is indeed estimated that 
€ 
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( ) < ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( ) , then the 
potential bias in 
€ 
Mˆ S Ys  and 
€ 
ˆ F s,MSY , are bounded by the fact that the true MSYs and Fs,MSY 
can be no smaller than yield and fishing mortality predicted at EwExtinct (
€ 
ˆ Y s ˆ E wExtinct( ) ) and 
€ 
ˆ F s ˆ E wExtinct( )). This implies that:   
€ 
Mˆ S Ys
MSYs
≤
Mˆ S Ys
ˆ Y s ˆ E wExtinct( )
  (4.3a), 
€ 
Fs Fs,MSY( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
≤
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
    (4.3b). 
In other words, the difference between true MSY (MSYs) and predicted MSY (
€ 
Mˆ S Ys) for 
the strong stock will be no greater than the difference between predicted MSY and 
predicted yield at the effort at which the weak stock is predicted to be driven extinct (
€ 
ˆ Y s ˆ E wExtinct( )) (equation (4.3a)) (e.g. Figure 4.2A vs. B), and similarly for effort (equation 
(4.3b)).  Equations (4.3) imply that bounds on biases in predicted MSY (
€ 
Mˆ S Ys) and FMSY 
(
€ 
ˆ F s,MSY ) for the strong stock can be empirically identified using only single-species 
assessments.  These equations (4.3) both depend on the assumption that the single species 
population models used in assessing both the strong stock and the weak stock accurately 
predict their equilibrium statics (Yi vs. E, and gi(.) vs. ni*(E)), but do not assume a specific 
population model (e.g. logistic). 
 To provide a concrete example, I return to the logistic growth assessment model 
(equations (4.1a,b,c)), but now assume that the true population growth in the absence of 
harvesting is described by a Lotka-Volterra competition model for both stocks, whereby 
gi(Ni,Nj) = 1 – (Ni/Ki) – cij(Nj/Kj), for i,j = s,w; i ≠ j, where cij = cji is a positive constant 
defining the strength of competition, which is assumed to correlate with niche similarity 
(sensu MacArthur & Levins 1967).  In other words, 0 ≤ cij ≤ 1, where cij = 1 would imply 
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that stocks i and j were ecologically identical, cij = 0 would imply no niche overlap (nor 
interaction). This assumption provides a concrete interpretation of cij and guarantees that 
stocks co-exist stably in the absence of harvesting (MacArthur & Levins 1967).  The 
weak stock, w, has a higher ‘vulnerability’ to fishing, denoted Vi and defined as Vi = qi/ri 
for stock i (Burgess et al. 2013; see also Clark 1976; Holt 1977), than the strong stock, s 
(i.e. Vw > Vs) (qs, qw, rs, rw are still assumed to be constant). Without harvesting, the 
equilibrium abundance of stock i (i.e. Ni0) is given by: 
€ 
Ni0 =
Ki
1+ cij
  (4.4a). 
Over the range of fishing efforts where both stocks are extant (i.e. Ns, Nw > 0, E < 
EwExtinct), the equilibrium abundance of stock i (as a fraction of Ni0), ni*(E), with fishing 
effort E is given by:   
€ 
ni* E( ) =1−Vi
1− cij V j Vi( )
1− cij
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
E   (4.4b), 
the relationship between equilibrium abundance (ni*(E)) and per-capita production rate 
(gi(.)) is given by: 
€ 
gi ni* E( ),n j* E( )[ ] = ri
1− cij
1− cij V j Vi( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
1− ni* E( )( )   (4.4c), 
and the equilibrium yield with fishing effort E, Yi(E), is given by: 
€ 
Yi E( ) = Ni0qi E −Vi
1− cij V j Vi( )
1− cij
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
E 2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
  (4.4d). 
At fishing efforts larger than EwExtinct, the equilibrium abundance-effort (ns*(E) vs. E) 
density-dependence (gs(.) vs. ns*(E)) and yield-effort (Ys vs. E) relationships for the 
strong stock are given by: 
€ 
ns* E( ) = 1+ csw( ) 1−VsE( )  (4.5a), 
€ 
gs ns* E( )[ ] = rs 1−
Ns* E( )
Ks
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ = rs 1−
ns* E( )
1+ csw
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟   (4.5b), 
 
€ 
Ys E( ) = 1+ csw( )Ns0qs E −VsE 2( )  (4.5c). 
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 As can be seen from equation (4.4b), hydra effects (i.e dni*(E)/dE > 0) occur for 
the strong stock when Vs < cswVw.  While the weak stock is extant, as can be seen from 
comparing equations (4.4c) and (4.1b), and (4.4d) and (4.2a), the equilibrium density-
dependence (gi(.) vs. ni) and yield-effort (Yi vs. E) relationships of both the weak stock 
and the strong stock (if there is no hydra effect) are perfectly abstracted by a logistic 
equation; specifically one where:   
€ 
ˆ ri = ri
1− cij
1− cij V j Vi( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
  (4.6), 
€ 
ˆ q i = qi, and 
€ 
ˆ N i0 = Ni0 = Ki 1+ cij( ).  As can be seen from equation (4.6), competition 
indeed makes the weak stock less productive (
€ 
ˆ r w < rw) (Figure 4.1A) and the strong stock 
more productive (
€ 
ˆ rs > rs) (Figure 4.1B), with the productivity of the strong stock reverting 
(
€ 
ˆ rs = rs) once the weak stock is driven extinct (Figure 4.1B,D).   
 If rs and rw are indeed estimated as 
€ 
ˆ rs and 
€ 
ˆ r w according to equation (4.6), the bias 
in predicted MSY (or any other reference point) for the strong stock (
€ 
Mˆ S Ys) can be 
solved for analytically (Appendix A). As illustrated in Figure 4.3A, though the bias in 
€ 
Mˆ S Ys  depends on the strength of competition (csw), which is difficult to measure, it is 
approximately equal to the estimable upper bound defined by equation (4.3a) over a large 
range of csw (~csw > 0.5). In the logistic model, this upper bound on 
€ 
Mˆ S Ys  bias is given 
by (Appendix A): 
€ 
Mˆ S Ys
MSYs
≤
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
2
2 ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
−1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
  (4.7), 
 It should be noted however that mean estimates of rs and rw will be similar but not 
exactly equal to 
€ 
ˆ rs and 
€ 
ˆ rw  in equation (4.6) in practice because the logistic model would 
be fit to transient (i.e. non-equilibrium) data. Unlike in a single-species case (equation 
(4.1b)), the transient density-dependence relationship (gi(ni(t),nj(t)) vs. ni(t)) will not be 
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identical to the equilibrium relationship (gi(ni*(E),nj*(E)) vs. ni*(E), given by equation 
4.4c). Specifically, mean estimates of rs will be slightly smaller than 
€ 
ˆ rs in equation (4.6), 
and mean estimates of rw slightly larger than 
€ 
ˆ r w in equation (4.6), to a degree positively 
related the rate at which the fishery develops (i.e. how quickly E(t) increases) relative to 
population dynamics (see Figure 4.S1). In other words, rapid fishery expansion 
introduces an additional, albeit small, source of bias into predictions of competing stocks’ 
responses to fishing, which makes strong stocks appear less productive and weak stocks 
more productive. In the case of the strong stock, this bias may actually partially 
counteract the larger bias that is the primary focus of this study. 
 
(b) Three or more stocks 
 With more than two stocks, yield-effort and density-dependence relationships can 
still often be well abstracted by single-species models over the range of efforts where all 
stocks are extant.  For example, suppose now that there are J competing stocks, with 
Lotka-Volterra competition (MacArthur & Levins 1967) as above, such that the rate of 
change of the abundance of stock i, dNi(t)/dt, is given by:  
€ 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni t( ) ri 1− Ni t( ) Ki( ) − cij N i t( ) Ki( )j=1, j≠ i
J
∑⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
− qiE t( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟   (4.8), 
where cij < 1 for all i,j. The pre-harvest equilibrium abundance, Ni0, of stock i, is given 
by: 
€ 
Ni0 = Ki C−1( ) ijj=1
J
∑   (4.9a), 
where, 
€ 
C =
1 c12 ... c1J
c21 1 ... c2J
... ... ... ...
cJ1 cJ 2 ... 1
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
  (4.9b), 
C-1 is the inverse of C, and (C-1)ij is the element in the ith row and jth column of C-1. 
Over the range of efforts at which all stocks are extant, the equilibrium abundance of 
stock i, scaled to Ni0, ni*(E), is given by: 
  87 
  
€ 
ni* E( ) =1−
Vi
X
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ E   (4.9c), 
where 
€ 
X =
C−1( )ijj=1
J
∑
C−1( )ij V j Vi( )j=1
J
∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ ⎟ 
  (4.9d); 
 
the relationship between equilibrium abundance (ni*(E)) and per-capita production rate 
(gi(.)) is given by: 
€ 
gi n* E( )[ ] = riX 1− ni* E( )( )  (4.9e), 
where 
€ 
n* E( ) = n1* E( ),...,nJ* E( ){ }, and the equilibrium yield with fishing effort E, Yi(E), is 
given by: 
€ 
Yi E( ) = Ni0qi E −
Vi
X
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ E 2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟   (4.9f). 
Similarly to the two stock case, these relationships are perfectly abstracted by a logistic 
growth model with 
€ 
ˆ ri = riX  for any stock for which X > 0  (X < 0 would result in a hydra 
effect).   
 However, the key difference is that, with 3 or more stocks, shifts in the 
productivity of stronger stocks following extinction of the weakest stock can be either 
positive or negative, implying that it is possible to have either positive or negative bias in 
estimation of MSY or other reference points. Nonetheless, the empirically estimable 
upper bounds on positive bias given by equations (4.3) and (4.7) still apply because the 
equilibrium statics are well abstracted over the range of efforts at which all stocks are 
extant. An illustrative example of this is provided in Figure 4.3B,C using the above 
model with 3 stocks.  The strongest stocks are most likely to have positive MSY 
estimation bias, but can also have negative bias (Figure 4.3B).  Bias is particularly likely 
to be positive if a strong stock is much stronger than all others (Figure 4.3B).  The upper 
bound on bias defined by equation (4.7) (Figure 4.3A) is clearly visible in both Figure 
4B,C. Similarly to the two-stock case, there are likely to be small biases in estimating the 
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abstracted yield-effort and density-dependence relationships as a result of transient 
dynamics.  
 
(c) Multiple fishing types 
 All results presented thus far are general to multiple fishing types under the 
assumption of constant relative efforts among them (i.e. when Ek(t)/∑lEl(t), where Ek(t) is 
the effort of fishing type k at time t, is constant for all k).  Constant relative effort implies 
that,  
€ 
Fi = qikEkk∑ = Ekk∑ qik
Ek
Ekk∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ ⎟ k
∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
= q iE  (4.10), 
where 
€ 
q i  is a constant, and E = ∑kEk(t).  Thus, with constant relative efforts, all fishing 
types together behave identically to a single fishing type with vulnerability,
€ 
q i , for stock i 
and effort E.   
 Multiple fishing types with changing relative efforts would impact the results 
similarly to changing catchabilities, q, which both result in changing per-unit-effort 
mortality rates (i.e. average catchability, 
€ 
q i).  In both cases, the parameter estimates of 
single-species assessment models should not be affected if underlying population growth 
is truly a single-species process (i.e. there are no species interactions), assuming 
observations or estimates of indices of abundance (i.e. ni) and per-capita production (gi(.)) 
are unaffected by changing 
€ 
q i .  For example, if both the underlying population growth 
and assessment models are logistic, then estimation of ri using equation (4.1b) would be 
unaffected by changing 
€ 
q i ; and observations of CPUE and ni would allow the changes in 
€ 
q i  to be inferred.  Though abundance indices estimated from fishery-independent surveys 
may be largely unaffected by changes in fishery q, it is possible for CPUE-based 
abundance indices to be affected (see Maunder & Punt (2004) for review of CPUE-based 
abundance indices).  
 However, changes in 
€ 
q  would impact estimates, using single-species models, of 
the productivity of stocks that competed with one another (or interacted otherwise), 
because changes in relative 
€ 
q  among different stocks would impact the indirect effects of 
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fishing effort on population growth via competition (or other ecological interactions).  
Though beyond the scope of this study, it is likely that temporal dynamics in 
€ 
q  would 
have widely varied and strongly context-dependent impacts on the estimation and 
competition-related estimation bias in stock reference points using single-species 
assessment models.  Moreover, because dynamic 
€ 
q  should impact productivity estimates 
of stocks interacting with others in the fishery, but should not impact productivity 
estimates of stocks without species interactions, significant changes in estimated 
productivity of a stock, in the absence of exogenous explanations (e.g. climate change), 
may be a sign of important ecological interactions worth considering in the assessment 
process.   
 
(d) Flexible population models (Beverton-Holt) and steepness 
 The logistic model has been a central focus of this study thus far due to its 
tractability, but it is also important to briefly consider more flexible population models, 
such as the Beverton-Holt model (Beverton & Holt 1957), which are much more 
commonly used in fisheries research (Hilborn & Walters 1992), and are also much more 
likely to be able to accurately abstract most pre-collapse yield-effort relationships.  The 
Beverton-Holt model with a single age class can be written in the form of equation 
(4.1b), with gi(ni(t)) given by (see Appendix A in Chapter 3)); Mangel et al. 2013):    
€ 
gi ni t( )( ) = ri
1− hi( ) 1− ni t( )( )
1− ni t( ) + hi 5ni t( ) −1( )( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
  
(4.11), 
Here, hi is the ‘steepness’ of population growth of stock i, defined as the fraction of 
maximum recruitment produced at an abundance 20% the size of carrying capacity 
(Mangel et al. 2013), and is a measure of the strength of density-dependence (high 
steepness implies strong density-dependence). This transformed Beverton-Holt model 
(equation (4.11)) is identical to the logistic model (equation (4.1b)) when hi = 0.2 (for all 
i).   
 Steepness impacts the bias in estimating MSY and other reference points. For 
example, suppose MSY is predicted for a strong stock, s, (MŜYs) using a fitted Beverton-
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Holt model, where steepness is estimated as 
€ 
ˆ h s , the current fishing effort is estimated to 
be a fraction, 
€ 
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY , of EMSYs, and a fraction, 
€ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct , of the effort needed to 
drive the weakest stock extinct, EwExtinct.  If  
€ 
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( ) < ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( ) , the predicted 
upper bound on bias in MŜYs, assuming constant relative effort among different fishing 
types (from equation (4.3a), see Appendix B for full derivation), is given by:   
€ 
Mˆ S Ys
MSYs
≤
ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( ) − 2 ˆ h s$ % & 
' 
( 
) 1− ˆ h s( ) 1− u( ) − 2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )$ % & 
' 
( 
) u
ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( ) 1− ˆ h s + 5 ˆ h s −1( )u − 2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )$ % & 
' 
( 
) 
  (4.12a), 
€ 
u =
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
  (4.12b). 
As illustrated in Figure 4.4A, strong apparent density-dependence (i.e. high 
€ 
ˆ h s ) results in 
smaller potential biases in MSY estimation.  The upper bound on bias in 
€ 
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY  is still 
given by equation (4.3b). 
 Additionally, unlike in the case of logistic growth, even flexible single-species 
models do not perfectly abstract a stock’s density-dependence and yield-effort 
relationship when competing stocks differ in the strength of true (i.e. not estimated) 
density-dependence (true steepness, hi, in this model).  They often provide good 
approximations, but there are exceptions. For example, Figure 4.4B-F compare true and 
abstracted equilibrium yield-effort (Yi(E) vs. E) relationships in two-stock fisheries, in 
which the true population dynamics are assumed to be described by a Beverton-Holt 
model modified to include competition by defining per-capita production as: 
€ 
gi xi t( )( ) = ri
1− hi( ) 1− xi t( )( )
1− xi t( ) + hi 5xi t( ) −1( )( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
  
(4.13), 
€ 
xi t( ) = Ni t( ) Ki( ) + cij N j t( ) K j( )   (4.13b), 
where xi(t) is the sum of abundances of all stocks in the fishery, scaled to their carrying 
capacities, and weighted by their competition coefficients. Though true yield-effort 
relationships often strongly resemble relationships predicted by a single-species model, 
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strong (true) density-dependence in strong stocks (i.e. high hs), coupled with weaker 
(true) density-dependence in weak stocks, (i.e. low hw) can lead to two-peaked yield-
effort relationships for the strong stock (Figure 4.4E,F), which can make abstraction 
unreliable, but does not necessarily systematically bias MSY and F/FMSY estimates in the 
same way as weak stock collapses (Figure 4.4E).  The two-peaked yield-effort 
relationship for the strong stock with hs > hw occurs because the stronger density-
dependence of the strong stock (i.e. hs > hw) compensates for its lower vulnerability (Vs < 
Vw) at high combined abundances (i.e. large xi), making the strong stock actually more 
easily depleted (i.e. weaker) at low efforts, but less easily depleted (stronger) at high 
efforts.  In fact, two-peaked yield-effort relationships could cause strong stocks to be 
estimated to be weak if the observations only cover a low range of efforts (Figure 4.4F), 
thereby reducing the threat of overestimation of references points (but increasing the 
likelihood of underestimation). 
 
4.3. Discussion 
 Using relatively simple models, this study demonstrates an important pitfall of 
single-species stock assessment frameworks that is caused by ecological competition in 
multispecies fisheries.  Though flexible single-species models, such as the Beverton-Holt 
(Beverton & Holt 1957) model can often provide reasonably accurate predictions of 
yield-effort relationships with any set of extant competing populations, estimates of 
achievable and sustainable yields at efforts beyond those that cause the collapse (i.e. 
extinction or functional extinction) of the weakest stock are highly unreliable.  
Significant overestimation of reference point yields (e.g. MSY) and mortality rates (e.g. 
FMSY/FCurrent) is particularly likely in the strongest stocks as a result of this bias.  Such 
overestimation can lead to unintended overfishing and possibly even unexpected 
collapses of these strong stocks and other weaker stocks caught along with them (e.g. 
Figure 4.1B).  This finding might be cause for concern in some fisheries, as strong stocks 
are often the main contributors to multispecies fishery profits, and are consequently often 
the central focus of assessment and management. 
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 However, there are several possible solutions that can effectively eliminate this 
threat of overestimation and consequent overfishing that do not necessarily require 
abandoning single-species assessment frameworks.  First, as I illustrate here, single-
species assessment models can often reliably identify conditions under which bias in 
reference point estimates are likely. In particular, if it is estimated, within a single-species 
assessment framework, that 
€ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( ) > ˆ F s ˆ F s,Reference Point( )  (where s denotes a strong 
stock and w denotes the stock estimated to be weakest – depleted at the lowest effort; 
where each is assessed separately using a single-species model), it is likely that 
€ 
ˆ F s ˆ F s,Reference Point( ) is biased by a factor of up to 
€ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( ) / ˆ F s ˆ F s,Reference Point( ) (equation 
(4.3b)).  The upper bound on bias in the reference point yield (e.g. MSY) can be 
calculated from the single-species assessment model used (e.g. equation (4.7a) for the 
logistic model, equations (4.12) for the Beverton-Holt model).  More precise estimates of 
biases may be possible if competition strengths can be measured, though this is likely to 
be difficult in practice. 
 Systematic reference point estimation bias arises when some stocks are much 
more susceptible to overfishing from current practices than others, which is also the well-
known weak stock problem (Hall et al. 2000; Gaines & Costello 2013).  The condition 
for estimation bias demonstrated here, 
€ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( ) > ˆ F s ˆ F s,Reference Point( ) , implies that any 
solution that effectively addresses the weak stock problem (i.e. leads to balance in the 
exploitation rates of different stocks) also eliminates the potential for systematic 
overestimation of reference points in strong stocks.  There have been several examples of 
recent success in reducing disproportionate depletion of weak stocks and by-catch 
species, using technological innovations (e.g. turtle excluder devices (Crowder et al. 
1994)), and incentives (e.g. multispecies catch quotas) encouraging fishers to avoid 
spatial or temporal targeting behaviours that are associated with high catch of weak 
stocks and by-catch (Hall 2000; Cox et al. 2007; Branch & Hilborn 2008; Moore et al. 
2009).  My results suggest that such management successes, in addition to reducing 
threats of overfishing to weak stocks, are likely to have the added benefit of allowing for 
more reliable MSY estimation from strong stocks.  There is also evidence that catch 
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balancing may lead to higher fishery yields and profits (Garcia et al. 2012; see also 
Chapter 5). Further research and advances in mitigating exploitation imbalances in 
multispecies fisheries is thus critical.   
 My results also add important insights to the small but growing literature on when 
single-species assessment models can reliably estimate yield-effort relationships, or more 
generally, the shape of realized density-dependence (Abrams 2009a), by abstracting 
multispecies reality.  Both Abrams (2009b) and Tschirhart (2012) showed that switching 
and other dynamic behaviours, in models of either predation or competition, can lead to 
non-differentiable portions (i.e. sharp peaks or valleys) in yield-effort relationships, 
whereby the harvested population switches abruptly from one productivity regime to 
another.  My analysis highlights the potential of weak stock collapses to create similar 
regime shifts for strong stocks with which they compete.  The potential for such shifts in 
different harvests is important to understand, as they can lead to unexpected collapse if 
they occur at efforts beyond the range of historical observations.  It is likely that weak 
stock collapses cause shifts in productivity regimes in many if not most types of 
ecosystems, but this has not yet been widely studied, and is an important area of future 
research. 
 Abrams (2009a,b,c) also showed that predators often have realized density-
dependence relationships that have both concave and convex segments, leading to yield-
effort relationships with multiple peaks (similar to Figure 4.4E,F) as a result of predator 
satiation and prey-density-dependence (Abrams 2009a), adaptive changes in prey 
behaviour (Abrams 2009b), or changes in apparent competition between multiple prey-
types in response to increasing predator mortality-rates (Abrams 2009c).  My analysis 
shows that opposing asymmetries in vulnerability (catch-rate/growth rate) and the 
strength of density dependence (i.e. strong stocks, with lowest vulnerability, have 
strongest density dependence) can produce similar patterns in less vulnerable competing 
species (strong stocks) (Figure 4.4E,F).  This occurs because the ‘strong’ stock is in fact 
more easily depleted (i.e. weaker) at low efforts due to its stronger density-dependence. 
In effect, the two-peaked yield-effort relationship is caused by a reversal in which stock 
is stronger and which is weaker. Consequently, any other factor that could lead to 
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reversals in relative depletability among stocks along an effort gradient may also result in 
two-peaked yield-effort relationships in strong stocks.  For example, if stocks with higher 
growth rates (r) also had more hyperstable catches (which would cause q to rise more 
quickly as abundance (N) declined), the stocks with lower growth rates and lower 
hyperstbility might be more easily depleted at low efforts (i.e. weaker) but less easily 
depleted at high efforts (i.e. stronger), leading to a two-peaked yield-effort relationship.   
 This study focuses on biases in single-species assessments driven by inter-specific 
interactions (competition in particular), but there may be other sources of bias.  One that 
may be of particular concern is fishery-induced evolution, whereby fisheries impose 
selection pressures on the life histories of stocks, often towards smaller body size and 
earlier age at maturity (Hutchings & Fraser 2008).  Fishery-induced evolution is thought 
to cause overestimation of the recovery potential of many depleted stocks (e.g. see 
Hutchings 1999; Olsen et al. 2004 for evidence in northwest Atlantic cod (Gadus 
morhua)). 
  Imbalances in exploitation rates of different species in multispecies fisheries pose 
threats to weak stocks and by-catch species by creating economic incentives to deplete 
them in order to obtain profits from stronger stocks (Burgess et al. 2013; Gaines & 
Costello 2013).  This study illustrates how such imbalances also can lead to 
overestimation of the sustainable yields of strong stocks as a result of ecological 
competition.  Together, these principles imply that misuse of single-species assessment 
models in multispecies fisheries could exacerbate the weak stock problem by creating 
misleading incentives to overfish in pursuit of phantom catches that evaporate when a 
weak stock collapses.  Fortunately, as illustrated and discussed here, the potential for bias 
in single-species assessments in multispecies fisheries is both quantifiable and correctable 
within existing assessment and management frameworks. 
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Figure 4.1. Apparent (red and blue dashed curves) and actual (black solid curves) (A, B) density-
dependence (per-capita production vs. abundance) and (C, D) yield-effort relationships with competition, 
as well as yield-effort relationships, that would occur without competition (grey dotted curves), are shown 
in models with logistic growth, Lotka-Volterra competition, two stocks and one type of fishing.  Blue 
sections of the apparent relationships indicate portions where the weak stock is extant; red sections indicate 
portions where the weak stock would have to have negative abundance for the predicted yields or per-
capita production from the strong stock to be achieved. (A, C) and (B, D) show these relationships 
respectively for the weak and strong stock with parameter values: {rw = rs = qw = 1, qs = 0.65, csw = 0.5}.  
Under these parameter values, both the strong and weak stocks are driven extinct at lower fishing efforts 
than the effort that would be predicted, by fitting a single-species model, to produce MSY for the strong 
stock (ÊMSYs) (B, D). 
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Figure 4.2. Apparent (red and blue dashed curves) and actual (black solid curves) yield-effort relationships 
with competition, as well as yield-effort relationships, that would occur without competition (grey dotted 
curves), are shown for the strong stock in two-stock models with logistic growth, and Lotka-Volterra 
competition. Blue sections of the apparent yield-effort relationship indicate portions where the weak stock 
is extant; red sections indicate portions where the weak stock would have to have negative abundance for 
the predicted yields to be achieved.  The panels illustrate how the magnitude of biases in MSY estimates 
for the strong stock (MŜYs) depend on the relative values of efforts causing extinction of the weak stock 
(EwExtinct), true MSY for the strong stock (EMSYs), and the effort predicted to produce MSY for the strong 
stock under the productivity regime in which the weak stock is extant (ÊMSYs).  The maximum possible 
biases (given by equation 4.3) occur when true MSY occurs at the extinction effort of the weak stock (i.e. 
EMSYs = EwExtinct) (A), whereas biases are smaller than this maximum when EMSYs > EwExtinct (B, C). (C) 
shows a hydra effect, whereby fishing effort increases the abundance of the strong stock while the weak 
stock is extant.  MSYs is estimated without bias (i.e. MSYs = MŜYs) (D) when the predicted MSY effort for 
the strong stock (ÊMSYs) is smaller than EwExtinct. Parameter values are: {rw = rs = qw = 1} in all panels; (A): 
{qs = 0.7, csw = 0.5}; (B): {qs = 0.3, csw = 0.1}; (C): {qs = 0.35, csw = 0.5}; (D): {qs = 0.85, csw = 0.5}. 
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Figure 4.3. Panel (A) shows the exact (black and grey curves) and maximum (blue curve) biases in 
estimated strong stock MSY (MŜYs) in a two-stock model with logistic growth, Lotka-Volterra competition 
and a single type of fishing. With more than two stocks, single-species assessment models can either over- 
or underestimate strong stock MSY. Panels (B) and (C) show MSY estimation biases for (C) the strongest 
stock (s) and (D) the weaker strong stock, or medium stock (m) from 2000 randomly selected parameter 
sets ({ri = 1, qi ~ U[0.3,1], cik ~ U[0,0.9] for i = 1,2,3}, identities of strong, weak and medium stocks were 
determined by ranking apparent vulnerabilities, 
€ 
ˆ V i). Parameter sets with hydra effects are not shown as 
apparent MSY does not exist.    
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Figure 4.4.  (A) shows predicted maximum biases in estimating strong stock MSY, MSYs, using a 
Beverton-Holt model (from equations (4.12a)) at different levels of apparent steepness, 
€ 
ˆ h i. (B)-(E) show 
true (solid black curves), apparent (dashed blue curves), and no-competition (dotted grey curves) yield-
effort relationships in 2-stock models with a single type of fishing and modified Beverton-Holt growth 
(equations (4.13)).  The apparent relationships (blue dashed curves) shown are obtained from fitting the 
yield-effort relationship predicted by a single species Beverton-Holt model to the true yield effort 
relationships (solid black curves) over the range of at which the weak stock is extant, in all panels except 
(F), where the fit is performed over the range E = {0, 0.4}.  Parameter values are: {rw = rs = qw = 1, qs = 
0.7, csw = cws = 0.5} for all panels, with steepness (h) values shown in the panels. 
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4.4 Supplementary Material  
 
Appendix A – Analytical derivation of MSY estimation bias with Lotka-Volterra 
competition and assumed logistic growth (Figure 4.3A)  
 In a two-stock, single fishing type system, in which the true dynamics are 
governed by Lotka-Volterra competition (equation (4.8)), and MSY for each stock is 
estimated using a logistic growth model (equations (4.1)), the relationship between true 
MSY for the strong stock, MSYs, and estimated MSY, MŜYs (as illustrated by the black 
and grey curves in Figure 4.3A), is given by: 
€ 
Mˆ S Ys
MSYs
=
1,
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
≤1
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
2
2 ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
−1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
, 1 <
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
≤
1
1− csw
1+ 2csw
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
1+ csw( )
2 ,
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
>
1
1− csw
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
  (4.S1)
 
The proof of this is as follows: 
 The yield effort relationship for the strong stock, when the weak stock is extant, is 
given by (from equation (4.2): 
€ 
Ys E( ) = ˆ N s0 ˆ q s E − ˆ V sE 2( )  (4.S2a), 
where, 
€ 
ˆ qs = qs  (4.S2b), 
€ 
ˆ r s = rs
1− csw
1− csw Vw Vs( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
 (4.S2c), 
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€ 
ˆ V s =
ˆ q s
ˆ r s
= Vs
1− csw Vw Vs( )
1− csw
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
 (4.S2d), 
€ 
ˆ N s0 =
Ks
1+ csw
  (4.S2e). 
The weak stock goes extinct at an effort, EwExtinct where, 
€ 
Fw,Extinct = ˆ q w EwExtinct = ˆ r w   (4.S3a), 
and thus, 
€ 
EwExtinct =
1
ˆ V w
  (4.S3b). 
Using similar logic, it can be shown that the predicted MSY effort for the strong stock 
(assuming no hydra effects), ÊsMSY is given by: 
€ 
ˆ E MSYs =
1
2 ˆ V s
   (4.S4). 
Similarly, the MSY effort if the weak stock is not present is 1/(2Vs), which is smaller than 
ÊMSYs because Vs < Vw, which implies that 
€ 
ˆ V s  < Vs.  Because of this, if EwExtinct  ≥ ÊMSYs, it 
must be the case that yield is a decreasing function of effort at higher efforts; and thus 
MSYs = MŜYs if 
€ 
ˆ V w 2 ˆ V s( ) ≤1.  Because fishing mortality, F, is proportional to fishing 
effort for both stocks, 
€ 
ˆ V w
2 ˆ V s
=
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
 at any given effort level.  Thus, MSYs = 
MŜYs if 
€ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
≤1.If 
€ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
>1, MSYs will either be equal to the yield at 
the effort level where the weak stock goes extinct (if 
€ 
1
ˆ V w
≥
1
2Vs
) or it will be equal to the 
MSY that would be realized if the weak stock never existed (if 
€ 
1
ˆ V w
≤
1
2Vs
).   
 From equations (4.S2a) and (4.S3), the yield of the strong stock at the extinction 
effort of the weak stock is: 
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€ 
Ys EwExtinct( ) =
Ks
1+ csw
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
ˆ q s
ˆ V w
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1−
ˆ V s
ˆ V w
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  (4.S5). 
Substituting 
€ 
Mˆ S Ys = ˆ N s0
ˆ r s
4
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ =
Ks
1+ csw
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
ˆ q s
4 ˆ V s
 into equation (4.S5) gives: 
€ 
Ys EwExtinct( ) = 4M ˆ S Ys
ˆ V s
ˆ V w
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1−
ˆ V s
ˆ V w
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  (4.S6). 
Substituting 
€ 
ˆ V w
2 ˆ Vs
=
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
 in equation (4.S6) gives:  
€ 
Ys EwExtinct( ) = Mˆ S Ys
2 ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
−1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
2
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
  (4.S7). 
The yield of the strong stock at the MSY it would reach without the presence of the weak 
stock, denoted MSYs,w-, is equal to (rsKs/4), which, by equations (4.S2b,c), is equal to: 
€ 
MSYs,w− = Ks
ˆ q s
4 ˆ V s
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
1− csw Vw Vs( )
1− csw
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
  (4.S8). 
From equations (4.S2b,c), it can be shown that: 
€ 
Vw
Vs
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ =
csw + ˆ V w ˆ V s( )
1+ csw ˆ V w ˆ V s( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
  (4.S9). 
Substituting equation (4.S9) into equation (4.S8) gives: 
€ 
MSYs,w− = Mˆ S Ys
1+ csw( )
2
1+ csw ˆ V w ˆ V s( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
  (4.S10), 
which is equivalent to: 
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€ 
MSYs,w− = Mˆ S Ys
1+ csw( )
2
1+ 2csw
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
  (4.S11), 
Thus, the true MSY, MSYs, will be given by equation (4.S7) if 
€ 
1
ˆ V w
≥
1
2Vs
, and equation 
(4.S11) if 
€ 
1
ˆ V w
≤
1
2Vs
. Equations (4.S2b,c) can also be used to show that the condition, 
€ 
1
ˆ V w
≥
1
2Vs
, is equivalent to: 
€ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
≤
1
1− csw
   (4.S12). 
Thus, the true strong stock MSY, MSYs, is given by: 
€ 
MSYs =
Mˆ S Ys,
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
≤1
Mˆ S Ys
2 ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
−1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
2
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
, 1 <
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
≤
1
1− csw
Mˆ S Ys
1+ csw( )
2
1+ 2csw
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
,
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
>
1
1− csw
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
  (4.S13), 
 from which equation (4.S1) follows. 
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Appendix B – Derivation of equation (4.12) 
 With a single age class, the predicted density-dependence of strong stock s, 
€ 
ˆ gs ns( )
, using a Beverton-Holt assessment model, is given by: 
€ 
ˆ g s ns( ) =
1− ˆ h s( ) 1− ns( )
1− ns + ˆ h s 5ns −1( )( )   
 (4.S14), 
where 
€ 
ˆ h s  is the estimated steepness of strong stock s.  The predicted maximum bias in 
MŜYs is determined by the difference between MŜYs and the predicted yield at an effort 
a fraction 
€ 
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
 of the estimated MSY effort, denoted 1/u below for ease of 
notation, where 
€ 
u =
ˆ F w ˆ F w,Extinct( )
ˆ F s ˆ F s,MSY( )
.  The predicted yield as a function of effort is given by: 
€ 
ˆ Y s ˆ n s E( )( ) = ˆ N s0 ˆ q s ˆ n s E( )E   (4.S15), 
where 
€ 
ˆ qs is the average estimated qs, weighted by relative efforts, and
€ 
ˆ n s E( ) is the 
predicted equilibrium abundance at with total effort, E, found by solving the equation:   
€ 
ˆ g s ˆ n s E( )( ) = ˆ q sE   (4.S16), 
which defines equilibrium at effort E.  Inserting the solution of equation (4.S16) into 
(4.S15) gives: 
€ 
ˆ Y s E( ) =
ˆ N s0 ˆ r sE ˆ V s 1− ˆ h s( ) 1− E ˆ V s( )
1− E ˆ V s + ˆ h s 5E ˆ V s −1( )
  (4.S17), 
where 
€ 
ˆ V s = ˆ qsˆ rs
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ . 
The predicted total effort, E, at MSY, ÊMSYs, can be calculated from equation (4.S17) to 
be: 
€ 
ˆ E MSYs =
1− ˆ h s( ) + 2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )
ˆ V s 5 ˆ h s −1( )
  (4.S18). 
Inserting equation (4.S18) into (4.S17) gives the predicted MSY: 
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€ 
Mˆ S Ys =
ˆ N s0 ˆ r s 1− ˆ h s( ) ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( ) − 2 ˆ h s⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1− ˆ h s( ) − 2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
5 ˆ h s −1( )
2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )
  (4.S19). 
The actual MSY will be no smaller than the predicted yield at an effort ÊMSYs/u, which is 
equivalent to: 
€ 
MSYs ≥
ˆ N s0 ˆ r s 1− ˆ h s( ) 1− ˆ h s − 2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1− u + ˆ h s 5u −1( ) − 2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
u 5 ˆ h s −1( )
2 1− u( ) 1− ˆ h s( ) − 2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
  (4.S20). 
Dividing equations (4.S19) and (4.S20) gives equation (4.12a): 
€ 
Mˆ S Ys
MSYs
≤
ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( ) − 2 ˆ h s$ % & 
' 
( 
) 1− ˆ h s( ) 1− u( ) − 2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )$ % & 
' 
( 
) u
ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( ) 1− ˆ h s + 5 ˆ h s −1( )u − 2 ˆ h s 1− ˆ h s( )$ % & 
' 
( 
) 
  (4.12a). 
 
 
Figure 4.S1. A comparison of equilibrium (solid black curves) and transient (solid grey curves) density 
dependence relationships (gi(.) vs. ni) in a weak stock (A) and a strong stock (B) having Lotka-Volterra 
competition and caught by a single fishing type with no other competitors. Parameter values are the same 
as in Figure 4.1 ({rw = rs = qw = 1, qs = 0.65, csw = 0.5}).  Blue and red dashed curves illustrate apparent 
equilibrium density dependence in the presence of the weak stock (blue regions indicate the range of 
equilibrium abundances at which the weak stock is extant, red regions indicate strong stock productivities 
that would require negative weak stock abundance).  Rapid fishery development (i.e. large Eʹ′(t)) results in 
more balanced transient depletion of the two stocks than would occur at successive equilibria, which results 
in weaker indirect competitive effects, and thus a strong stock that seems less productive (B) and a weak 
stock that seems more productive (A). 
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Abstract. 
Biological diversity is known to play an important role in generating and maintaining 
ecosystem productivity and other functions, and has consequently become a central focus 
of many efforts to preserve ecosystem services.  Theoretical parallels suggest the 
diversity of fishing fleets may have a similarly important role in determining the 
productivity and ecological impacts of fisheries, but this possibility has rarely been 
explored.  Here I present theoretical analyses showing that the diversity of métiers – 
combinations of technology and fishing grounds – and technical efficiencies in a fishing 
fleet can be important determinants of the productivity, profitability, and ecological 
impacts of fisheries, particularly mixed-stock or multispecies fisheries.  Diversification of 
métiers can increase yields and reduce adverse ecological impacts in both managed and 
open-access multispecies fisheries.  Diversification of technical efficiencies creates 
opportunities for larger profits in well-managed fisheries, but often decreases yields and 
worsens ecological impacts in open-access fisheries.  These results suggest that the 
potential impact of management may be highest in fisheries with diverse fleets, 
highlighting the importance of managing large, international fisheries such as those 
targeting tunas. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Biological diversity is widely considered to be an important driver of the 
productivity and stability of ecosystems and the services that they provide (McCann 
2000; Loreau et al. 2001; Balvanera et al. 2006; Cardinale et al. 2006; 2011; Tilman et al. 
2006, 2012; Worm et al. 2006; Palumbi et al. 2009; Isbell et al. 2011, 2013; Reich et al. 
2012).  In ecological communities of consumers, diversity leads to high productivity 
through complementarity effects, whereby species with different resource requirements 
are able to partition resources more efficiently (Tilman et al. 1997; Lehman and Tilman 
2000; Loreau and Hector 2001; Thébault and Loreau 2003); and sampling effects, 
whereby more diverse communities are more likely to contain highly productive species 
by chance (Lehman and Tilman 2000; Loreau and Hector 2001; Thébault and Loreau 
2003).  Both of these effects cause consumer diversity to impact resource availabilities 
(Tilman et al. 1997).  Diversity increases the stability of ecosystems’ productivities and 
services through ‘portfolio effects’, whereby functional redundancies between species 
allow sudden perturbations affecting one species to be compensated by other similar 
species; and ‘negative covariance effects’, whereby sudden collapses in the abundance of 
a species lead to compensatory increases in the abundances of its competitors (Lehman 
and Tilman 2000; McCann 2000).   
The role of biological diversity in promoting high and stable yields in fisheries 
has been well studied, with similar conclusions: Diverse aquatic ecosystems are generally 
thought to lead to more productive and stable fisheries (e.g. Worm et al. 2006; Schindler 
et al. 2010).  The diversity of fishing fleets is also likely to play an important role in 
determining the productivity, stability, and ecological impacts of fisheries, but this has 
not been widely or systematically explored.  Though there are strong theoretical parallels 
between fishers and ecological consumers, there are also some important differences.  
Fishers’ behaviours and incentives can be complex and plastic, and can be influenced by 
management (Branch et al. 2006). Fisheries management can also have varying goals 
including profits, employment, food production, subsistence, recreation, and cultural 
value (Branch et al. 2006; Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009; Chan et al. 2012).  
Fishers can vary widely in their technical efficiencies, and thus may not be bound to the 
  108 
same types of tradeoff surfaces as many other organisms are hypothesized to be – where 
it has been suggested that differences among species in overall resource-use efficiency 
are minor compared to differences in resource specialization (Tilman 2011).  
Fishing fleets can be diverse in a variety of ways.  Fishers within a particular 
fishery may differ from one another in terms of their choice of fishing grounds, vessel 
sizes and gear-types, and target species; as well as their objectives, expert knowledge, 
behavioural plasticity, risk aversion, and other differences (Branch et al. 2005; 2006).  
Recent evidence from some fisheries suggests that certain types of fleet diversity create 
important opportunities for progress toward management objectives in certain situations.  
For example, in mixed-stock or multispecies fisheries, in which any particular gear-type 
is likely to catch multiple species or stocks (populations), management often faces the 
challenge of navigating tradeoffs between overexploiting slow-growing populations and 
under-exploiting more rapidly reproducing populations (Hilborn 1976; Boyce 1996; 
Hilborn et al. 2004; Burgess et al. 2013; Gaines & Costello 2013).  Recent studies on 
multispecies trawl and groundfish fisheries in the E.U. (Marchal et al. 2011; Ulrich et al. 
2011), United States (Dougherty et al. 2013), Canada and New Zealand (Sanchirico et al. 
2006), and tuna fisheries in the Pacific (Sibert et al. 2012) have each found that 
management can overcome some of these tradeoffs at large spatial scales through 
management schemes that govern the allocation of fishing rights among fishers having 
different fishing grounds, gears or target species.  In fisheries with diversity in economic 
efficiency, management using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can increase fishery 
profits by encouraging the trading of fishing rights from low-efficiency fishers to high-
efficiency fishers (Grafton et al. 2000; Marchal et al. 2011; Grainger and Costello 2012; 
Schnier and Felthoven 2013).  Balancing exploitation across species in a marine 
ecosystem is generally thought lead to the highest combined yields and least adverse 
ecological impacts (Garcia et al. 2012). Fleet diversity is likely to have significant 
influence on exploitation balancing. 
Here, I use a combination of general theoretical models and stochastic simulations 
to illustrate some important opportunities and pitfalls presented by fleet diversity to the 
yields, profits, and ecological objectives of managed and open-access fisheries.   
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Following recent bioeconomic literature, I consider fleet diversity in terms of two 
concepts: 1) ‘métiers’ (ICES 2003; Marchal et al. 2013) (also called ‘fishing 
opportunities’ (Branch et al. 2005)) – unique combinations of fishing gear and 
geographic targeting that have roughly uniform relative catch-rates of different stocks in 
a multispecies or multi-stock fishery; and 2) technical efficiency (Hilborn 1985b; 
Marchal et al. 2013) – which determines the costs at which fishers obtain particular 
catches at particular abundances.   
Specifically, I provide theoretical evidence suggesting that: i) diversifying métiers 
in multispecies fisheries should often lead to higher yields and less overfishing in both 
managed and open-access fisheries – by creating opportunities to reduce tradeoffs 
between management objectives for different stocks and encouraging balanced 
exploitation under open-access via competition; and ii) diversifying technical efficiency 
should create opportunities for greater profits in managed fisheries, but lead to more 
severe depletions (and thus lower yields) in open-access fisheries also via competition.  
For brevity, my analysis focuses on equilibrium statics, and thus effects of fleet diversity 
on the temporal stability of yields, profits, stocks, and ecosystems, as well as other 
possible dynamic effects are not considered explicitly, but are discussed and deserve 
future study.   
 
5.2 Defining fleet diversity 
The analyses presented here use a ‘fishing unit’, defined as a group of fishers 
from a particular métier having a particular efficiency, as the base unit of fleet diversity. 
Métiers are defined in this analysis by their relative catch-rates of different stocks.  
Efficiency is defined by the costs of obtaining a particular set of catches at a particular set 
of stock abundances. Thus, a particular fishing unit’s métier is defined by relative 
catchabilities (per-capita-per-unit-effort catch rates) for different stocks, while its 
efficiency is determined in combination by the magnitudes of stocks’ catchabilities and 
the per-unit-effort costs of fishing. 
 Defining fishing effort in terms of unit costs (i.e. measuring effort in dollars 
instead of hooks, days, etc.) allows for a simple mathematical representation of métiers 
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and efficiency as components of catchability that are directly comparable across gear-
types.  Suppose S different fish stocks are caught in a fishery, and each stock has 
population size, Ni(t) for stock i at time t, and a per-capita growth rate, 
€ 
gi N t( )( )  for stock 
i, in the absence of fishing, where 
€ 
N t( ) = N1 t( ),N2 t( ),...,NS t( )( )  (i.e. stocks may interact 
with one another).  Suppose fishers in a particular fishing unit, j, are spending Ej(t) (in 
dollars or some other monetary unit) on fishing effort and catch a fraction, qij, of 
individuals of stock i with each dollar spent (qij is the catchability of stock i in fishing 
unit j).  Because relative catch-rates are the key distinguishing features of fishing units 
for the purposes of this analysis, it is instructive to consider qij constant for all stocks (i) 
and fishing units (j), and to consider changes in qij for any particular fisher – resulting 
from catch hyperstability (Harley et al. 2001), economies of scale (e.g. Squires and 
Kirkley 1991), or changing behaviour, for example – as transitions between fishing units.  
Thus, stock i, if only targeted by fishing unit, j, has a rate of change, dNi(t)/dt at time t, 
given by: 
€ 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni t( ) gi N t( )( ) − qijE j t( )( )   (5.1a). 
Stock i’s price-per-individual caught is denoted, pi, and I assume throughout this analysis 
that it is either constant or increasing as its harvest falls, pi = pi(Ni(t)) (i.e. piʹ′(.) ≤ 0 
because harvest falls as population size (N) falls) (see Clark 1976, 1985; Courchamp et 
al. 2006), but does not increase enough to result in rising per-unit-effort revenues with 
decreasing abundance (i.e. d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi > 0 for all Ni, i is assumed) (see Appendix A in 
the Supplementary Material; Courchamp et al. 2006).  The total profits of fishers in 
fishing unit j at time t, πj(t), are thus given by, 
€ 
π j t( ) = E j t( ) pi Ni t( )( )qijNi t( ) −1i=1
S
∑( )  (5.1b). 
Métiers and efficiency are defined mathematically by partitioning qij into two 
components: mij (where ∑imij = 1), a fraction representing the métier’s catch rate of stock 
i relative to other stocks, and ej, another constant representing fishing unit j’s efficiency, 
such that qij = mijej.  With this substitution, equations (5.1a) and (5.1b) become: 
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€ 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni t( ) gi N t( )( ) −mije jE j t( )( )   (5.2a) 
 
€ 
π j t( ) = E j t( ) e j pi Ni t( )( )mijNi t( ) −1i=1
S
∑( )  (5.2b). 
It can be seen from equations (5.2a) and (5.2b) that {mij}∀j captures the relative catch rates 
of different stocks by fishers in fishing unit j (i.e. its métier), and ej captures the cost 
efficiency of catch in fishing unit j, controlling for relative catch rates and stock 
abundances (i.e. its technical efficiency). 
 
5.3 Fleet diversity in managed fisheries 
In managed fisheries, fleet diversity creates opportunities to increase yields and 
profits while also minimizing adverse ecological impacts.  Diversity in efficiency creates 
opportunities for management to increase fishery-wide profits by implementing a policy 
that causes the most efficient fishers to take larger shares of the catch.  Diversity in 
métiers in multispecies fisheries creates opportunities for management to reconcile profit-
and yield-maximization with prevention of overfishing and other ecological objectives by 
increasing the available degrees of freedom in the relative aggregate catch rates of 
different stocks (Figure 5.1, Figure 5.S2).   
With few different métiers in a multispecies fishery, profits, yields, and 
management goals for different stocks often tradeoff with one another as a result of 
fishers’ lack of control over the relative catch-rates of different stocks in the fishery 
(Boyce 1996; Squires et al. 1998) (Figure 5.1a,b).  As a result, it is often impossible to set 
a target catch or effort-quota that does not either over-exploit some stocks or under-
exploit others (Figure 5.1b).  However, a multispecies fishery with multiple métiers that 
are diverse in their relative catch rates can achieve a much wider range of combinations 
of exploitation rates and equilibrium abundances of its stocks.  This is accomplished by 
influencing both total fishing effort and relative fishing efforts among métiers through 
management (Figure 5.1c).       
To be precise, in a multispecies fishery with only a single métier, j, the set of 
possible equilibrium abundances of different stocks is constrained to a one-dimensional 
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surface whose shape is largely determined by the stocks’ relative catch rates in the métier 
and their relative population growth rates (Figure 5.1a,b; Burgess et al. 2013). I hereafter 
refer to this as the ‘vulnerability constraint’ of métier j, because the relative catch rates 
and population growth rates of stocks determine their relative ‘vulnerabilities’ to 
depletion by métier j (Burgess et al. 2013). For example, if all stocks have logistic 
population growth (gi(.) = ri(1 – (Ni/Ki)) for all i, where ri is the maximum per-capita 
growth rate and Ki is the carrying capacity of stock i (Schaefer 1954)), then the 
equilibrium abundances, Nx* and Ny*, of any two non-extinct stocks, x and y, must 
satisfy:   
€ 
1− Nx
*
Kx
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
1− Ny
*
Ky
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
=
mxj
rx
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
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  (5.3). 
Equation (5.3) defines the vulnerability constraint of métier j in this model, which is 
linear with a slope determined by the relative values of mij/ri (normalized 
catchability/maximum growth rate) for different stocks (see also Holt 1977; Clark 1985). 
The shapes of vulnerability constraints under some other types of ecological assumptions 
are discussed in Appendix A, and illustrated in Figure 5.S1a-e.   
In a multispecies fishery with multiple métiers, any desired combination of 
stocks’ equilibrium abundances that lies in the region in population space bounded by the 
vulnerability constraints of the different métiers could be achieved by implementing a 
policy that influences both the total effort fishery-wide and relative efforts in different 
métiers (Figure 5.1c).  This is illustrated mathematically in Appendix B.  The space of 
possible sets of equilibrium stock abundances in a fishery has a dimensionality 
determined by the number of different métiers.  Thus, it is highly unlikely that a 
particular target set of stock abundances in a managed fishery will be achievable if there 
are fewer métiers than stocks to be managed.  This is also shown mathematically in 
Appendix B, and illustrated graphically in Figure 5.S2.  Additionally, because the relative 
impacts of a métier on different stocks are determined by the relative vulnerabilities of 
stocks to the métier (mij/ri in the logistic model) rather than simply their relative catch 
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rates (mij), it is the diversity in relative vulnerabilities of stocks among métiers (i.e. 
differences in {(mij/ri)}∀j rather than {mij}∀j) that is particularly important in providing 
opportunities for yield and profit gains in managed fisheries.      
 Figure 5.2a,b shows the results of stochastic simulations of a 5-stock fishery 
illustrating the opportunities that fleet diversity offers managed fisheries for increases in 
yields and profits, and reduction in weak stock collapses by avoiding the inter-stock 
tradeoffs common in multispecies fisheries.  For simplicity, each stock is assumed to 
have logistic population growth and constant prices, though the qualitative results 
generalize to more complex models.  Each simulation fixes the number of fishing units 
and randomly generates 500 parameter sets, {ri, mij, ej, Ki} for all i and j (ri, (mij/ri) ~ 
U[0,1] (mij’s are normalized after each draw to sum to 1); ej ~ U[1,10]; Ki ~ U[10,100]; 
for simplicity, pi is fixed at 1 for all stocks, as Ki already provides a randomly selected 
determinant of the relative values of the same per-capita catch rate from different stocks), 
and sets equilibrium fishing efforts, Ej* for all j, in order to maximize either yield (Figure 
4a) or profit (Figure 5.4b) from all 5 stocks combined.  The maximum achievable yield 
(MAY) or profit (MAP) from the fishery as a whole, with each parameter, set is 
compared to the theoretical maximum yield (MTY; the sum of maximum sustainable 
yields (MSY) for all stocks) or profit (MTP) from the fishery given the stocks’ ecological 
parameters and the bounds on efficiency placed on the random selection of fishing units.  
The average number of stocks persisting at the achievable maximum (MAY or MAP) is 
also reported.  This procedure was repeated for both yield- (Figure 5.2a) and profit-
maximization (Figure 5.2b), allowing métiers only, efficiencies only, or both to vary 
among fishing units within each random draw. 
  As the theory predicts, diversifying métiers increased the average fishery-wide 
maximum achievable yields (Figure 5.2a) and profits (Figure 5.2b).  Diversifying métiers 
also reduced the average frequency of stock extinctions required for yield- or profit-
maximization (Figure 5.2a,b) by creating opportunities for management to avoid 
tradeoffs between overexploiting some stocks and under-exploiting others by influencing 
relative effort allocations among métiers.  Diversifying efficiency increased fishery-wide 
achievable profits (Figure 5.2b), but had no effect on the achievability of yields (Figure 
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5.2a) or stock extinction frequencies at the optima (Figure 5.2a,b).  Results are 
qualitatively similar with mij and ri drawn independently, but yields and profits increase 
more slowly with diversity of métiers, and saturate at higher diversities. 
  
5.4 Fleet diversity in unmanaged fisheries 
 In an unmanaged, or ‘open-access’ fishery, effort levels are driven by profits and 
eventually determined by the conditions that make further effort unprofitable (Clark 
1976) (Figure 5.3a).  The impacts of fleet diversity on yields, profits, and stocks (Figure 
5.4) are mediated by competition between fishers (Figure 5.3b,c,d).  Competition tends to 
favour the most efficient fishers in the fishery (Figure 5.3b), and the likelihood of having 
high efficiency extremes in a fishing fleet increases with its diversity via a sampling 
effect (see Loreau & Hector 2001 for discussion of an analogous sampling effect 
contributing to the positive effect of biodiversity on ecosystem productivity). As a result, 
fleet diversification tends to lead to greater aggregate efficiency (Figure 5.4a), which 
allows profits at lower stock abundances and thereby tends to lead to decreases in long-
term yields and increases in the frequency and severity of stock collapses (Figure 5.4b).  
Competition among fishers in different métiers tends to either favour métiers with more 
balanced exploitation rates (Figure 5.3c) or result in co-existence (Figure 5.3d), both of 
which lead to more balanced aggregate exploitation rates (Figure 5.4a), often resulting in 
higher yields and fewer stock collapses (Figure 5.4b).  I illustrate these points 
mathematically below, graphically in Figure 5.3, and in stochastic simulations in Figure 
5.4. Fleet diversity has little to no effect on long-term profits, because profits tend 
towards zero at any diversity of fishing units, provided that there is no monopoly or 
oligopoly in the fleet’s ownership (Clark 1976).       
 To illustrate these points graphically and mathematically, I assume (following 
Clark (1976; 1985)) that fishing effort within an individual fishing unit increases when 
profits are positive, decreases when they are negative, and stays constant when profits are 
0 (i.e. revenues are exactly equal to opportunity costs).  In other words, I assume, for 
fishing unit j, that dEj(t)/dt < 0 if πj(t) < 0, dEj(t)/dt > 0 if πj(t) > 0, and dEj(t)/dt = 0 if 
πj(t) = 0.  I do not make specific assumptions about the rate or manner in which effort 
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adjusts to profit conditions.  Thus, in a fishery catching S stocks with only a single fishing 
unit, j, equilibrium would occur at a set of stock abundances, N*j = {N1*j,…,NS*j}, 
satisfying:   
€ 
e j pi Ni* j( )mijNi* j =1i=1
S
∑   (5.4). 
Equation (5.4) defines an S – 1 dimensional surface on which N*j must lie, which I 
hereafter refer to as the ‘profitability constraint’ of fishing unit j. It is illustrated in Figure 
5.3 under the assumption of constant prices (where it is linear) and in Figure 5.S1f under 
the assumption of increasing prices with decreasing abundance (where it is generally 
convex, see Appendix A). Its slope is determined by the métier (Figure 5.3c,d) and its 
position relative to the origin is determined by efficiency (Figure 5.3b).  Equilibrium with 
a single fishing unit occurs at the intersection of its vulnerability and profitability 
constraints (Figure 5.3a). 
Competition between fishing units for fish has strong parallels with ecological 
communities of consumers competing for resources, which have been extensively 
studied.  One of the seminal results in ecological competition theory is that outcomes of 
competition depend largely on species’ abilities to invade communities of their 
competitors – meaning that they have positive growth rates when they are rare and 
competitors are at equilibrium (MacArthur and Levins 1964; Levin 1970; Tilman 1980).  
As Tilman (1980) illustrates graphically and mathematically, if two species are 
competing and: i) each can invade the other’s equilibrium, they co-exist; ii) one can 
invade the other’s equilibrium, but not vice versa, the successful invader will 
competitively exclude the other; iii) neither can invade the other’s equilibrium, one 
species will exclude the other, but which wins will depend on which establishes first or 
increases in abundance faster (called a ‘priority effect’).  The same principles apply to 
competing fishing units, except that it turns out that priority effects require fishers from 
different fishing units to receive different prices for the same catch, and are thus unlikely 
(see Appendix C, Figure 5.S3). There are some additional complexities when equilibria 
are not stable (e.g. see McGehee and Armstrong 1977; Armstrong and McGehee 1980), 
which I do not consider explicitly here for brevity.  However, these complexities do not 
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affect the general principle that outcomes of competition are driven by species’ (or 
analogously, fishing units’) abilities to invade each other’s established populations 
(Armstrong and McGehee 1980), and thus should also not affect the qualitative results I 
present concerning the effects of diversity of métiers and efficiency on yields and 
ecological outcomes.   
As illustrated in Figure 5.3b, competition favours efficiency because more 
efficient fishers can still make profits at stock abundances resulting in zero profits for less 
efficient fishers within the same métier.  This can be easily shown by substituting ek (ek > 
ej) into equation (5.4) for ej, which would transform the equation to an inequality (i.e. 
πk(N*j) > 0).  Similarly, less efficient fishers make negative profits at the equilibria of 
more efficient fishers of the same métier (πj(N*k) < 0), which would eventually force 
them to exit the fishery.  Because competition favours efficiency, and because increasing 
diversity increases the likelihood of sampling high efficiency extremes, increasing fleet 
diversity should increase the aggregate efficiency of open-access exploitation, on 
average, though the diversity of active vessels would eventually decline as inefficient 
vessels exited the fishery. 
A high diversity of métiers is more likely to lead to balanced exploitation of the 
stocks in a fishery than a low diversity of métiers for two reasons: 1) competition among 
fishers with equal efficiency tends to favour those in métiers with more balanced 
exploitation of the different stocks (Figure 5.3c); and 2) competitive co-existence 
between fishers in two different métiers leads to aggregate relative exploitation rates 
among stocks that are intermediate to those that would be produced by each métier 
individually (Figure 5.3d).  Specifically, in a fishery in which all fishing units have the 
same efficiency and all mij between 0 and 1 are technologically feasible for any stock, i, 
(i.e. all possible métiers are feasible) competition among infinitely diverse métiers results 
in relative equilibrium abundances, Nx* and Ny*, of any two extant stocks, x and y, 
satisfying: 
€ 
px Nx*( )Nx* = py Ny*( )Ny*   (5.5), 
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In other words, all extant stocks have relative equilibrium abundances equal to the 
inverse of their equilibrium price-ratios (i.e. (px*/py*) = (Ny*/Nx*), where pi* = pi(Ni*)).   
 This occurs because: i) in a fishery in which all fishers are equally efficient, there 
exists a métier that can invade any equilibrium point not satisfying equation (5.5) (e.g. 
métier 2 in Figure 5.3c); and ii) co-existence among multiple fishing units occurs at 
equilibrium stock sizes at the intersection of their profitability constraints (Figure 5.3d), 
and all possible profitability constraints with a particular efficiency intersect at a single 
point, at which equation (5.5) is satisfied (Figure 5.3c,d).  Point ii) follows from equation 
(5.4). To illustrate point i), suppose a fishery in which all fishers have the same efficiency 
is at an equilibrium, N* = {N1*,…, NS*}, not satisfying equation (5.5). This implies that 
there is at least one pair of stocks, x and y, with the property px(Nx*)Nx* > py(Ny*)Ny*.  
Given this fact, any new fishing unit, k, with the property relative to any established 
fishing unit, j, that mxk > mxj, myk < myj, and mik = mij for all i ≠ x,y, will have positive 
profits at this equilibrium, and thus be able to invade the fishery.  Moreover, the invasion 
of fishing unit k would increase the overall mortality rate of stock x relative to stock y, 
which would reduce Nx* relative to Ny*.  Assuming that d[pi(Ni*)Ni*]/dNi* > 0 (i = x, y) 
(i.e. revenues from any stock are positively related to its abundance), this would decrease 
the difference between px(Nx*)Nx* and py(Ny*)Ny*, which would iteratively lead to 
equation (5.5) being satisfied at infinite diversity.   
 Putting the results concerning efficiency and balanced exploitation together: 
In an open-access fishery where all métiers are feasible for any efficiency up to a 
maximum efficiency, eMAX, and métiers are independent of efficiencies, infinite fleet 
diversity results in an equilibrium, denoted 
€ 
N**eMAX , at which equation (5.5) holds for all 
extant stocks, and all are exploited with efficiency eMAX.  To be precise,
€ 
N**eMAX = N1**eMAX ,...,NS**eMAX{ } solves (from equations (5.4) and (5.5)), 
€ 
pi Ni**eMAX( )Ni**eMAX = 1eMAX   (5.6), 
for all extant stocks.  This is illustrated in a stochastic simulation of a fishery targeting 
two stocks having logistic growth and constant prices in Figure 5.4a (see caption for 
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parameter values/distributions).  As fleet diversity increases, the distribution of equilibria 
converges toward 
€ 
N**eMAX (Figure 5.4a). 
 Of course, the convergence of stock sizes, as a result of fleet diversification, to the 
equilibrium, 
€ 
N**eMAX , described by equation (5.6), depends on the assumption that 
efficiencies are distributed independently from métiers (i.e. eMAX is the same for all 
métiers).  In reality, however, this is not likely to be the case.  For example, if some 
stocks are generally easier or cheaper to catch than others due to their range or ecology, 
métiers with higher relative catch rates of these stocks are likely to be more efficient.  
One simple way to consider this in the modeling framework presented here is to let qij = 
ejaimij, where ej measures the overall efficiency of fishing unit j that is independent of its 
target stock, and ai (ai > 0) measures how easy stock i is to catch relative to other stocks.  
With this definition of qij, increasing fleet diversity in a fishery with maximum 
efficiency, eMAX, will drive equilibrium stock abundances towards an equilibrium, 
€ 
N**eMAX
, described by:    
€ 
pi Ni**eMAX( )aiNi**eMAX = 1eMAX   (5.7), 
where 
€ 
px Nx**eMAX( )axNx**eMAX = py Ny**eMAX( )ayNy**eMAX  for any two stocks, x and y.  Thus, 
the general results are that a diversification of métiers will tend to drive stocks to be 
exploited to relative abundances at which they generate equal marginal revenue for 
equally efficient classes of technology, and diversification in efficiency will tend to 
broadly decrease stocks’ abundances.   
 By promoting balanced exploitation, diversification of métiers typically leads to 
higher yields and reduces the likelihood of weak stock collapses. In contrast, 
diversification of efficiency typically reduces yields and increases the likelihood of weak 
stock collapses by promoting high aggregate efficiency.  These points are illustrated in 
Figure 5.4b in a stochastic simulation of the same 2-stock fishery as in Figure 5.4a (see 
caption for parameter values/distributions).  
 Provided efficiency is finite, 
€ 
N**eMAX will occur at a positive abundance (equation 
(5.6)/(5.7), Figure 5.4a).  Thus, the effect diversifying métiers reducing the likelihood of 
weak stock collapses will typically dominate the opposite effect of diversifying 
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efficiency, meaning that broad increases in fleet diversity should generally reduce the 
threat of weak stock collapses, as is the case in the simulated example in Figure 5.4b.  
However, whether the positive effect of diversifying métiers on equilibrium yield 
dominates the negative effect of diversifying efficiency will be context-dependent – 
driven largely by the maximum feasible efficiency, eMAX.  If eMAX is sufficiently large, as 
in the simulated example in Figure 5.4b, the effect of métier diversification increasing 
yield dominates at very low fleet diversity, but the efficiency effect dominates at higher 
diversity as the métier effect saturates.  However, the effect of diversifying métiers can 
dominate at high fleet diversity if eMAX is sufficiently small.   
 While these results should generalize to most types of fleets and fished stocks, 
there are some important exceptions.  In particular, as discussed in Appendix D and 
illustrated in Figure 5.S4, diversification in either métiers or efficiency often leads to the 
collapse of stocks whose non-substitutable prey or mutualists are also caught in the 
fishery; and diversifying métiers can sometimes increase the likelihood of stock collapses 
in fisheries where technological limitations make some relative catch-rates infeasible.  
Additionally, any stock whose price can rise fast enough to increase the revenues it 
generates as its abundance falls (i.e. d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi < 0 for stock i) is likely to be fished 
to extinction in general (Courchamp et al. 2006), but diversifying métiers or efficiency 
can also increase the chances of this (see Appendix A).  
 For by-catch populations, having little or no commercial value, the effect of 
diversifying métiers on the likelihood of collapse depends on the range of feasible 
relative catch rates and the way in which by-catch rates impact the efficiency of catching 
commercially valued stocks.  If by-catch comes at an efficiency cost, then diversifying 
métiers would be expected to reduce impacts on by-catch species, as low-by-catch 
métiers would be favoured by competition.  In contrast, if by-catch mitigation comes at 
an efficiency cost, then diversifying métiers in an open-access fishery would have the 
opposite effect, increasing the impacts on by-catch species.  Diversifying métiers could 
similarly increase impacts on by-catch species if low-by-catch technologies were 
infeasible.   
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5.5 Discussion  
 This study presents two broad theoretical results: I) Diversifying métiers in 
multispecies fisheries often leads to higher yields and less overfishing in both managed 
and open-access fisheries – by creating opportunities to reduce tradeoffs between 
management objectives for different stocks and encouraging balanced exploitation under 
open-access. II) Diversifying technical efficiency creates opportunities for greater profits 
in managed fisheries, but tends to lead to more severe depletions (and thus lower yields) 
in open-access fisheries.  Together, these results suggest that the potential value of 
transitioning from open-access to management in a fishery often increases with the 
diversity of its fleet.  
The results concerning managed fisheries follow directly from the principle that 
more diverse fleets give managers more possible combinations of relative catch rates and 
costs (i.e. more degrees of freedom), with which they can more effectively balance 
objectives for different stocks and minimize costs, through controls influencing both total 
fishery-wide effort and relative efforts among different types of fishers.  The results 
concerning open-access fisheries follow from the following principles of competition 
among fishers: i) All else equal, fishers with high technical efficiency (i.e. they obtain 
catches at low costs relative to other fishers, with stock abundances being equal) will tend 
to outcompete less efficient fishers, and high efficiency extremes are more likely to be 
sampled in a diverse fishery. ii) If a particular fishing fleet is exploiting commercially 
valued stocks highly asymmetrically relative to their prices and abundances, and 
technology exists to adopt an alternate fishing practice that better targets a currently 
underexploited stock, someone will eventually adopt this practice and profitably enter the 
fishery, increasing the overall fishing pressure on the previously underexploited stock 
relative to others (i.e. balancing exploitation) as a result.  Greater diversity in fishing 
technology increases the likelihood, again because of a sampling effect, that technology 
will exist to exploit such economic opportunities.  iii) Métiers with highly different catch 
profiles (relative catch-rates among stocks) compete less, and are likely to coexist in a 
fishery, resulting in relative aggregate catch rates among stocks that are intermediate to 
those each métier would produce on its own (e.g. Figure 5.3d).  Greater diversity in 
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métiers increases the likelihood of sampling catch profiles across the full range, thus 
more likely resulting in balanced aggregate exploitation.  
Though these principles, and the results (I) and II)) that they imply, are illustrated 
mathematically in this paper using simplifying assumptions that may be unrealistic – 
notably: a) that fleet diversity can be partitioned into discrete fishing units, each with 
uniform relative catch rates and efficiency; and b) that open-access equilibria are stable 
enough for basic equilibrium-based competition results in theoretical ecology (Tilman 
1980; see Armstrong and McGehee 1980) to hold – they are likely to be far more general. 
Similar theoretical simplifications have been used, for example, to conceptually illustrate 
some of the mechanisms underlying positive relationships between biodiversity and 
ecosystem productivity (e.g. Tilman et al. 1997), which have proven to be highly robust 
both theoretically and empirically to added complexities (see Cardinale et al. 2006, 2011 
respectively for recent meta-analysis and review).  
Thus, these model simplifications (a) and b) above) should be thought of as 
conceptual tools for understanding broad results, rather than accurate descriptions of 
reality.  It is likely that many open-access fisheries have unstable or cyclic dynamics.  
Relative catch rates – the defining characteristic of métiers – and technical efficiency are 
likely to vary continuously, such that no two fishers are identical.  However, there is 
empirical evidence that métiers can be grouped somewhat discretely into groups of 
vessels with highly similar relative catch rates (Branch et al. 2005), and it is possible that 
the same is true for efficiency.  For example, vessels of similar size with similar distances 
between ports of origin and fishing grounds may have similar fuel and labour costs.  
Thus, the fleet diversity that is important in practice is likely to be the number of these 
different semi-discrete vessel ‘types’, and more importantly, how different they are from 
one another in their efficiency and relative catch rates. 
Recent studies provide some empirical support for the benefits of diversity in 
métiers in managed and open-access fisheries.  For example, Dougherty et al. (2013) 
showed, theoretically and in simulations of western U.S. groundfish fisheries, that setting 
multispecies harvest quotas at a local scale to achieve coast-wide goals could increase 
overall fishery yields without increasing the likelihood of collapsing any of the stocks.  If 
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métiers vary spatially due to the varying juxtapositions of species’ ranges on different 
fishing grounds, the type of management Dougherty et al. (2013) propose is equivalent to 
regulating the relative efforts in different métiers.  Similar results have also been found 
for other multispecies fisheries in the E.U. (Marchal et al. 2011; Ulrich et al. 2011), 
Canada and New Zealand (Sanchirico et al. 2006), and Western and Central Pacific tuna 
fisheries (Sibert et al. 2012).  Burgess et al. (2013) provide evidence suggesting that the 
diversification of métiers in Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries resulting from the 
expansion of industrial deep-set longline, purse-seine and pole-and-line fishing methods 
reduced the long-term threat of collapse posed by these fisheries to many tuna and billfish 
populations by tending to increase the balance in their exploitation rates.  Garcia et al. 
(2012) provided evidence for the benefits of catch balancing to yields, profits, and the 
ecological impacts of fisheries in simulations of several marine ecosystems. 
There is also some empirical support for the ideas that fishers with high technical 
efficiencies can competitively dominate diverse fleets and increase overfishing, and that 
management can exploit differences among fishers’ technical efficiencies to increase 
fishery-wide profits.  For example, Schnier and Felthoven (2013) found that the 
introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQ) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island 
crab fishery increased the likelihood of inefficient fishers exiting the fishery.  This is 
consistent with theory suggesting that rights-based fishery management leads to fishery-
wide efficiency by incentivizing the redistribution of fishing effort to more efficient 
fishers (Grafton et al. 2000).  Similar results have been seen in other fisheries (e.g. 
Weninger 1998; 2008; Brandt 2007; Costello et al. 2010; Grainger and Costello 2012).  
In open-access fisheries, the rise of industrial fishing in the mid-20th century and 
subsequent wide-spread fishery collapses (e.g. Myers and Worm 2003; Pauly et al. 2005; 
Worm et al. 2006; 2009) is evidence of the ability of efficient fishers to competitively 
dominate fisheries, and the increases in ecological risk associated with efficiency gains.    
 Though the results presented here suggest that management is likely to face fewer 
tradeoffs between yield- or profit-maximization and species conservation in diverse 
fleets, it is important to note that the structures of some food webs may make such 
tradeoffs difficult or impossible to overcome, regardless of fleet diversity.  For example, 
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if a fishery targets both a predator and its prey, maximizing yield or profit across the 
whole fishery might require the elimination of the predator to increase prey catches.  
Matsuda and Abrams (2006) explore such tradeoffs in detail and outline several 
instructive examples.  Similarly, as discussed in Appendix D, diversification of either 
métiers or efficiency in open-access fisheries may exacerbate indirect threats from 
fisheries to some specialist predators and mutualists.  The vulnerability of top predators 
and other marine species to fishing-induced trophic cascades has been extensively 
documented both empirically (e.g. Estes et al. 1998; Pauly et al. 1998; Jackson et al. 
2001; Frank et al. 2005; Essington et al. 2006; Myers et al. 2007) and theoretically (e.g. 
May et al. 1979).  In addition, the introduction to a fishery of gears that have adverse 
impacts on the ecosystem in addition to the harvest itself (e.g. habitat destruction by 
trawls) may in some cases have negative impacts on the productivity of the fishery that 
outweigh the benefits of additional fleet diversity. Ecosystem-based fishery management 
(Pikitch et al. 2004) or other holistic approaches to fishery management may be 
particularly important in large fisheries with diverse fleets.   
The focus of my analysis of open-access fisheries on equilibrium statics rather 
than dynamics did not allow the analysis to consider the possibility of transient stock 
collapses, effects of fleet diversity on the temporal variance in yields and profits, or the 
stability of fished ecosystems.  Fleet diversity likely plays an important role in 
determining the stability of fishing yields and profits, and fished stocks.  Ecological 
theory suggests that increasing biological diversity decreases the stability of individual 
species’ populations (May 1973), but increases the stability of aggregate ecosystem 
services such as productivity (Lehman and Tilman 2000).  This suggests that increasing 
fleet diversity may analogously destabilize the populations of individual stocks or the 
profits of fishers in individual fishing units, but may increase the stability of fishery-wide 
yields and profits.  Recent evidence from California Current fisheries suggests that 
fisheries can indeed destabilize individual fish populations (Hsieh et al. 2006; Anderson 
et al. 2008). By decreasing the stability of individual stocks, increasing fleet diversity 
may also increase the likelihood of transient stock collapses.  The effects of fleet 
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diversity on the stability of the economic and ecological impacts of fisheries merit further 
study.    
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Fisheries are an important global provider of food, employment, and other social 
benefits (Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009; Costello et al. 2012a; Chan et al. 
2012), but also have large and increasing ecological impacts (Worm et al. 2006, 2009; 
Costello et al. 2012b; Halpern et al. 2012; Ricard et al. 2012).  With global fish demand 
rising (Delgado et al. 2003) and global protein demand expected to double in the next 
half-century (Tilman et al. 2011), fisheries management faces the delicate challenge of 
providing the highest possible levels of sustainable production at the lowest possible 
ecological cost.  The theory presented here, for which there is some empirical support in 
the literature, broadly suggests that diversifying métiers can have positive impacts on the 
yields and ecological sustainability of both managed and open-access multispecies 
fisheries.  My analysis also suggests that the potential of management to improve 
fisheries’ socio-economic and ecological outcomes relative to open-access is likely to be 
highest in diverse fishing fleets.  Large international fishing fleets targeting widespread 
or migratory stocks, such as those targeting tunas, are likely to be some of the most 
diverse, but are also some of the most difficult to manage (Beddington et al. 2007; Worm 
et al. 2009).  Continued advances in the management of these fisheries will be critical to 
ensuring the long-term sustainability of the socioeconomic benefits of fisheries and the 
ecosystems that support them.  In the meantime, continuing to diversify métiers in 
multispecies fisheries may reduce threats to some weak stocks even without management 
(e.g. Burgess et al. 2013).  
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Figure 5.1. Total and relative efforts and achievable abundances in managed fisheries. (a) With a 
single métier in a fishery, stocks’ relative equilibrium abundances are constrained (the vulnerability 
constraint (red line)) by their relative vulnerabilities to the métier.  (b) As a result, with few métiers in a 
multispecies fishery it is often impossible to simultaneously achieve target abundances for multiple stocks, 
instead trading off overexploiting some with under-exploiting others.  (c) With multiple métiers, 
management influencing both their relative and total effort levels can produce any set of equilibrium stock 
abundances within the region (shaded) bounded by the vulnerability constraints each would produce in 
isolation (red and blue lines). 
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Figure 5.2. Fleet diversity increases achievable yields and profits in managed fisheries. Results of a 5-
stock stochastic simulation of average relationships between fleet diversity and achievable yields and 
profits with (a) optimal management for obtaining maximum achievable yield (MAY) and (b) optimal 
management for obtaining maximum achievable profit (MAP).  Average maximum achievable (a) yields 
(MAY) and (b) profits (MAP) are shown (black) along with the average number of extinctions achieving 
MAY or MAP requires (grey).  Each point represents a sample of 500 models with randomly chosen 
parameter values.  Vertical lines indicate standard errors. 
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Figure 5.3. Competition in open-access fisheries. (a) With one fishing unit, equilibrium occurs at the 
intersection of the vulnerability constraint and profitability constraints (N*1 for fishing unit 1). (b) If fishers 
are in the same métier, more efficient fishers will outcompete less efficient fishers (competitive equilibrium 
is denoted N*1&2). (c), (d) As métiers diversify with equal efficiency, equilibrium abundances will tend 
toward equalization of price*abundance is equal for all stocks (tan dashed line), either via (c) competitive 
exclusion, (d) co-existence, or both.  The profitability constraints of all fishing units with equal efficiency 
(red and blue dashed lines in (c) and (d)) intersect at a single point where price*abundance is equal for all 
stocks (as drawn, p2 > p1).  
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Figure 5.4. Consequences of fleet diversification in open-access fisheries.  (a) A stochastic simulation 
showing the frequency distribution of equilibria (N*) in a 2 stock fishery in which 1, 2, and 3 fishing units 
respectively (from left to right) were randomly drawn 15 000 times from a uniform distribution of all 
possible métiers (mij ~ U[0,1]) and a bounded range of efficiencies (ej ~ U[1,12]).  Stocks were assumed to 
have logistic growth with ri, Ki = 1 for i = 1, 2 and p1 = 1, p2 = 2. Grey lines represent all possible 
intersections of vulnerability and profitability constraints for the most (large dashes) and least (small 
dashes) efficient fishers. As a result of competition among fishers, increasing fleet diversity increases 
causes the probability of having the most efficient possible exploitation and stock abundances where 
price*abundance are equal at equilibrium (
€ 
N**eMAX , intersection of grey and black dashed lines) 
approaches 1.  (b) A stochastic simulation with the same parameter values and distributions as (a), where 
each of 1 to 30 fishing units are drawn randomly 1000 times, with métiers and efficiencies varying 
separately and jointly.  When only métiers vary, diversification leads to higher yields (black) and fewer 
extinctions (grey) on average by balancing exploitation. When only efficiencies vary, diversification has 
the opposite effect, by reducing equilibrium abundances. When both métiers and efficiencies vary, the 
probability density of equilibrium abundances concentrates at 
€ 
N**eMAX as diversity increases. As a result, 
the effect of métiers’ diversity reducing extinctions dominates (grey), but in this case the effect of 
efficiencies reducing average equilibrium yields also dominates (black).  Error bars shown are standard 
errors (n = 1000). 
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5.7 Supplementary Material  
 
Appendix A – Vulnerability and profitability constraints under different ecological 
and economic assumptions 
 
Vulnerability constraints 
 The vulnerability constraint of a particular fishing unit, j, is the set of possible 
equilibrium abundance vectors, N*, at different efforts with only unit j in the fishery.  
The vulnerability constraint can be mathematically described by the system of equations 
resulting from setting the right hand side of equation 2a equal to 0 simultaneously for all 
combinations of extant stocks, x and y, at equilibrium:  
€ 
gx N*( )
gy N*( )
=
mxj
myj
  (5.S.A.1) 
As can be seen from equation (S.A.1), the vulnerability constraint is determined solely by 
the métier, and is not influenced by efficiency.  Additionally, because it is defined by a 
system of S – 1 unique equations, it will be a one dimensional curve with any number of 
stocks, S. Figure 5.S1a-e illustrates vulnerability constraints in 2-stock models under 
different ecological assumptions (i.e. values of gi(.)), listed below.    
Fig.5.S1a – No interaction: 
€ 
gi N t( )( ) = ri 1− Ni t( ) Ki( )( ) , for i = 1, 2, where ri and Ki are 
positive constants respectively representing the maximum intrinsic per-capita growth rate 
and carrying capacity of stock i (sensu Schaefer 1954). 
Fig.5.S1b – Competition: 
€ 
gi N t( )( ) = ri 1−
Ni t( ) +α ijN j t( )( )
Ki
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
, for i, j = 1, 2, j ≠ i, where ri 
and Ki are the same as above, and αij is a positive constant representing the strength of 
the competitive effect of individuals of stock j on the growth rate of stock i (sensu 
MacArthur and Levins 1967).  Stable co-existence of both stocks in the absence of 
harvesting requires αij ≤ (Ki/Kj) for i, j = 1, 2.   
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Fig.5.S1c – Mutualism: 
€ 
gi N t( )( ) = ri 1−
Ni t( ) −α ijN j t( )( )
Ki
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
, for i, j = 1, 2, j ≠ i, where ri 
and Ki are the same as above, and αij is a positive constant representing the strength of 
the mutualistic effect of individuals of stock j on the growth rate of stock i.  
Fig.5.S1d – Predator and non-essential prey: 
€ 
gpred N t( )( ) = rpred 1−
Npred t( ) −α predpreyNprey t( )( )
Kpred
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
, 
€ 
gprey N t( )( ) = rprey 1−
Nprey t( ) +α preypredNpred t( )( )
Kprey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
, where ri and Ki are the same as above (i 
= pred, prey), and αpredprey and αpreypred are positive constants respectively representing 
the strength of the positive effect of prey on predator growth rates and predators on prey 
growth rates.  Note that the predator does not require any particular abundance of prey to 
survive (with no prey, the predator has logistic growth). 
Fig.5.S1e – Predator and essential prey: 
€ 
gpred N t( )( ) = rpred
Nprey t( ) − Nprey,MINpred( )
Kprey − Nprey,MINpred( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
, 
€ 
gprey N t( )( ) = rprey 1−
Nprey t( ) +α preypredNpred t( )( )
Kprey
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
, where the prey growth is the same as in 
Fig. 5.S1d, but the predator now needs a minimum abundance of prey, Nprey,MINpred to 
survive. 
 As illustrated in Figure 5.S1 and in the main text for the logistic model (equation 
(3)), the shape of the vulnerability constraint is largely determined by the type of 
interaction (predation, competition, etc.), and by relative values of (mij/ri) in most 
communities.  
 
Profitability constraints 
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 The profitability constraint of a particular fishing unit, j, is the set of abundance 
vectors, N, that result in zero profits for fishers in unit j.  It is defined mathematically by 
setting the right hand side of equation 2b equal to 0 (equivalent to equation (5.4)):  
€ 
e j pi Ni( )mijNi =1i=1
S
∑   (5.S.A.2). 
As can be seen from equation (5.S.A.2), the profitability constraint is determined by both 
the métier (its slope; Figure 5.3c,d) and the efficiency (its position relative to the origin; 
Figure 5.3b) of fishers in fishing unit j.  It is an S – 1 dimensional surface, which is linear 
if prices are constant (Figure 5.3).  If prices increase as abundance decreases (piʹ′(.) < 0), 
but not fast enough to cause profits to increase with decreasing abundance (i.e. 
d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi > 0 for all Ni, i), the profitability constraint is generally convex, as 
illustrated for a 2-stock fishery in Figure 5.S1f, because the decrease in price as 
abundance of a stock increases generally results in diminishing marginal returns to stock 
abundance (i.e. d2[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi2 < 0 for all Ni, i).  This is analogous to the property of 
convex isoquants as a result of diminishing marginal returns to production factors (e.g. 
capital, labour) in microeconomics (see Mas-Colell et al. 1995).  
 If a stock, i, has the property that the revenues it generates increase as its 
abundance decreases (i.e. d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi < 0), then it is likely to be driven extinct 
(Courchamp et al. 2006), and this likelihood can be exacerbated by increasing the 
diversity of métiers. If d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi < 0 at current and all lower abundances, Ni, of 
stock i, then any fishing unit whose current revenues from only stock i are greater than its 
costs can profitably harvest stock i to extinction.  Increasing efficiency or métiers would 
increase the likelihood of sampling such a fishing unit.  If d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi < 0 at current 
abundance of stock i but not abundances lower than a certain abundance (because of price 
saturation, for example), increasing the diversity of efficiency or métiers would increase 
the likelihood of sampling a fishing unit that could drive stock i to this abundance, at 
which point the theory presented in the main text would apply, and equilibrium at infinite 
fleet diversity would satisfy equation (5.5).  Thus, equation (5.5) (equality of 
price*abundance across all extant revenue-generating stocks at equilibrium) is likely to 
be satisfied even if prices can increase faster than abundances decline for some stocks. 
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Appendix B – Importance of influencing relative and total efforts, and the number 
of different métiers being equal to or exceeding the number of stocks, to achieve a 
target set of stock abundances or mortality rates 
Consider the model of an S-stock fishery from the main text, where there are now 
J different fishing units, such that equation (5.2a), describing the population growth of 
species i becomes: 
€ 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni t( ) gi N t( )( ) − mije jE j t( )j=1
J
∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟   (5.S.B.1) 
Suppose there is a desired ‘target’ (denoted T) abundance for every stock, NTi for stock i, 
that is achieved by inflicting instantaneous per-capita fishing mortality rates, FT = 
(FT1,…, FTS) on all stocks.  The per-capita fishing mortality rate of stock i at time t, Fi(t), 
is given by: 
€ 
Fi t( ) = mije jE j t( )j=1
J
∑   (5.S.B.2). 
Because effort in each fishing unit is defined in units of monetary cost, effort in fishing 
unit j, Ej, can be represented as the total cost-budget of the fishery as a whole (total 
effort), denoted E(t) at time t, multiplied by the fraction of this cost-budget allocated to 
fishing unit j (relative effort), denoted bj(t) at time t, where ∑jbj(t) = 1.  With this 
substitution, the fishing mortality rate of stock i is given by: 
€ 
Fi t( ) = E t( ) mije jb j t( )j=1
J
∑   (5.S.B.3). 
In order for the target mortality rates, FT, to be achieved for all stocks, effort must be 
allocated such that,  
FT = E*(Q  b*) (5.S.B.4), 
where Q = {m11e1,…,m1JeJ},…,{mS1e1,…,mSJeJ}}, b* = {b1*,…,bJ*}, and b* and E* 
respectively define relative and total efforts needed to achieve the target.  This equation 
requires Q to have a rank of S or greater to be solved for b*, which requires at least S 
different métiers.  Figure S2 illustrates this graphically in a 3-stock fishery.  When the 
dimensionality of the set of achievable abundance targets (determined by the number of 
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different métiers) is smaller than the number of stocks, it is highly unlikely that a 
particular set of target abundances will be contained in this set (Figure 5.S2a,b vs. c).     
 
Appendix C. Priority effects on the outcome of competition can only occur if fishers 
from different fishing units receive different prices for the same catch.   
 Priority effects occur when two fishing units compete and neither can invade the 
other’s equilibrium, resulting in an outcome of competition determined by which unit 
enters the fishery earlier or can expand faster.  Priority effects are unlikely if all fishers 
face the same prices.  This property is illustrated in Figure 5.S3 in a model of a fishery 
targeting two stocks with logistic growth.  Analogously to priority effects between two 
ecological consumers (see Tilman 1980), priority effects between two fishing units result 
in the existence of an unstable equilibrium, where the profitability constraints of both 
fishing units are satisfied, and additional effort in each fishing unit would shift stock 
abundances away from the equilibrium to levels where it unit made higher profits than 
the other fishing unit (Figure 5.S3).  This implies that for priority effects to exist between 
two competing fishing units, x and y, there must be at least one stock, i, for which mix > 
miy and pimix < pimiy (i.e. more effort in fishing unit x would reduce the abundance of 
stock i relative to others, which would have a greater negative impact on fishing unit y’s 
revenues than its own), or mix < miy and pimix > pimiy (the converse).  This is impossible if 
pi is the same for all fishing units.   
 
Appendix D – Exceptions to common effects of fleet diversification on yield and 
ecological impacts of open-access fisheries, as a result of ecology or technological 
feasibility 
 Provided efficiency is finite, infinitely diverse métiers in a multispecies fishery 
drive stocks’ abundances to a point in the first quadrant where they generate equal 
marginal revenue (equation (5.7)), preventing extinction of weak stocks directly caused 
by the fishery.  This property is illustrated in Figure 4 in a model with no interspecific 
interactions in Figure 5.4, but also holds under many types of interactions.  For example, 
Figure 5.S4a shows the results of a similar stochastic simulation of a fishery targeting 
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two competing stocks, with the same qualitative results as in Figure 5.4b. The procedure 
is the same as in Figure 5.4b, except the population growth of both stocks in the absence 
of fishing is described by a simplified Lotka-Volterra competition model (sensu 
MacArthur and Levins 1967), where 
€ 
gi N t( )( ) =1− Ni t( ) − 0.3N j t( )  (i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j), and 
other parameter values/distributions are: {p1 = 1, p2 = 2, m1j ~ U[0, 1], ej ~ U[2, 12]}. As 
the number of fishing units increased, average yields decreased when efficiency varied, 
and increased when only métiers varied.  The average number of extinctions decreased as 
the number of fishing units increased when métiers varied, and increased when only 
efficiency varied (Figure 5.S4a, right panel).  
 However, some ecosystem structures or restrictions on the range of 
technologically feasible fishing units can cause diversification of métiers to lead to more 
frequent stock collapses.  Ecological specialist stocks that either have obligate prey or 
mutualists also caught or otherwise impacted by the fishery may still be driven extinct.  
Specifically, a stock, i, having long-term persistence that requires an obligate mutualist or 
prey, k, to have at least a minimum population size, Nk,MINi, will be driven extinct at 
infinite fleet diversity if 
€ 
Nk**eMAX < Nk,MINi.  This is illustrated in a stochastic simulation of 
a fishery targeting a predator (Stock 2) and its essential prey (Stock 1) in Figure S4b.  
The procedure was the same as in Figures 5.4b and 5.S4a, except that stocks’ population 
growth in the absence of fishing was now described by: 
€ 
g1 N t( )( ) =1− N1 t( ) − N2 t( ), 
€ 
g2 N t( )( ) =
N1 t( ) − N1,MIN 2( )
1− N1,MIN 2( )
, and other parameter values/distributions are: {p1 = 1, p2 = 
0.5, m1j ~ U[0, 1], ej ~ U[2, 5]}.  In this model, increases in all types of diversification led 
to increases in average likelihood of predator extinction (Figure 5.S4b).  This occurred 
because competition among diverse métiers and efficiency drives the prey’s abundance to 
a level that is below N1,MIN2 (Figure 5.S4b, left panel).  Additionally, all types of fleet 
diversification increased average yields, as the prey’s average yields increased in 
response to reduced predation pressure, which more than compensated for lost predator 
yields (Figure 5.S4b, right panel).  This latter result is somewhat dependent on parameter 
values, but is likely to hold in systems where transfers of biomass up food chains are 
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inefficient, a common property in nature (e.g. Lindeman 1942; Odum 1957; Christensen 
and Pauly 1992).   Thus, diversification of métiers in fisheries impacting multiple trophic 
levels may increase both yields and the likelihood of stock collapses.   
 Diversification of métiers can also increase the likelihood of stock collapses when 
some relative catch rates are not technologically feasible.  Some relative catch rates may 
not be feasible if, for example, two stocks have sufficiently high niche overlap that it 
would be difficult or impossible to design a fishing technology that catches one without 
also catching the other at a certain rate. If relative catch rates that lead stocks to have 
relative depletions satisfying equation (5.5) or (5.7) are not technologically feasible, then 
it is possible for métiers that drive one or more stocks extinct to be favoured by 
competition.  Figure 5.S4c illustrates this point in a stochastic simulation identical to 
Figure 5.S4a, in which métiers for which m1j < 0.55 are now technologically infeasible 
(i.e. m1j ~ U[0.55, 1]).  As a result, the relationships between diversification in yield seen 
in Figure S4a are similar, but now all types of diversification increase the likelihood of 
stock 1’s collapse (Figure 5.S4c).  An analytical example of this is also given below.  
 Suppose 2 stocks, x and y, having logistic growth (
€ 
gi N t( )( ) = ri 1− Ni t( ) Ki( )( )  for 
all i) where rx = 2ry, Kx = Ky = ax = ay = 1, and px = py = p, are exploited in a fishery, and, 
due to technological constraints, mxj ≤ myj for any fishing unit j.  At any efficiency, pxNx* 
= pyNy* would require either a single fishing unit, j, where mxj = 2myj, or 2 fishing units, j 
and k, where mxj > 2myj and mxk < 2myk, or vice versa.  However, this is infeasible because 
mxj ≤ myj for all j.  Thus, pxNx* > pyNy* at all feasible equilibria, implying that 
competition favours fishing units with the largest possible harvest rate of stock x, which 
in this case corresponds to mx = my (i.e. mx = my = 0.5 because mxj + myj = 1 for all j by 
definition).  Thus, if the maximum efficiency is eMAX, infinite fleet diversity would result 
in equilibrium stock sizes, Nx* = (2/3peMAX) + (1/3), Ny* = (4/3peMAX) – (1/3).  Infinite 
fleet diversity results in the extinction of stock y if emax ≥ 4/p.   
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Figure 5.S1. Vulnerability and profitability constraints with different assumptions. Vulnerability (a-e) 
(VC) and profitability constraint (f) (PC) with different ecological and economic assumptions.  In each 
figure, stocks’ zero net growth isoclines (ZNGI) (gi = 0) (blue and green lines) and equilibrium abundances 
(filled circle) in the absence of harvesting are shown.  If one of the stocks is not caught in the fishery (qi = 
0), increasing fishing effort causes equilibrium abundances to move along its ZNGI (gi = 0) towards the 
origin (dashed lines).  If both stocks are caught, increasing fishing effort causes equilibrium abundances to 
move along the vulnerability constraint, which must lie somewhere in the gray shaded region, and whose 
slope is determined by the stocks’ relative catch rates and growth rates.  Specific functional forms on which 
the shapes of ZNGIs are based for different classes of species interactions are given in Appendix A. (f) 
When prices increase as stocks’ abundances decrease, the profitability constraint – the set of stock 
abundances that result in zero profits, separating abundances yielding positive profits (blue shaded region) 
and losses (red shaded region) – is generally convex.  
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Figure 5.S2. Diversity of métiers and achievable abundances in managed fisheries. The relationship 
between the number of métiers and the achievability of a multi-stock abundance target (NTarget, open 
circles) is shown in a 3-stock model.  A hypothetical vulnerability constraint producing the target is also 
shown (dashed purple line). With only 1 métier (a), achievable outcomes are constrained to a single one-
dimensional vulnerability constraint curve (red), which is unlikely to coincide exactly with the desired 
curve (purple) in 3-dimensional space by chance.  Similarly, with 2 métiers (b) it is also unlikely, though 
less unlikely, that the 2-dimensional plane of possible achievable outcomes (shaded region) contains the 
desired outcome.  However, with 3 (c) or more métiers, the chance that the desired outcome is achievable 
becomes sizeable, provided the 3 métiers differ in their relative catch rates. 
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Figure 5.S3. Priority effects require fishing units to face different prices. A 2-stock 2-fishing unit 
model illustrating the reason for which priority effects are only possible if fishers in different fishing units 
face different prices.   Slope equations for the vulnerability constraint (Slope(VC)) and profitability 
constraint (Slope(PC)) are derived respectively from equations (3) and (4), assuming there are 2 stocks, 
each having logistic growth and constant prices, where abundances (Ni, i = 1,2) are normalized as fractions 
of carrying capacity (i.e. K1 = K2 = 1).  Circles indicate equilibrium stock sizes with: only fishing unit 1 
(N*1, red), only fishing unit (N*2, blue), and the unstable co-existence equilibrium (N*1&2, red and blue). 
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Figure 5.S4. Relationships between fleet diversity and yields and ecological impacts in different types 
of open-access fisheries.  These are illustrated in 2-stock fisheries in which (a, c) stocks are competing or 
are (b) predator (Stock 2) and essential prey (Stock 1).  In panel (c), only métiers j with m1j ≥ 0.55 are 
technologically feasible, illustrated by the grey dashed line in (c) (left).  Points at which p1N1* = p2N2* are 
illustrated (black solid lines), as well as all possible intersection points of vulnerability and profitability 
constraints for fishing units with minimum (eMIN) (grey dotted lines) and maximum (eMAX) (black dotted 
lines) feasible technological efficiency are shown in the left-hand panels.  Stocks’ zero net growth isoclines 
(ZNGI) (gi = 0) (blue and green lines) are also shown.  The right-hand panels show the relationships 
between fleet diversity and yield (black) and the average number of extinctions (grey) in stochastic 
simulations of the fisheries illustrated in the corresponding left-hand panels.  Each point represents a 
sample of 1000 models with randomly chosen parameter values.  Vertical lines indicate standard errors. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion: Improving the informational efficiency of 
fisheries science 
 Fisheries science and management are inherently data-limited pursuits.  Fisheries 
exist within complex social-ecological systems, in locations that are particularly difficult 
and expensive to sample.  Conventional approaches to fisheries management have mostly 
relied on fitting single-species assessment models to data to estimate sustainable harvest 
rates and population trends (Hilborn & Ovando 2014). Despite their relative simplicity, 
conventional assessment approaches have been estimated to cost up to 15% of the landed 
value of the stocks assessed (Arnason et al. 2000; Hilborn & Ovando 2014).  Moreover, 
though conventional assessments are becoming more widespread, with large databases 
(FAO 2011; Ricard et al. 2012) including nearly 400 stocks encompassing 35% of the 
world’s catch (Hilborn & Ovando 2014), there are still thousands of unassessed fish 
stocks encompassing a majority of the world’s catch (Costello et al. 2012).  For 
unassessed stocks, a number of data-poor stock assessment approaches (DPSA) have 
emerged that approximate population statuses and threats from life-histories and catch-
histories and how these correlate with the statuses and threats of better-studied species 
(e.g. Caddy 1999, 2002; Cheung et al. 2005; Costello et al. 2012; Le Quesne & Jennings 
2012; Martell & Froese 2013).  At the other end of the spectrum, there have been calls for 
more holistic, ecosystem-based approaches to fisheries management (Pikitch et al. 2004; 
Palumbi et al. 2008), which may require significantly more data and complex models 
than conventional management approaches (Pauly et al. 2000; Christensen & Walters 
2004), and are thus likely even less broadly applicable. 
 Clearly, there is a fundamental tradeoff in fisheries assessment approaches between 
reach and predictive power that is driven by information requirements (Figure 6.1).  
Approaches requiring little information are likely to be widely applicable, but also much 
less reliable for specific fisheries (Costello et al. 2012; Hilborn & Ovando 2014). 
Conversely, approaches that provide the greatest predictive power often require the most 
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input information (e.g. Pauly et al. 2000; Christensen & Walters 2004), making them less 
widely applicable.  Thus, the best assessment approach for any given fishery is sure to be 
dependent on the amount and type of available information, in addition to other factors 
such as budget, location, and management institutions (Hilborn & Ovando 2014).  
However, as with any tradeoff situation, it is important to ensure that efficiency is being 
achieved (e.g. Polasky et al. 2008).  In this case, efficiency means achieving the 
maximum predictive power possible for a given amount of information (Figure 6.1).     
 The studies in this volume highlight two important pathways to improving the 
informational efficiency of fisheries science: theoretical concision, and ecological 
abstraction.  Theoretical concision means striving for parametric simplicity in 
mechanistic models, and rooting models in measurable parameters.  The rationale for 
doing this is analogous to the information theoretic rationale for preferring simpler 
statistical models (Burnham & Anderson 2002). The approaches to predicting extinction 
and overfishing threats presented in Chapter 2 (Burgess et al. 2013) and Chapter 3 focus 
on identifying the threat potential of current fishing practices (gear, relative 
catchabilities) and other biological and socioeconomic conditions (price flexibilities, 
catch elasticities, management).  The modeling framework used in Chapter 3 also 
considers profits and abundances in relative, rather than absolute terms.  These focuses 
and formulations both promote parametric simplicity, reducing the data requirements of 
the approaches without necessarily compromising their predictive power.  Mechanistic 
approaches to assessing extinction and overfishing threats are important because they 
allow conditions conducive to eventual unsustainable harvest rates and population 
declines to be identified before such harvest rates and declines are realized (Burgess et al. 
2013).        
 Ecological abstraction occurs when models of only a subset of species in a larger 
ecosystem are successfully able to predict the dynamics of this subset of species 
(Schaffer 1981).  Understanding when simple models reliably predict sustainable harvest 
rates of fished populations, and other important fishery impacts, within complex 
ecological realities is important in prioritizing data collection efforts and designing 
precautionary management approaches, where necessary. The study presented in Chapter 
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4 provides evidence that single-species assessment models will often provide reliable 
estimates of sustainable harvests of competing populations caught in multispecies 
fisheries, but only over ranges of fishing effort in which all populations in the fishery are 
extant.  At efforts beyond those needed to cause the extinction of the most susceptible 
population to overfishing, estimates of sustainable yields and harvest rates are highly 
unreliable.  In the least susceptible populations, overestimates of sustainable yields and 
harvest rates are particularly likely.  However, because conditions leading to unreliable 
assessments, bounds on the magnitude of sustainable yield and mortality-rate 
overestimates, and management solutions are possible within single-species assessment 
and management frameworks, incorporating competition explicitly into assessments in 
multispecies fisheries may not be necessary.  In contrast, other studies have shown that 
single-species assessments can be unreliable when foraging behaviors are dynamic 
(Abrams 2009c; Tschirhart 2012), and in many predator-prey systems (Abrams 
2009a,b,c).  More complex assessment models may thus be useful in such situations.  
More research is needed to broadly characterize the conditions under which simplistic 
assessment models reliably predict important population and community responses to 
fishing.     
 Previous studies have highlighted two other promising pathways to improving the 
informational efficiency of fisheries science: interpolating or approximating missing data 
using data from similar species or fisheries (e.g. Cheung et al. 2005; Costello et al. 2012; 
Le Quesne & Jennings 2012; Martell & Froese 2013), and making use of recent advances 
in non-linear, non-parametric forecasting methods (e.g. Sugihara & May 1990; Sugihara 
et al. 2012; Deyle et al. 2013).  Non-linear, non-parametric forecasting methods, which 
can be applied with only a single time series (e.g. abundance or CPUE in one population), 
have been used with considerable success in making short-term forecasts in ecology (e.g. 
Sugihara & May 1990; Sugihara 1994) and recently in some fisheries (e.g. Glaser et al. 
2011; Liu et al. 2012; Deyle et al. 2013; but see Glaser et al. 2013). A related approach to 
empirically identifying causal relationships in complex systems has also been developed 
(Sugihara et al. 2012), which could allow for functional relationships between species to 
be identified.  Future approaches to fisheries science and management combining 
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theoretical concision, ecological abstraction, interpolation of missing data using 
information from closely related species or fisheries, and non-linear, non-parametric 
forecasting are likely to be highly successful in the face of data limitations, and highly 
informative in prioritizing future data gathering efforts. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Information-based tradeoff between reach and predictive power in fisheries assessments.  
Assessment approaches face a tradeoff between reach (i.e. how widely applicable they are) and predictive 
power.  Any hypothetical assessment technique requiring no information would theoretically be applicable 
to any population, but would have no predictive power.  More information allows for greater predictive 
power in assessments, but limits the breadth of applicability to species for which the information is 
available.  The maximum predictive power achievable in an assessment with different amounts of 
information defines the efficiency frontier with respect to this tradeoff, represented by a dark-grey line in 
the above figure).  The open circle shows a point on the hypothetical efficiency frontier and the black 
dashed lines illustrate the amount of information corresponding to this point. 
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